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CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE PSEUDO-PLATONIC DIALOGUE <i>ERYXIAS</i>	D. E. EICHHOLZ 129
CORRIGENDUM	A. S. F. GOW 149
NOTES ON HERODOTUS—II	J. E. POWELL 150
SOME NEW READINGS IN EURIPIDES	C. H. ROBERTS 164
ÆSCHYLUS, <i>AGAMEMNON</i> 1148	A. Y. CAMPBELL 168
NOTES ON THREE PASSAGES FROM THE <i>NICOMACHEAN ETHICS</i> , BOOK VIII	
	GEOFFREY PERCIVAL 171
ARTHIUS OF ZELEIA	M. CARY 177
THE COMIC FRAGMENTS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE STRUCTURE OF OLD	
ATTIC COMEDY	M. WHITTAKER 181
THE ORIGINS AND METHODS OF ARISTOTLE'S <i>POETICS</i>	F. SOLMSEN 192
SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS: LITERATURE AND GENERAL	202
LANGUAGE	215
INDICES	217

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
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BASIL BLACKWELL



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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JULY-OCTOBER, 1935.

THE PSEUDO-PLATONIC DIALOGUE *ERYXIAS*

I

THE purpose of this essay is to elucidate certain difficulties in the text of the *Eryxias* and to make the author's position as a thinker clearer than it has hitherto been. The *Eryxias* is a work which has suffered severely from excessive partisanship. While German and Dutch scholars of the eighteenth century appear to have valued it highly—a great deal too highly—as a work of enlightened ethical purpose,¹ the scholarship of the nineteenth century was almost unanimous in condemning it as an inept imitation of Plato's early writings.² It soon became apparent, however, that it was not a mere imitation. The economist Hagen³ recognized in it traces of Stoic doctrine and proceeded somewhat hastily to the conclusion that the author was 'a Stoic . . . who expressed the sentiments of his school in the form of a Platonic dialogue.'⁴ Otto Schrohl of Göttingen, whose thesis⁵ is the most considerable work on the subject, is less emphatic in claiming the author as a Stoic, but nevertheless traces most of his ideas to Stoic and Cynic origins. This view is modified but retained in its essentials by Professor Souilhé in the Budé edition of Plato.⁶ While stressing the importance of the Platonic element, he agrees that the author's point of view has been influenced by Stoic and Cynic teaching, the influence of Cynicism being in his opinion predominant.⁷

These writers, then, are of the opinion that the author had at least a sympathetic interest in Cynicism and Stoicism. This view, however, is tenable only if we are prepared to assume that every conclusion reached in the course of the dialogue expresses the author's own convictions, and is intended to be accepted as such by the reader. It cannot be denied that there is considerable excuse for making this assumption, for the author often makes no visible distinction between those conclusions which he accepts as his own opinion and those which may merely be intended to expose the inconsistencies inherent in the opinions of other thinkers. Moreover a distinction of this sort is not always easy for the reader to discover for himself, since the author not only fails at several critical points of the dialogue to make clear the connection between one argument and another, but on more than one occasion forgets to state what conclusion a given argument is meant to establish. Nevertheless it is reasonable to start at least by assuming that this distinction is intended. For if every conclusion in the dialogue is accepted at its face value, the dialogue appears to be nothing but a tissue of inconsistencies. This indeed is what it is in the opinion of Professor Souilhé, who regards the author as an eclectic who has not succeeded in making a satisfactory synthesis of his material.⁸ Similarly Dr. Schrohl,

¹ At least seven editions of the pseudo-Platonic *Περὶ Ἀπέρῃς*, *Axiochus* and *Eryxias* appeared between 1711 and 1788.

² Hermann, *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, pp. 416-417 (Heidelberg, 1839), is an exception.

³ *Observationum oeconomico-politicarum in Aeschini dialogum, qui Eryxias inscribitur*, partes II (Königsberg, 1822). This work was not accessible to me.

⁴ Quoted by Dr. Schrohl in his thesis on the *Eryxias* (p. 7). See below.

⁵ *De Eryxia, qui fertur Platonis* (Göttingen, 1901).

⁶ Vol. XIII, part 3 (*Dialogues Apocryphes*).

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 86. Professor Paul Shorey in his account of the *Eryxias* (*What Plato said*, pp. 433-436) appears to me to suggest a similar point of view when he says of the final argument 'Its conclusion may seem to point to the Stoic interpretation of the Gorgias'. He does not work out this idea.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

whose exposition of the argument is in general extremely inaccurate, has nevertheless noticed at least one apparent discrepancy. This, however, he attributes to carelessness on the part of the author.¹ Consequently the exposition of the dialogue² which follows is based on the assumption that not all the conclusions reached in the course of the dialogue are intended to be accepted as true. It will be found possible on closer examination to distinguish those portions of the dialogue where the author is attempting to establish his own views from those in which he may be attacking the views of his opponents. When examined from this point of view, the inconsistencies noticed by Professor Souilhé and Dr. Schroll vanish.³ It will also be found that there is no reason for thinking that the author had any sympathy with Stoicism.⁴

II

Introduction (392A-393A).—The scene of the conversation is the portico of Zeus Eleutherios⁵ and the dramatic date falls between the years 427 and 415.⁶ The conversation is described by Socrates to a friend or friends not mentioned by name. While walking in the portico with a young companion, Eryxias, he had met Critias and Erasistratus, Erasistratus having lately returned from Sicily.⁷ Socrates asked him for news of the situation there, and was told that the Syracusans had been dangerously provoked by various minor acts of aggression on the part of the Athenians and would have to be crushed by 'a great expedition'. Ambassadors had been despatched from Syracuse to Athens, and were then in the city. At that moment the Syracusan ambassadors passed by. Erasistratus pointed to one of them as the wealthiest man in Sicily and Italy. And according to Erasistratus he was not merely the wealthiest man: he was also the most vicious.

393BI-395AI: *First argument*.—Socrates feels impelled by Erasistratus' remark to enquire into the relationship of riches and virtue. An argument with Erasistratus ensues, leading to the conclusion that the *wisest man is the richest*. [If this is the case, Erasistratus' description of the Syracusan is presumably inaccurate.] The argument proceeds as follows:

(1) Of any two men, that man is considered the richer who possesses the more valuable property. This is true whether their property is of the same or of different kinds: that man is the richer who possesses the more valuable object. Consequently the richest of all is the man who possesses the most valuable object, whatever it may be (393BI-393C4).

(2) Now good health is more valuable than material riches in combination with sickness. Indeed in daily life anyone, if he were given the choice, would prefer good health and a pittance to ill-health and a fortune. It follows that if any man possesses

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 15-16 and 18-19.

² I have felt it necessary to work out this exposition in some detail, since previous attempts to summarize the argument appear to me to be misleading.

³ I do not, however, wish to maintain that the dialogue is free from logical weaknesses. There is a particularly serious one (which will be discussed later) at 402AI-4.

⁴ Professor A. E. Taylor (*Plato, the Man and his Work*, third edition, pp. 548-550) points out that the dialogue is to some extent a polemic against Stoicism. His conclusion, however, appears to be based purely on the first argument of the dialogue, in which, as we shall see, there is little ground for recognizing any such polemic. Moreover, he appears to follow other writers in assuming that the whole of the last part of the dialogue represents the author's own point of view.

⁵ The portico of Zeus Eleutherios is the scene of the pseudo-Platonic *Theages* and also of

Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. It is possible that the author was influenced in his choice of a setting by the *Oeconomicus*. Certain other details in the dialogue appear to show the influence of this work. See Souilhé, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁶ The earlier date is fixed by the reference to certain minor acts of aggression, the earliest of which, the cruise of Laches and Charoeades, took place in 427. The latter is indicated by the covert reference to a 'great expedition'. Presumably the Sicilian expedition of 415-414 is hinted at.

⁷ The author, as Dr. Schroll has observed, appears to have imitated Charmides in the grouping of his characters. In both Socrates takes the chief part and Critias the second. Erasistratus corresponds to Chaerephon, each taking only a minor part in the discussion, while the characters who give their names to the dialogues fill an intermediate position.

something which is more valuable than good health, he will be the richest man of the three: for this thing will be the most valuable thing of the three (393c4-393d3).

(3) Does such a thing exist? Socrates suggests that it is 'that thing the possession of which enables a man to take the best measures for the success of his own affairs and those of his friends', Erasistratus that it is 'happiness'. These two suggestions, however, are not incompatible. Happy people are those who 'do well', and the people who do well are those who achieve the greatest number of successes at the cost of the fewest failures. (Or, as he has previously said, who are able to take the best possible measures for the success of their own affairs and those of their friends.) What enables them to do this? The knowledge of what is good and bad, and of what to do and avoid [and this knowledge is wisdom]. Consequently it is the wisest man who is the happiest, that is, who possesses what is most valuable, that is, who is richest (393d3-394a5).

(4) This conclusion is attacked by Eryxias on the ground that the possession of wisdom is compatible with complete destitution. Consequently wisdom cannot be the thing that is most worth possessing, nor can the wisest man be the richest.

Socrates' reply is that just as material wealth is compatible with complete destitution and yet is valued highly, so too wisdom may be compatible with complete destitution and yet be regarded as the most valuable of all things.

If the further objection is raised that wisdom cannot be the most valuable thing because, unlike material wealth, it cannot be readily exchanged for the necessities of life, this must be attributed not to the inherent worthlessness of wisdom itself, but to the failure on the part of human society to see that it is the most choiceworthy of all possessions (394a5-395a1).

The proposition that the wisest man is also the richest which is established and defended in this chapter is similar to the Stoic paradox *μόνος ὁ σοφός πλούσιος*. Both Professor Souilhé and Professor Taylor have drawn attention to this similarity and have probably been quite right in so doing. For if, as there is every reason to believe, the dialogue was written after the rise of Stoicism, it is almost certain that we have here a deliberate reference to the paradox. His readers at least would naturally interpret it as such. It is not equally certain, however, what the reference is meant to convey. Is the author's attitude to the paradox one of approval or of opposition? Professor Souilhé expresses himself with great caution, merely remarking on the similarity. But elsewhere he assumes that the author has partly derived his opinions from Stoic sources. Consequently we are entitled to interpret his silence as implying that the author approved of the paradox. This view is not easy to accept. In the first place, if the author is supporting the Stoic paradox, it is difficult to understand why he should choose to establish it in a form in which it is deprived almost entirely of its paradoxical character. According to his argument, the wise man is merely the richest man, not the *only* rich man: a man may still be rich even if he merely has a great deal of property or a great deal of money (cf. 393b). Moreover, the argument is based not on the Stoic scheme of values, but on the more conventional scheme which we often find implied or expressed by Plato and Aristotle. Wisdom occupies the highest place, but health is placed above wealth, whereas according to the Stoics both belong to the 'promoted' class of indifferent objects.¹ (Allowance, of course, must be made for the possibility that the author is arguing *ad hominem*. The present objection, however, taken in conjunction with the first, appears to carry some weight.)

Professor Taylor, while agreeing with Professor Souilhé that there is a clear allusion to the Stoic paradox, differs from him in thinking that the author wishes to dissociate himself from it. 'This is the thesis', Professor Taylor writes, 'which Eryxias treats as idle playing with words and Socrates "side tracks" in order to discuss the more than verbal question whether riches are good or bad'.² This description does not seem to me to be quite fair. It is true that Eryxias accuses Socrates of playing with

¹ Diogenes Laertius VII, 102.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 550.

words, but it should be added that Socrates scornfully repudiates the accusation. Moreover, as we have seen, Socrates not merely establishes the proposition that the richest man is the wisest, but also defends it with some show of feeling when Eryxias attempts to refute it. Finally it is Eryxias who suggests that they should discuss the more practical question whether riches are good or bad, and not Socrates, who, it is reasonable to assume, is intended to represent the standpoint of the author himself. Consequently, although the author makes Socrates fall in with the suggestion, it is difficult to believe that he does so because he considers the previous argument unsound. It is more natural to suppose that he regards the argument as sound in itself, but unlikely, if continued, to throw any light on the value of 'riches' in the ordinary sense of the term (i.e., material wealth), inasmuch as it is based on the unusual conception of wealth (developed inductively in 393B-C) as 'that which is of value'. This conception is presumably worthy of examination and leads, as we have seen, to an interesting conclusion, but must not be regarded as an excuse for shirking the more practical issues raised by Eryxias.

Thus there does not appear to be adequate reason for supposing either with Professor Souilhé that the author in this passage is expressly supporting Stoic doctrine or with Professor Taylor that he is expressly showing his disapproval of it. The truth may therefore lie in between. The author has perhaps wished to show that however remarkable the paradox may appear to be, propositions less sensational but nevertheless similar are consistent with Socratic and Platonic teaching, and are therefore acceptable to any reasonable person.

395A1-395C5: *Transition to second argument.*—Eryxias' objection is formerly disposed of. Yet, he replies, if wisdom is the most valuable of all things, Socrates will have to say that he is richer than Callias, and this he will never be able to do.

Socrates thereupon suggests that Eryxias is accusing him of insincere levity in bringing forward an argument which is fallacious, although logically unanswerable; just as if he were one of those people [the Eristics presumably] who are capable of composing a fallacious, although logically unanswerable, proof that 'Socrates' begins with an 'A', and not with an 'S'.

395C5-397B7: *Second argument.*—Eryxias still maintains that the conclusion of the foregoing argument is untenable. Moreover, the enquiry is of no practical use. What is really important is to estimate (1) what means of attaining wealth are or are not justifiable, (2) whether riches (in the ordinary sense of the term) are good or bad (395C5-395E1).

The second is the question which is now taken up. Eryxias and Critias are the chief participants. It is immediately evident that they are in fundamental disagreement, but the development of the argument is for a while interrupted by a digression in which Socrates stresses the importance of attempting to reach an agreement on the question under discussion, and announces his intention of co-operating to the utmost in the attempt (395E1-396E3).

The argument is continued. Eryxias had maintained at the beginning of the argument (395E) that riches are good; and Critias had denied this on the ground that what appears to be harmful for some people cannot be good. Critias has now to show that riches can be harmful. His argument runs as follows:

(1) It is admitted that adultery, gluttony and drunkenness are all bad things, adultery because it is a criminal offence, gluttony and drunkenness because they wreck the health of the body.

(2) There exist, moreover, people whose instincts predispose them to such practices.

(3) But they will not be able to indulge in them unless they possess a certain amount of wealth.

(4) It follows that if wealth will enable them to give rein to impulses which will work them harm, to these people at least it must be harmful (396E3-397B7).

[If, therefore, Critias' original assumption, that a thing which is harmful to some

people cannot be good, is true, it follows that riches, which are harmful to some people, cannot be good].¹

This argument, as Dr. Schrohl (pp. 37-38) and Professor Souilhé (p. 84) have observed, is probably derived from Plato, who makes use of similar material and language in the *Euthydemus*, 281B. Dr. Schrohl compares Critias' assumption that a thing which is harmful to some people cannot be good with certain Stoic doctrines,² and maintains that there is a deliberate allusion to Stoicism here. This question, however, can hardly be discussed until the part played by Critias in the later portions of the dialogue has been considered.

397B7-399A5: *Digression*.—Eryxias is exasperated by Critias' success in proving that riches are not good. In order to soothe him, Socrates recounts an unfortunate experience which had some time previously befallen Prodicus of Ceos when he was defending the proposition so successfully upheld by Critias.³

The altercation described in this digression has no direct bearing on the main discussion and is therefore omitted from this summary.

399A5-C5: *Transition to main discussion*.—Socrates alleges that the object of the digression has been to show how differently two people can fare in attempting to establish the same proposition. Where Prodicus had failed miserably, Critias had gained a brilliant success. He suggests ironically that an audience looks to the merits of the reasoner rather than to those of the reasoning. [This remark appears to imply that the present argument is not sound and that, for all his skill, Critias may ultimately meet with the fate of Prodicus.⁴] Socrates, at any rate, withholds his assent from the view upheld by Prodicus and Critias, namely that to be rich is good for the good man and bad for the bad,⁵ and presses for a further enquiry.

399D1-end: *Main discussion*.—Critias has contended that to be rich is good for some people and bad for others. Socrates asks if the meaning of this proposition is quite clear. What is the meaning of 'being rich'? If we define it with Eryxias as 'possessing much wealth', is even that clear? 'What is 'wealth' (χρήματα)? It seems to vary with the country one lives in. No form of money is valid everywhere, nor is any given thing that money can buy equally desirable everywhere. Indeed, no single thing is, everywhere and for everyone, wealth.

What is the common quality of the various things that constitute wealth for particular people and in particular places? One thing only, utility. Anything which is to rank as wealth (χρήματα) must be directly or, in the form of currency, indirectly useful (χρήσιμα) (399D1-400E12).

Thus anything which is to rank as wealth must possess utility. But not all useful things are wealth; so that a thing which is to rank as wealth must possess not merely utility, but utility of a certain kind. Only those things will rank as wealth which are useful for a certain purpose. If so, for what purpose?

¹ I have occasionally inserted in this summary statements in brackets which are extraneous to the original text. They occur at points where the author has failed either to make clear certain implications or to emphasize the connection between one section and another.

² He quotes Diog. Laert. VII, 103: *ἐν τῇ φασιν ὅτι ἐστὶν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν· πλούτῳ δὲ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ ἐστὶν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος καὶ ὑγιής.*

³ I have added an appendix on this passage.

⁴ This suggestion was made by Hermann (*Platonische Philosophie*, footnote to p. 578). He does not, however, explain where and how the refutation takes place.

⁵ Actually the proposition established by Critias is not this, but a slightly different one,

namely that to be rich cannot be good since for some people it is harmful. The present proposition is mentioned for the first time after the conclusion of Critias' argument and is described as having been upheld by Prodicus (397E4-5). If it is to be attributed to Critias, it should be either identical with or obviously implicit in Critias' proposition, whereas it is verbally, at least, inconsistent with it. The author, however, appears to regard the two propositions as identical. Prodicus' proposition when it is first mentioned at 397E is alleged to have been put forward by Critias also. (Or else it is alleged that he would have put it forward in similar circumstances. *ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ νῦν δὲ* would support either interpretation.) The author is clearly guilty of a logical error here.

We may discover this in the following manner:

(1) If we wish to find out the purpose for which anything, e.g. medicine, is useful, we can do so by considering what change in the conditions of human life would make it unnecessary. The elimination of disease would make medicine unnecessary; consequently we may assume that this is the purpose for which medicine is useful.

(2) Similarly the elimination of the need of the body for such things as nourishment, warmth and coolness would render unnecessary all the things which are usually recognized to be wealth; not merely those commodities, such as food, drink, clothing and shelter, which minister *directly* to the various needs of the body, but those also, such as money and its equivalents, through which we may procure the first class of commodities and which therefore minister *indirectly* to these needs. Consequently anything which is to rank as wealth must be useful for this purpose, the satisfaction of the various needs of the body (401A1-E12).

It is clear then that things which are useful for satisfying the various needs of the body are wealth. But is the meaning of the term 'useful' clear? It is agreed that a thing cannot be useful for a given purpose on one occasion and useless for it on another. And not merely this; it cannot be useful for a given purpose unless it is *indispensable* for it on all occasions (εἴ τι δεοίμεθα τούτου) (402A2).¹

Hence it may happen that some things which have hitherto appeared entitled to rank as wealth are not useful (in the sense demanded) for satisfying the needs of the body, and are therefore not wealth.

¹ This passage is difficult to interpret, and also appears to be logically unsound. Consequently some comment seems called for. The passage runs as follows:

SOCRATES: Πότερον ἂν φήσαιμεν οἷον τε εἶναι ταῦτον πρῶγμα πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐργασίαν τότε μὲν χρησίμων εἶναι τότε δὲ ἀχρεῖον; (402A1-2.)

ERYXIAS: Οὐκ ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δεοίμεθα τούτου πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐργασίαν, καὶ χρησίμων μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. (402A3-4.)

The discussion is concerned with wealth *in general* and the satisfaction of bodily needs *in general*. With this reservation, we may interpret Socrates' question as follows:

'Should we admit it to be possible that <a specimen of> a given class of things should be useful for <the achievement of one instance of> a given class of purposes on one occasion <when it is our wish to attain such a purpose> and yet that <a specimen of> the same class of things should not be useful for <the achievement of another instance of> the same class of purposes on another similar occasion?'

In other words, to use the example employed at 402A6, can fire be useful on one occasion for casting a bronze statue, and yet not be useful, on some other occasion, for so casting another?

Eryxias answers: 'No. A thing <of the class A> is useful for a purpose <of the class B> if, and only if, that purpose can never be attained except by means of that thing <A>.'

That is, fire cannot be called useful for casting a bronze statue unless it is true that no bronze statue can ever be cast without the aid of fire.

It will be noticed that Eryxias' reply is not a mere restatement of Socrates' question. The question might imply no more than that a thing

A is useful for a purpose B, because the purpose B can always be attained *better* (e.g. more agreeably, more economically, more effectively) with the help of A than without it. So far, the meaning attached to *χρησίμως* may be merely the meaning attached to it in ordinary usage. But Eryxias' answer gives the term a far narrower connotation. It implies that a thing A is useful for a purpose B because the purpose B must always be attained with the help of A, and can never be attained without it. The term is applied to a thing which *must* be used for a given purpose, and not, as usually, to a thing which can be *conveniently* used for that purpose. No attempt is made to justify this identification of the 'useful' with the 'indispensable'. It remains an unproved hypothesis, presumably because the author has no proof to offer, and is a fatal flaw in the whole of the final argument of the dialogue.

It may be noticed that this conception of the term 'useful' is already implicit in the previous stage of the discussion (401D-E). The method adopted here by Socrates for defining the purpose for which a given thing is *useful* is none other than the method which the ordinary man would use for defining the purpose for which it is *indispensable*. Eryxias is asked to consider what thing it is the removal of which will enable all that is usually regarded as wealth *to be dispensed with*; since the procuring of this thing will be the purpose for which anything which is to rank as wealth will *be useful*. This thing, whatever it is, must be something which without the help of wealth cannot be procured at *all*, not merely something which can be procured *better* with its help than without it.

[It is not suggested that this can be true of things, such as food, clothes, etc., which minister directly to the needs of the body. These indeed must be *indispensable* for this purpose (cf. *τάβαραία* 402E6) and so must be useful for it.]

On the other hand, money and its equivalents, which minister only indirectly to the needs of the body, may prove under some circumstances to be unnecessary for this purpose. That is, they may be *useless* for this purpose, and so may not be wealth. [This will later prove to be the case.] (402A1-D2.)

Socrates, however, turns aside in order to apply the results of the previous analysis to the propositions put forward in the first part of the dialogue.

(1) It is applied first to the view upheld at the beginning by Socrates, that the wisest man is the richest. This view will no longer appear so paradoxical. For according to the previous definition, money can exist as wealth only in so far as it is useful for satisfying the needs of the body. And if it is useful for this purpose at all, it is useful because it is a means of procuring commodities, such as food and drink, which minister directly to this end. But the various forms of knowledge may be equally a means of procuring these commodities. Teachers actually employ them in this way. Consequently if we maintain that money is wealth, we must admit that the various forms of knowledge can rank as wealth also (402D2-403A1).

(2) On the other hand, Critias cannot have been right in maintaining that to be rich is good for the good man and bad for the bad man. For according to his view only the good man knows how to use money and the other things which are usually regarded as wealth.¹ That is, it is only for the good man that such things are useful; that is, it is only for the good man that they exist as wealth. [Consequently it is ridiculous for Critias to maintain that to be rich (in his sense of the term) is good for the good man and bad for the bad man, since it is not possible according to this view for the bad man to be rich at all.] (403A1-403B9.)

[Moreover, Critias ought to admit that the knowledge which he attributes to the good man is *itself* a form of wealth.] A man who enters into possession of a comparatively commonplace form of knowledge, such as horsemanship, must according to the argument above (par. 1) become richer for possessing it. [This, however, must according to Critias be all the more true of the man who enters into possession of goodness, since this carries with it the knowledge which makes money useful, and so turns it into wealth.²]

Critias naturally protests against this polemic (403B9-403D1).

¹ Prodicus' proposition (397E4-7), which, as we have seen, is attributed rightly or wrongly to Critias, runs in full as follows: '[To be rich] is good for good men *who know how wealth should be employed*, and bad for the vicious who do not know.'

² The implications of this paragraph (403B9-C6) are more than usually obscure, and my interpretation is in consequence conjectural. The passage translated runs as follows: 'But to proceed (*ἀλλά*) it appears that even a man who, owing to his ignorance of horsemanship, is the possessor of horses which are useless to him will, if anyone teaches him horsemanship, have been made richer at the same time, if property which was useless to him before has thereby been made useful to him. For his instructor, by imparting to him a form of knowledge, will have made him rich at the same time'. This is followed directly by the suggestion that Critias will disagree with the preceding conclusions, whereupon Critias does in fact protest.

A possible clue to an interpretation is suggested by the opening phrase (*καὶ τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα*

ἵππικῆς, 'Even the man who . . .'), which implies that what is true of the man who becomes *ἵππικός* will be even more obviously true of some other person. Since the example of the *ἵππικός* is used above (403B) to illustrate something which is true of the *καλὸς κάγαθός*, this person will presumably be the *καλὸς κάγαθός*. If, therefore, we substitute *καλοκάγαθίας* for *ἵππικῆς*, *ἀργύριον* for *ἵππους* and *καλὸν κάγαθόν* for *ἵππικόν*, the following extension of the argument will result:

(1) If horses become useful to a man who becomes *ἵππικός*, it is clear that in becoming *ἵππικός* he has acquired a fresh form of knowledge and therefore a fresh form of wealth (403B9-C6).

(2) But if the knowledge which a man acquires in becoming *ἵππικός* is a form of wealth, still more so is the knowledge which a man acquires in becoming *καλὸς κάγαθός* a form of wealth, since this form of knowledge, by making money useful for him, actually makes it wealth for him also.

NOTE ON PAR. 403B.

Professor Souilhé accuses the author of inconsistency in this passage in that he appears to make Critias disown a proposition which he has previously defended.¹ The proposition is the one attributed to him at 397E4-7 and referred to by Socrates above at 403B3-5, according to which it is the good man alone who knows how to make use of money and the other recognized forms of wealth. But there is nothing to show that this is the proposition which he refuses to accept. What he *does* refuse to accept is almost certainly the conclusion which results when Socrates applies his own definition of wealth to the proposition in question. Socrates having succeeded in defining wealth as 'that which is *useful* for satisfying the needs of the body', it will follow from Critias' assumption that it is only for the good man that money and its equivalents exist as *wealth* (since according to that assumption it is only for the good man that money is *useful*). The new proposition, that money and its equivalents exist as wealth only for the good man, is plainly inconsistent with Critias' original proposition, as has been shown in the summary. (According to his proposition to be rich is bad for the bad man, whereas according to the new proposition it is not possible for him to be rich, at least in the accepted sense of the term, at all.) Consequently Socrates has succeeded with the help of his definition of wealth in reducing Critias' proposition to a form in which it is no longer acceptable to him, and his inability to maintain it in its original form not unnaturally distresses him. This presumably is the refutation of Critias' view which in Hermann's opinion is hinted at earlier in the dialogue.²

399DI-END: *Main discussion (continued)* :

The main thread of the discussion is now taken up at the point where it was left in par. 402D. Critias challenges Socrates to prove what he has already hinted at, namely that money and its equivalents [which contribute only indirectly to the satisfaction of bodily needs] are not wealth.

Before proceeding to do this it is necessary to distinguish clearly the two classes of objects which appear to be useful for a given purpose. These are :

(1) Things which contribute directly to a given purpose and are an effective means to its attainment, e.g., in building a house, the building materials and building tools [or, in satisfying the needs of the body, food, drink, clothing, etc.].

(2) Things which contribute indirectly to a given purpose and are merely a pre-condition of its attainment, e.g., in building a house, the tools by means of which the materials are prepared and the building tools manufactured, and the tools by means of which these tools are manufactured, and so on [or, in satisfying the needs of the body, money and its equivalents].³

The constituents of the second class are :

(a) Infinite in number ; and they may be infinitely remote in the chain of causation from the end to which they contribute.

(b) They are all entitled *equally* to be regarded as *useful* for the end in question. [E.g. if we once admit that the pickaxe used for quarrying stone is useful for building a house, then we must also admit that the bellows (which fed the fire which smelted the metal of which the pickaxe is made) are also useful for building the house.] (403DI-404A4.)

We now proceed to the final stage of the proof :

(1) If the food, drink, clothing, etc., which minister directly to the needs of the body, are already present in sufficient measure, then neither money nor any equivalent of money will be required for procuring them.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 83. Dr. Schrohl finds a similar difficulty (p. 18).

² See footnote to par. 395A5-C5.

³ This distinction as applied to food, etc., on

the one hand and money and its equivalents on the other is already hinted at in par. 401D6-E2, and again in par. 402B3-C1.

(2) That is, money and its equivalents, which minister only indirectly to the needs of the body, will not be indispensable on this occasion for the purpose in question.

(3) That is, money and its equivalents will not be *useful* on this occasion for the purpose in question (see 402A3-4).

(4) But since it was agreed that a thing cannot be useful on one occasion for a given purpose and useless for it on another (see 402A1-2), it follows that money and its equivalents cannot be *useful* at all for satisfying the needs of the body, and therefore cannot be a form of wealth.

[The same objection can be brought against anything which is merely a precondition of a given end, and is therefore tantamount to an assertion that things of this class cannot be useful for attaining a given end.]

Critias meets this argument with an obvious rejoinder. The principle that a thing cannot be useful for a given purpose on one occasion and useless for it on another will entitle him equally to maintain that since money and its equivalents are useful for satisfying the needs of the body on some occasions, they can never be anything but useful, and so must be a form of wealth.

[The same statement can be made of anything which is a precondition of a given end, and is therefore tantamount to an assertion that things of this class are necessarily useful for attaining a given end.] (404A4-C2.)

Socrates, however, forces him to renounce this view by means of the following chain-argument:

(1) Critias must admit that the sense of hearing is useful for the attainment of virtue, for virtue is imparted by oral instruction.

(2) But since the skill of the physician can cure deafness, the skill of the physician will on occasion be a precondition of the attainment of virtue and will therefore, according to his view, be *useful* for the attainment of virtue.

(3) Now the skill of the physician may be secured by wealth, and wealth in its turn by vicious acts. Consequently vicious acts may on occasion be a precondition of the attainment of virtue, and thus, according to Critias, useful for this purpose. [It was shown previously (403D9-404A4) that all things which are preconditions of a given end, however remote in the chain of causation they may be, are equally entitled to be regarded as useful for it or the reverse. If one of them is useful, all are useful.]

(4) But since it is by means of virtue that virtuous acts are performed, vicious acts will, if they are useful for the attainment of virtue, be equally useful for the performance of good acts.

But this Critias has already agreed to be impossible (404C4).

(5) [If, however, vicious acts are not useful for the performance of good acts, in spite of the fact that they are a precondition of their performance,] it will follow that things of this class are not necessarily *useful* for the purpose to which they contribute.

(6) This conclusion is corroborated by the following consideration:

If everything which is a precondition of a given end is necessarily useful for that end, then we shall be forced to admit that sickness will be useful for the attainment of health, ignorance for the attainment of knowledge, vice for the attainment of virtue, for all these things are in a sense preconditions of the attainment of their opposites. This, however, is absurd.

(7) Consequently Critias will no longer be able to maintain that things which are a precondition of a given end are necessarily useful for that end. [And yet the maintenance of this view is essential if he is to maintain that money and its equivalents are wealth (see above). Thus his attempt to resist the opposite conclusion (that money and its equivalents are *not* wealth) falls to the ground.] (404C2-405B7.)

NOTE ON 404C4.

Socrates here asks Critias if a bad action can be useful for the performance of a good one; and Critias replies that it cannot.

(SOCRATES: 'Ἀρ' οὖν οἷόν τε μοχθηρόν τι πρᾶγμα πρὸς ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐργασίαν χρήσιμον εἶναι;

CRITIAS: Οὐκ ἔμοιγε φαίνεται.)

Both Professor Souilhé and Dr. Schrohl compare this statement with the Stoic doctrine that evil cannot be productive of good,¹ and base their view that the author was a supporter of Stoicism upon it. The statement, if carefully examined in its context, does not appear to me to support this conclusion. If it occurred in a passage where Socrates was engaged in establishing a positive conclusion of his own, we should have to infer that the author himself accepted the doctrine as true; and there would be strong grounds for regarding him as a Stoic. The passage in which it occurs is not of this kind. Socrates is engaged at this point not in developing his own views about wealth, but in parrying an attempt on Critias' part to refute them. His method of doing this is to show that the view which Critias upholds in opposition to his own (i.e. that money is wealth) is logically inconsistent with the doctrine (also admitted by Critias to be true) that a bad action cannot be useful for the performance of a good one. To be consistent, he must give up one or the other, and it is implied that he will give up the former. The doctrine is merely introduced as part of a device for crushing Critias beneath the upper and the nether millstone. Consequently it does not follow that if the doctrine is accepted here by Critias, we are to assume that it is accepted by the author in the person of Socrates. If the doctrine as expressed has any reference to the Stoic doctrine, it indicates not that the author is in sympathy with Stoicism, but that Critias is intended to represent the Stoic standpoint to which he himself is opposed.

399DI-END: *Main discussion (concluded)*:

[The view that money and its equivalents, which minister only indirectly to the needs of the body, are a form of wealth has proved on examination to be untenable. The only things which do rank as wealth are presumably those things, such as food, drink, clothing, etc., which minister directly to such needs. What opinion are we to have of these?]

(1) Critias agrees that to have violent and numerous needs is symptomatic of a state of sickness; just as to have few and moderate needs is symptomatic of a state of health. A man addicted to gluttony or to any of the other baser passions is in a worse state than a man who is not; and the more violent and numerous his needs, the worse will his state be.

(2) Now things exist as wealth only when they are useful, that is (according to the conception adopted in the dialogue) when they are indispensable, for satisfying the needs of the body.

(3) But it is the man with the most violent and numerous needs to whom the greatest amount of resources will be indispensable for this purpose.

(4) That is, the greatest amount of resources will be *useful* to him for this purpose.

(5) Consequently the greatest amount of resources will exist as *wealth* for him.

(6) But it has been agreed that the man with the greatest and most numerous needs is the most unhappy man.

(7) Hence the richest man is the most unhappy man. [Therefore to be rich (τὸ πλουτεῖν), i.e. to possess much wealth (πολλὰ χρήματα²), must be bad.] (405B7-end.)

The dialogue ends with the conclusion that the richest man is also the most unhappy, and at first sight it appears to be merely the last of a number of con-

¹ See Seneca, *Ep.* 87, 22: 'Bonum ex malo non fit', and Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristot. Top. Comment.* Ed. M. Wallies, p. 201, lines 19-32: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, κτλ. Here he attacks the doctrine from

a Peripatetic standpoint.

² This is the definition adopted as far back as par. 399g. It has not been superseded but merely elucidated by the subsequent discussion about the nature of χρήματα.

clusions most of which are mutually incompatible. This apparent incompatibility has been chiefly responsible for producing the unfavourable impression which Professor Souilhé and others have formed of the dialogue. On closer examination it turns out to be largely illusory. The conclusions taken in order are as follows:

- (1) The richest man is the happiest (and therefore) the wisest man (394A3-5).
- (2) To be rich is good for the good man and bad for the bad man (397E4-7).
- (3) It is only for the good man that money and the other recognized forms of wealth exist as wealth (403B9).
- (4) The richest man is also the most unhappy (the final conclusion).

(1) and (2) may be disposed of without difficulty. (1), as I have indicated in my note on the passage, is based on the conception of wealth as 'that which is of value,' a conception which is not made use of in any subsequent section of the dialogue. (2) is established, or assumed to have been established, by Critias. It does not appear to meet with the approval of Socrates himself (399D), and it is only natural that it should be superseded when the nature of wealth has been more closely examined. (3) is more difficult to account for, since it occurs when the inquiry into the nature of wealth has already progressed some distance. Moreover, there is nothing in the text itself to show whether it is to be regarded as a statement of the author's own opinion or not. Two at least, however, of the assumptions on which it is based are suspicious:

(a) It rests on the assumption that money may be a form of wealth, whereas the author later proves to his own satisfaction that it is not.

(b) It rests also on the assumption that only the good man knows how to use money. This is never asserted or admitted by Socrates himself, and is in fact derived, as we have already observed, from Critias' (or more correctly Prodicus') proposition that to be rich is good for the good man, who knows how to use his wealth, etc. (number (2) above).

Consequently it is hardly likely that the conclusion which results from these assumptions is accepted by the author himself. I have indicated earlier¹ that what he appears to do in this passage is to make Socrates apply his definition of wealth to Critias' original conclusion, thereby reducing the conclusion to a form in which Critias can no longer accept it. It now appears somewhat probable that the conclusion which results from this process does not represent the author's own opinion but is merely a *reductio ad absurdum* of Critias' view, Critias being assumed to accept all the assumptions on which it is based.

We are left with (4). That this conclusion is meant to be accepted as true seems clear. It is based on the following assumptions:

(a) Socrates' definition of wealth as that which is useful for satisfying the needs of the body (401E).

(b) His conception of the 'useful' as that which is indispensable for a given purpose (402A-B).

(c) The proposition that the stronger and more numerous the desires of an individual are, the more wretched the condition of the individual must be (405E-406A).

There can be little doubt that all of these assumptions are intended to be accepted as valid. (a) and (c) are propositions which have been reached inductively as the result of arguments conducted by Socrates himself. (a) was established in par. 400A-401E; and all the conclusions concerning wealth which are reached subsequently are based upon it. (c) again is established in par. 405B-E by means of an argument which shows signs of careful construction. (b) is not established by any argument—a fatal flaw²—but it is accepted immediately by Socrates when it is put

¹ In a note on par. 403B.

² See footnote on par. 402A.

forward by Eryxias at 402A2-4; and his acceptance of it is already implied in the preceding chapter. Thus there is no sign that this final conclusion is based on assumptions that the author himself does not accept as true; and it may therefore be regarded as a statement of his own opinion.

The verdict of Professor Souilhé, who censures the writer as 'an eclectic who exploits three or four themes without making a unity of them' (p. 83), does not appear to be justified, since the greater part of the discussion proper can be shown to form a coherent whole. The exception is the opening argument (par. 393-394), where a special conception of wealth is temporarily adopted. Apart from this section and certain digressions, a single thread can be traced, not always easily, throughout. The chief stages of the discussion recapitulated are as follows:

(1) Eryxias asserts that to be rich is good. Critias argues that it appears to be harmful for some people and therefore cannot be good. His view is assumed to be equivalent to that of Prodicus, namely that to be rich is good for the good man and bad for the bad (395C-397B).

(The Prodicus episode, 397B-399D.)

(2) Socrates withholds his assent from this view and presses for an enquiry into the nature of 'being rich.' This is defined as 'possessing much wealth,' and 'wealth' in its turn is defined as that which is useful for the satisfaction of bodily needs (399D-401E).

(3) The useful is 'identified' with the 'indispensable.' Consequently wealth is that which is indispensable for the satisfaction of bodily needs (402A-D).

(Application of this definition to Critias' views, etc., 402A-403D.)

(4) The distinction between things which contribute directly and things which contribute indirectly to a given end is made explicit. It is shown that money, which contributes only indirectly to the satisfaction of bodily needs, is not useful (in the required sense) for this purpose. Consequently it is not wealth (403D-404B).

(Critias maintains the opposite view but is forced to renounce it, 404B-405B.)

(5) Those things which do count as wealth (presumably food, clothing, etc.) exist as wealth in large quantities only in the hands of people whose condition is utterly wretched. The richest man is the unhappiest man. [Consequently to possess much wealth (in the strict sense of the term) and so to be rich is undesirable.] (405B-end.)

If this account of the dialogue is sound, the author has not failed to produce a coherent view of the nature of wealth. There can be little doubt that he had a certain talent for dialectic of a somewhat arid kind, the most ambitious example of which is the argument whereby Socrates refutes Critias towards the end of the dialogue (par. 404C-405B). This merit, however, is offset by serious errors in logic and the disconcerting obscurity of the exposition.

III. THE DATE AND AUTHORSHIP OF THE DIALOGUE.

A. EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

There are two pieces of external evidence which must be considered in this connection. These are

- (1) Suidas *Λισχίνης*.
- (2) Diogenes Laertius III, 62.

(1) Suidas' words are: *διάλογοι δ' αὐτοῦ* (i.e., Aeschines) *Καλλίας Πίνων Ἀσπασία Ἀξίοχος Τηλαύγης Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ἀκέφαλοι Φαίδων Πολύαινος Δράκων Ἐρυξίας περὶ ἀρετῆς Ἐρασίστρατος σκυτικοί.*

[Dr. Schrohl accepts Usener's restoration of the final words: *Ἐρυξίας ἢ Ἐρασίστρατος σκυτικοί οἱ δὲ Φαίδωνος ἢ Πολυαίνου.*]

It is generally agreed that Suidas' testimony concerning the *ἀκέφαλοι* is not

trustworthy.¹ In the opinion of Dr. Schrohl (p. 6), the erroneous inclusion of the dialogue among the works of Aeschines the Socratic was due to the fact that the *Telauges* and *Callias* were, like the *Eryxias*, concerned with wealth, and dealt with it in a depreciatory manner.² It is possible, however, that the dialogue was deliberately attributed to Aeschines by a collector who had introduced it into his library under the impression that it was the genuine work of Plato.³ This may also be true of the *Περί Ἀρεῖς*, which has similarly survived in the Platonic corpus and is similarly attributed to Aeschines. Dr. Schrohl's suggestion may nevertheless be correct in so far as it explains why the *Eryxias* was foisted upon Aeschines rather than upon some other member of the Socratic circle.

(2) The reference in Diogenes Laertius runs: νοθεύονται δὲ τῶν διαλόγων (i.e., the Platonic dialogues) ὁμολογουμένως Μίδων ἢ Ἰπποτρόφος Ἐρυξίας ἢ Ἐρασίστρατος Ἀλκίων ἀκέφαλοι Σίσυφος Ἀξίохος Φαίλας Δημόδοκος Χελιδών Ἐρδόμεν Ἐπιμενίδης.

Except as a testimony that ancient scholarship was agreed that the *Eryxias* was spurious, this passage is of service only in fixing a somewhat late date as the latest possible date of composition. Alline argues that it is a quotation from a member of the Academy, Thrasyllus, who lived at Rome in the reign of Tiberius, and was responsible for completing the arrangement of the Platonic dialogues in tetralogies which had been initiated somewhat earlier by Dercyllides.⁴ Thrasyllus died in 36 A.D.,⁵ so that, if Alline is right, the *Eryxias* could not have been written later than this, and it is highly improbable that it was written in Thrasyllus' lifetime. The phrasing of the passage suggests that he knew nothing of the circumstances in which the dialogues here mentioned had been composed.

The external evidence offers no positive results. The passage in Suidas tells us nothing of the author, while the reference in Diogenes Laertius tells us next to nothing of the date. Any attempt to determine the date and authorship of the dialogue must consequently be based on indications afforded by the text itself.

B. INTERNAL EVIDENCE. THE GYMNASIARCH (399A).

The only detail in the text which has any direct bearing on the question of the date is the reference in par. 399A to the gymnasiarch who, according to Socrates, ordered Prodicus to leave the Lyceum after his unsuccessful argument with the unnamed youth.

Authorities⁶ are generally agreed that in the fifth and fourth centuries the gymnasiarchy at Athens was a tribal liturgy, the holders of which were required to train at their own expense a team of athletes for one of the inter-tribal contests, such as the torch-race at the Panathenaea. At some date, however, subsequent to

¹ See for example Hermann (*Disp. de Aeschini Socratici Reliquiis*, Göttingen, 1850, *passim*), Krauss (Teubner edition, p. 30) and Souilhé (*op. cit.*, p. 87).

² Dittmar (*Aeschines von Sphettus, Philologische Untersuchungen*, 1912, pp. 198-199) conjectures that the *Callias* was well known to the author of the *Eryxias* on the ground that certain statements of a similar kind occur both in the sixth Socratic letter, which he believes to have been based on the *Callias*, and in the *Eryxias* in par. 396B-397A. It is generally recognized, however, that this paragraph was inspired by a passage in the *Euthydemus* (see note in the summary). There is more to be said for his suggestion that the author's conception of Prodicus was partly the result of the severe treatment accorded to him in the *Callias*, to which Herodicus (cited by

Athenaeus, Bk. V, 220B) testifies.

³ Cf. Alline, *Histoire du Texte de Platon*, p. 41, footnote 3: 'Il est probable que les bibliothécaires, une fois dé trompés sur les apocryphes platoniciens, les attribuèrent, pour pallier leur erreur, aux petits Socratiques.' He mentions the *Ἐρδόμεν* as an example of this tendency.

⁴ Alline, pp. 121-123.

⁵ Dio Cassius, 58, 27.

⁶ Dr. Schrohl quotes Boeckh, *Staatsaushaltung der Athener*, Vol. I, p. 548 foll., and Dittenberger, *De Ephebis Atticis*, p. 40. J. Oehler (Pauly-Wissowa, Vol. VII, p. 1969 foll.), G. Glotz (Daremberg and Saglio, Vol. II, part 2, p. 1676 foll.) and W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens*, p. 203, have also thrown much light on the subject.

337 B.C.¹ the gymnasiarchy became a state magistracy, the gymnasiarch being appointed for a year and invested with considerable disciplinary powers. The credit of observing this point is due to Dr. Schrohl, who in a short note on the subject² maintains that the official who requested Prodicus to leave the gymnasium was not the holder of a liturgy, who would not possess this power of maintaining order, but a magistrate such as is known to have existed in Athens in the Hellenistic period. He concludes, therefore, that the dialogue could not have been written before the beginning of the third century.

This view appears substantially correct even allowing for the fact that state gymnasiarchies may have existed in other parts of Greece already in the fourth century,³ for the author appears to have based the Prodicus episode on an actual incident known to him which presumably took place in Athens. (See the appendix on this passage.)

A slightly more serious difficulty arises from the fact that the earliest extant inscription in which the magistracy is mentioned as existing at Athens dates from the years 240-239.⁴ It does not seem necessary, however, to assume that the *Eryxias* was written at a period later than this, since there is literary evidence, admittedly meagre, which suggests that the gymnasiarchy had become a magistracy considerably earlier. Diogenes Laertius⁵ quotes an anecdote in which Crates the Cynic is represented as boldly accosting a gymnasiarch; while a line in the *Bacchides* of Plautus, a play based on Menander's *Δὲς Ἐξαπατῶν*, contains a phrase which appears to be a Latin rendering of *γυμνασιάρχος*.⁶ The tone of both passages suggests that the reference is to a magistrate such as we find mentioned in the *Eryxias*. Menander died in 292-291, so that it is probable that the gymnasiarchy took on its new shape at the beginning of the third century. Oehler⁷ suggests that the modification was the work of Demetrius of Phalerum, a man to whom an institution of this kind would certainly have been congenial. Thus it is possible to conclude from the reference to a state gymnasiarch that the *Eryxias* was written as early as the beginning of the third century, but that in all probability it was not written much earlier than this. On the other hand, considerations which are more closely linked with the question of authorship make it improbable that the dialogue was written later than the middle of the third century. To these we must now turn.

C. THE AUTHOR'S ATTITUDE TO STOICISM.

In the course of my summary of the dialogue I drew attention to passages in which certain writers have detected traces of Stoicism. Dr. Schrohl notices two passages in which such traces occur,⁸ and concludes that the author himself was in sympathy with Stoicism. Professor Souilhé adopts the same view with more reserve.⁹ It is highly doubtful whether they are right in drawing this conclusion. In my note on par. 404c4 I pointed out that the apparently Stoic doctrine enunciated there is certainly accepted by Critias, but that there is nothing to show that it is accepted by

¹ This is the date assigned by Koehler to *C.I.A.* Vol. II, No. 1181, which is the latest extant inscription commemorating a liturgical gymnasiarchy.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

³ Aristotle (*Politics* 1323a1) classes it with other offices which had been established for the maintenance of good order in certain peaceful and prosperous cities.

⁴ *C.I.G.* Vol. II, part 5, No. 614b. This is the date assigned to the inscription by W. Kolbe (*Festschrift zu Otto Hirschfeld*, p. 513, etc.). Most

authorities, including Ferguson in his brochure on the Athenian archons of the third and second centuries, have maintained that the date is 290-287. Ferguson, in his later work, *Hellenistic Athens*, appears to accept Kolbe's dating.

⁵ Bk. VI, 89.

⁶ Act III, Sc. 2, line 21: *Gymnasi praefecto poenas pendere*.

⁷ In Pauly-Wissowa, Vol. VII, p. 1989.

⁸ Par. 395e6-396a2 and 404c4.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

Socrates, who may be assumed to represent the author's own standpoint; and that furthermore, since Socrates in this passage at least appears to be attacking Critias, there is some justification for holding that the author himself was opposed to Stoicism. Since the passage in question exhibits clearer traces of Stoicism than any other passage in the dialogue, it deserves to be studied in some detail.

In this passage Critias, who clings to the view that money is wealth, is forced to renounce it by Socrates, who employs two arguments in both of which the same method is pursued. Socrates shows that Critias cannot maintain his view without admitting along with it certain propositions which he will be highly reluctant to accept. According to the second argument (405A1-B5) he will have to admit that ignorance is useful for the attainment of knowledge, sickness for the attainment of health, etc.; and this is a conclusion which may be rejected on commonsense grounds. According to the first (404C4-405A1) he will have to admit that vicious acts are useful for the performance of good acts. Here the appeal is not to commonsense, for it is by no means immediately obvious that vicious acts cannot be useful for the performance of good acts. The similar doctrine, that evil cannot be productive of good, is a well-known Stoic tenet,¹ so that Dr. Schrohl is justified in regarding the present statement as Stoic in origin also. We should not, however, be justified in regarding the statement as containing a deliberate allusion to Stoic doctrine if it were not for the fact that the doctrine that evil cannot be productive of good forms the major premiss in a syllogism the minor premiss of which is also employed in a modified form in the present passage. The minor premiss is the statement that wealth may be acquired by evil acts: it occurs in the dialogue at 404E3. The details which the author of the *Eryxias* appears to have borrowed from the Stoic syllogism may be seen clearly from the following table:

Seneca, *Ep.* 87, 22.

Evil cannot be productive of good.

But wealth may be acquired by evil acts.

(Therefore if wealth is good, the evil acts must be productive of good; and this contradicts the primary assumption.)

Therefore wealth cannot be good.

Eryxias 404C4-405A1.

Evil acts cannot be useful for the performance of good acts.

If all things which are a means of procuring something which is directly useful for a given end are themselves useful for the attainment of that end, then the services of the physician may be said to be useful for the performance of good acts.

But the services of the physician may be procured by wealth.

And wealth may be acquired by evil acts.

Therefore if all things which are a means of procuring something which is directly useful for a given end are themselves useful for the attainment of that end, then evil acts must be useful for the performance of good acts. (And this contradicts the primary assumption.)

Therefore it does not necessarily follow that things which are directly a means of procuring something which is directly useful for a given end are themselves useful for the attainment of that end.

[Therefore money is not necessarily useful . . . etc.]

¹ See, for instance, Seneca, *Ep.* 87, 22.

It is almost certain that the author's contemporaries would have recognized the primary assumption in this argument as a Stoic tenet, and the subsequent occurrence of the familiar minor premiss could hardly leave them in doubt. Furthermore it is equally certain that the author intended them to recognize it as such. For if he had not intended them to do so, he would clearly have indicated in the text that no reference to Stoicism was to be looked for.

I have already suggested¹ that Socrates' procedure in this part of the dialogue is to show that Critias' continued support of the view that money is wealth is logically inconsistent with the view (also admitted by him to be true) that vicious acts cannot be useful for the performance of good acts. We may now go further and conclude that the author in attributing this view to him has represented him as upholding what may clearly be recognized as a Stoic doctrine. It might, however, be argued that since the principle is enunciated in the first place by Socrates, the same view should be attributed to the author, especially as Socrates does not explicitly disown it at any point. This argument is not corroborated by his behaviour in other parts of the dialogue. There we shall find that while Critias' views do resemble the Stoic doctrines on the subject, no trace of the Stoic point of view appears in the positive conclusions reached by Socrates himself. The other parts of the dialogue in which Critias is concerned are the following:—

(a) Pars. 395E6–396A2 and 396E2–397B7. Here Critias maintains that Eryxias cannot be right in insisting that it is a good thing to be rich; if it were good, it would not appear to be bad for some people. After an interruption from Socrates he proceeds to prove that for some people it is bad.

Dr. Schrohl has rightly pointed out² that this passage is based on par. 281B–E of the *Euthydemus*. The thought is identical, and at one point in par. 397C (immediately following the conclusion of the argument) there is a similarity of phrasing. The view advanced by Critias is, however, closely related to certain propositions employed by the Stoics in support of their view that wealth is an indifferent object.³ His view is, as Professor Souilhé implies,⁴ equally Socratic and Stoic. Nevertheless, in view of what has been said above, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it is introduced here rather because it is Stoic than because it is Socratic. It must not in any case be regarded as the author's own point of view because it contradicts the conclusion finally reached by him.

(b) Par. 403A2–D1. Here we have first a short argument from Socrates in which he proves to Eryxias that the recognized forms of wealth (money, etc.) exist as wealth only for the good man (ὁ καλὸς καγαθός). Then follows an obscure statement (403B9–C6) which need not be taken into account here (see p. 145, n. 4). Finally (403C6–D1) Socrates remarks 'Yet I could swear on behalf of Critias that he will not accept any of this': and Critias replies 'No, indeed; I should be mad if I did.'

The conclusion to which Critias objects so strongly is based, as we have seen, partly on Socrates' proposition that wealth is that which is useful for the satisfaction of bodily needs, partly on the proposition implicitly attributed to Critias but never accepted by Socrates⁵ that it is the good man alone who knows how to make use of money and the other recognized forms of wealth.⁶ It results in fact from the application of Socrates' proposition to that attributed to Critias, and Critias presum-

¹ In a note on par. 404C4.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 37–38.

³ Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII, 102: οὐ μᾶλλον δὲ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ὅτε πλοῦτος ὅτε ὑγίεια (von Arnim III, 117).

⁴ 'L'Euthydème en proclamant l'insignifiance

des biens extérieurs considérés en eux-mêmes, laisse pressentir la grande maxime vulgarisée par le Portique' (p. 85).

⁵ In his final argument Socrates assumes as a matter of course that other people besides the good man do know how to use wealth.

⁶ See summary, with the note on this passage.

ably objects to it because he recognizes in it his own proposition reduced to a form in which he can no longer accept it.

This proposition, like the one previously considered, has affinities both with Socratic¹ and Stoic² thought. Here too it is reasonable to suppose that it is attributed to Critias rather because it is Stoic than because it is Socratic. Furthermore, the tone in which Critias delivers his objection, which is that of a man who finds a precious dogma refuted and is reluctant to admit it, bears out this supposition. Finally, if Critias is intended to represent a Socratic point of view, it is not easy to see why he should be so reluctant to accept the proposition in its new form. If, however, his point of view is supposed to be that of a Stoic, his reluctance is easily explained. According to Stoic doctrine, wealth is an indifferent object. This estimate of its value is substantiated by a number of arguments which are intended to disprove the popular notion that it is positively good. These arguments, all of which depend on the circumstance that wealth may be possessed by immoral agents, and be productive of, or produced by, immoral behaviour,³ are completely invalidated by the present conclusion. In fact a Stoic would have to admit that if money and the other recognized forms of wealth exist as such only for the good man, they must themselves be good.⁴

Thus an examination of the available evidence points to the conclusion that the author has entrusted Critias with the defence of a Stoic point of view to which he himself is opposed. A similarly furtive intrusion of post-Aristotelian thought may be found in other spurious dialogues. In the *Second Alcibiades* an argument which most commentators have assumed to be criticism of the Stoic doctrine that 'everyone except the wise man is mad' is introduced with equal lack of ceremony.⁵ Again in the *Axiochus* Socrates attempts to reconcile Axiochus to the thought of death by means of an argument obviously derived from Epicurean sources.⁶ After some discussion it is superseded by one based on entirely different assumptions. Finally, in the latter part of the *Cebelis Tabula*, which does not belong to the Platonic corpus but may nevertheless be ranked from the literary point of view as a Socratic work, Socrates embarks without warning on an exposition of the Stoic scheme of values. In some of these cases the procedure is not the same as in the *Eryxias*, since it is Socrates himself who undertakes the defence of Stoic or Epicurean doctrines. Nevertheless, the convention by which such doctrines could be introduced without formal comment appears to have been well enough established in the Hellenistic period to make the account of Critias' position which I have given at least probable. Even if it cannot be accepted without reservation, one thing appears certain, namely that where traces of Stoicism occur in the *Eryxias* they do not prove that the author himself was attracted to Stoicism, but the exact opposite.

D. THE AUTHOR'S POSITION.

Both Professor Souilhé and Dr. Schrohl base their conception of the author's position on the tacit assumption that all the conclusions established in the dialogue

¹ See, for instance, *Meno* 88E.

² Stobaeus, *Eclogae Ethicae* 95, 9: *οικονομικὸν δ' εἶναι μόνον λέγουσι τὸν σπουδαῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον κτλ.* (von Arnim III, 623).

³ These arguments are stated and discussed in Seneca, *Ep.* 87. One of them is referred to earlier in this chapter: *Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiae fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: divitiae ergo non sunt bonum.*

⁴ Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 117, 9: *Quod nisi bonus non habet, bonum est.* If the obscure statement interposed at 403B9-C6 is to be taken, as I

have suggested in my note, as implying that the wisdom of the good man is as much a form of wealth as the material forms of it, Critias' reluctance to accept it may be similarly explained. The admission of *σοφία* to the genus wealth would completely undermine the Stoic scheme of values, since wealth would no longer be regarded simply as 'indifferent.'

⁵ 138C-140E.

⁶ 369B-370A. *ἤκουσα δὲ ποτε καὶ τοῦ Προδίκου λέγοντος ὅτι ὁ θάνατος οὔτε τοὺς ζῶντας ἐστίν οὔτε περὶ τοὺς μετῆλλαχότας κτλ.*

are expressions of the author's own point of view. This assumption has led the former to regard the author as an eclectic, the latter to contend that his thought is impregnated with ideas derived from the Stoics and Cynics. I have attempted to show in the earlier part of this essay (pp. 139-140) that this assumption breaks down; and that certain ideas (which may be derived from Stoicism) are associated with Critias and are not accepted by Socrates, with the result that several conclusions emerge which are also not accepted by Socrates. Consequently it then appeared essential to separate such conclusions carefully from others which might be taken as representing the author's own point of view. The conclusions belonging to the latter class are the following:

1. That the wisest man is also the richest (399A).¹
2. That money and its equivalents are not a form of wealth (404B).
3. That the richest man is inevitably also the most wretched (406).

The third of these requires careful interpretation. It must not be taken as meaning that all rich men (in the ordinary sense of the term) are wretched. The conclusion follows directly from the author's definition of wealth as something which is useful (i.e., indispensable) for satisfying the needs of the body. According to this view a man will not be rich merely if he possesses a large stock of commodities, but only if he possesses a large stock of commodities *which are useful (i.e., indispensable) to him in this way*. A man of whom this is true will inevitably be a man with violent and insatiable desires, and consequently depraved and miserable. In theory it will be possible for a perfectly good man to possess an infinite amount of property. His infinite amount of property, however, will not rank as infinite amount of *wealth*. Only that portion of it will rank as wealth which he requires for his personal use, and this, in his case, will merely be a small fraction of the whole.

If we examine the author's position with these three conclusions in mind, one thing immediately appears certain, namely that he could not have been a Stoic. (Other considerations have already made this extremely improbable.) A Stoic is not likely to have expressed the view that a man who possesses a considerable quantity of wealth must be wretched. For according to Stoic doctrine it was not merely possible for a good man to possess considerable wealth, but actually obligatory for him to do so if circumstances placed it within his reach. Even if wealth were not good, it was at any rate a 'promoted' object (*προηγμένον*), and consequently preferable in normal circumstances to poverty. But according to the view reached at the end of the *Eryxias*, to talk of a good man possessing riches involves a contradiction in terms. And even if this view permits a good man to possess considerable resources (which, of course, would not rank as wealth), the fact remains that it is *verbally* inconsistent with a system of values which is based entirely on the precise use of such terms as *ἀγαθόν*, *κακόν*, *ἀδιάφορον*, etc.²

There is perhaps more to be said in favour of the view that the author was a Cynic.³ The conclusion, for instance, that money and its equivalents are not a form

¹ The contradiction between the first and last propositions is only a verbal one, since the term 'rich' is employed in the first in an unusual sense. The wise man is the richest not because he possesses the greatest quantity of material goods, but because he possesses something of pre-eminent intrinsic value.

² The relation of the first of the three conclusions to Stoicism was discussed at the beginning of this article in the note on par. 394-395.

The possibility that the author was an Epicurean does not seem to me to be worth discussing. If this were the case, we should surely

expect some reference to pleasure in his definition of wealth.

³ Professor Souilhé, while implying that Stoicism has influenced the author's point of view, insists that Cynic influence is predominant (p. 86). His view rests on a misinterpretation of the final argument, where according to him riches are condemned because they give rise to numerous and pressing desires. What the author proves is not this, but that riches can only be said to exist as such when they are in the hands of a person whose desires are of this character.

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of wealth appears to be in harmony with Cynic teaching. It is only natural that a sect which did everything to depreciate convention (*νόμος*) at the expense of nature (*φύσις*) should have regarded currency (*νόμισμα*) as having no more than an arbitrary value.¹ Again it may be plausibly argued that the Cynics would have agreed with the author that a rich man must inevitably be wretched. For although this view is nowhere explicitly stated by them, it is implicit in much of their teaching.²

The agreement, however, is only superficial. The Cynics held that the rich man could not be a good man because it was necessary for anyone who was to live the good life to sacrifice all his external resources down to the bare minimum from the outset. Otherwise he would have no chance of acquiring the self-sufficiency and indifference to hardship which was an essential ingredient in the Cynic way of life.³ No such attitude is implied in the *Eryxias*, where the argument in question will permit of a good man possessing an unlimited quantity of resources so long as he does not delude himself into thinking that what he possesses is an infinite quantity of *wealth*. Moreover, the modicum of resources which, according to the same argument, will be necessary to the normal person for the satisfaction of his moderate needs will exist for him as a modicum of *wealth*; and there is no reason why this moderate quantity of wealth should not be regarded as desirable.⁴

Unless we are to assume that the author was a philosophical free-lance unconnected with any school, there remains only one probable hypothesis, namely that he was a member of the Academy. Dr. Schroll asserts⁵ that the point of view expressed in the *Eryxias* cannot be that of the Academy, since Plato never condemns wealth outright, but maintains that a moderate pittance is desirable and even necessary.⁶ I have attempted to show in the foregoing paragraph that the extreme view which Dr. Schroll claims to find in the *Eryxias* is not expressed or implied there; and that the final conclusion is quite compatible with the doctrine that a moderate amount of wealth is both necessary and desirable. The same conclusion is moreover in accord with Plato's frequent condemnation of *excessive* wealth. It is true that according to the argument in the *Eryxias* a man may possess considerable resources and yet not be miserable, this being possible so long as his resources are not made use of for the satisfaction of his own needs (in which case they will not rank as wealth). We may compare with this, however, the similar reservation made by Plato himself in the case of people who save without spending.⁷

The view that the wisest man is also the richest is equally compatible with Academic authorship. The argument which leads to it is founded on Platonic premisses and may be an attempt to show that the Stoic paradox *μόνος ὁ σοφὸς πλούσιος* is, when stripped of its paradoxical character, not inconsistent with Platonic teaching.⁸

The proposition that money is not a form of wealth cannot be paralleled from any Platonic source. On the other hand the Cynics are not alone in approximating to this point of view. Aristotle⁹ stigmatizes money as a mere convention which owing to devaluation 'sometimes appears to be mere trash'; so that the ideas with

¹ Diogenes is said to have proposed a currency of knuckle-bones (Athenaeus IV, 159B).

² See, for instance, Stobaeus, *Flor.* 93, 35 (Meineke): ὁ Διογένης ελεγε μήτε ἐν πόλει πλουσιὰ μήτε ἐν οἰκίᾳ ἀρετὴν οἰκεῖν δύνασθαι.

³ Diogenes Laertius VI, 70: διττὴν δ' ελεγε (i.e., Diogenes the Cynic) εἶναι τὴν ἀσκησιν, τὴν μὲν ψυχικὴν, τὴν δὲ σωματικὴν... εἶναι δ' ἀτελεῖ τὴν ἐτέραν χωρὶς τῆς ἐτέρας.

⁴ Apart from this difficulty, the *Eryxias* is not the sort of work which we should expect a

Cynic to produce. Except in one passage (394D-E) the homiletic note is lacking, and the major part of the discussion is more concerned with the correct use of terms than with the inculcation of an attitude.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

⁶ See, for instance, *Rep.* 422A and *Laws* 742D.

⁷ *Laws* 743B.

⁸ See the note on par. 393-394 in the summary.

⁹ *Politics* 1257B (Book I, Chap. 9, § 11).

which this proposition is linked were in all probability widespread.¹ Consequently the views expressed in the *Eryxias* do not appear to conflict with the possibility that the author was a member of the Academy. Moreover, if this was the case, the survival of the dialogue in the Platonic corpus is easily accounted for. There is nothing to suggest that any of the spurious dialogues were written by members of other schools. Some no doubt were produced by forgers,² some possibly by free-lances, but it is reasonable to assume that two of them, which like the *Eryxias* seem to contain some criticism of other schools, issued from the Academy. These are the *Second Alcibiades* and the *Axiochus*. This is almost certainly true of the former, which was included in the tetralogies,³ and in all probability is equally true of the latter, although like the *Eryxias* it was excluded from the tetralogies as 'incontestably spurious.'⁴ In this event the explanation whereby Alline accounts for the survival of the *Axiochus* will also account for the survival of the *Eryxias*.⁵ The fact that it contains a more thorough investigation of the nature of wealth than appears in any of the authentic dialogues may also have been in its favour.

The dialogue was probably written in the first quarter of the third century. The reference to a state gymnasiarch, already discussed, makes it in the first place highly improbable that it was produced earlier than 300 B.C.; and this is confirmed as the earliest probable date by one certain allusion to Stoic doctrine and several that are less certain. On the other hand it is unlikely that a member of the Academy could have produced it much later than the year 276. This is the year in which Arcesilaus became president of the Academy; and it is reasonable to assume that the conversion of the school to scepticism, if it had not already occurred, took place not much later. In the *Eryxias*, however, there is no trace of Academic scepticism.⁶ The Socrates of the dialogue assumes that complete agreement can be reached on the difficult question whether to be rich is good or bad;⁷ and asserts emphatically at one point that such agreement must be sought at all costs. It is possible that we have here (396A-D) a protest delivered against a doctrine which was already gaining ground but had not yet established itself as the official creed of the Academy.⁸

This comparatively early date is supported by the style and language of the dialogue, which except for certain lapses in grammar and vocabulary is a fairly pure specimen of Attic.

NOTE ON THE PRODICUS PASSAGE.

I have not given any detailed account of this passage (397E-399C), as it does not appear to me to throw any light on the questions which I have attempted to answer.

¹ This point of view would be easy for a Greek to adopt owing to the association of νόμισμα with νόμος. Compare the use of νομίζω in *Eryxias*, 400A.

² This may well be the case with the *Περὶ Δικαίου* and *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς* if they date from the Hellenistic period.

³ See Professor Souilhé's remarks in the Budé edition of Plato, Vol. XIII, part 2, p. viii.

⁴ Professor Souilhé (*l.c.*, p. ix) implies that none of the dialogues excluded from the tetralogies are by Academic authors. Alline (*Histoire du texte de Platon*, footnote to p. 117) maintains that the exclusion of such dialogues does not indicate non-Academic authorship, but merely the fact that their spuriousness was universally admitted (ἐμολογούμενος νοθεύονται). Dialogues such as the *Second Alcibiades* were admitted because their spuriousness, although suspected, was not proved. Even Professor Souilhé admits the possibility of Academic

authorship in the case of the *Axiochus* (Vol. XIII, pt. 3, p. 136). J. Chevalier, to whose essay (*la dialogue l'Axiochus*) he refers, attributes it to an Academic of the 1st century B.C.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 43, where he attributes its survival to its polemical character.

⁶ Professor Souilhé sees an allusion to Pyrrhonian scepticism in par. 395B. Socrates, however, explicitly dissents from the view expressed here.

⁷ Cf. διολογῆσθαι (396E2) συνομολογῆσαι (399D6).

⁸ It does not follow that if Stoicism is criticized in the dialogue, the dialogue must have been written after the accession of Arcesilaus. 'In the time of Arcesilaus . . . anti-Stoic polemic became the main business of the school. It does not necessarily follow that the polemic may not have begun rather earlier' (Professor A. E. Taylor, *l.c.*, p. 328. He is discussing the *Second Alcibiades*).

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Socrates in this passage recalls a certain incident which had taken place some time previously, in which Prodicus had attempted to propound the thesis just successfully established by Critias and, after being refuted by a youthful member of his audience, had been requested to leave the gymnasium. This digression has a certain dramatic propriety; it gives Eryxias time to regain his composure and prepares us for Critias' discomfiture. But apart from this it is difficult to explain the insertion of an episode which occupies a sixth of the total extent of the work and adds nothing to the subject under discussion. No interpretation appears to me to be wholly satisfactory, but the following is perhaps the most plausible:—

(1) The passage is an account of a contemporary or nearly contemporary controversy placed in a fifth-century setting.

(2) The view propounded by Prodicus is identified by the author with the one previously upheld by Critias. Consequently Prodicus may be a Stoic in disguise, most probably Zeno if the date suggested above is correct.¹

(3) The critical *reductio ad absurdum* employed by the youth at 398A5-9 is similar in form to one which the Megarian Alexinus (flor. 290 B.C.) employed against Zeno. (This latter argument is quoted from Sextus by Zeller, *Socrates and Socratics*, p. 216.) Consequently the young man may be a Megarian eristic in disguise, possibly Alexinus, who was a staunch opponent of Zeno (see Diogenes Laertius II, 109).

(4) Socrates' sarcastic intervention on behalf of Prodicus (398E) may perhaps be taken to imply that the author, while regarding certain Stoic doctrines as unsound, did not approve of the methods of attack employed by the Megarian eristics. (His disapproval of eristical devices is expressed elsewhere, in par. 393B-C.)

D. E. EICHHOLZ.

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL.

¹ We may compare the *Axiochus* (369B, etc.), where *Epicurean* doctrine is attributed to Pro-

dicus. Possibly this device was derived from the *Eryxias*.

CORRIGENDUM.

IN the April No., 1935, p. 66, I asserted that Bechtel's proposal to read *Κυλαίθιδος* at Theocr. 5. 15 was prompted by Hdas 6. 55, which is now read otherwise. This is a mistake; it comes from 6. 50, where the papyrus is quite legible.

A. S. F. GOW.

NOTES ON HERODOTUS—II.

(Continued from page 82.)

III. CAMBYSES in Sais decides (17²) ἐπὶ μὲν Καρχηδονίους τὸν ναυτικὸν στρατὸν ἀποστέλλειν, ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀμμωνίους τοῦ πεζοῦ ἀποκρίναντα, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς Αἰθίοπας κατόπτας πρῶτον. We therefore hear in 19¹ that Cambyses μετεμέμπετο ἐξ Ἐλεφαντίνης πόλιος . . . τοὺς ἐπισταμένους τὴν Αἰθιοπίδα γλῶσσαν. ἐν ᾧ δὲ τούτους μετήσαν . . . and then in 20¹ that εἰπέτε . . . ἐκ τῆς Ἐλεφαντίνης ἀπίκοντο οἱ Ἰχθυοφάγοι, ἔπεμπε αὐτοὺς ἐς τοὺς Αἰθίοπας κτλ. As it was a waste of at least three weeks to hale the Ichthyophagi all the way from Elephantine to Sais, only to send them back again on the way to Ethiopia, this looks like one of those mechanical devices already illustrated (pp. 78 f.) for fitting in an episode which does not organically belong to the main story.

In this case a difficulty attaches to the episode itself. Cambyses orders the fleet against Carthage, but the Phoenicians refuse. Φοινίκων δὲ οὐ βουλομένων οἱ λοιποὶ οὐκ ἀξιώμαχοι ἐγίνοντο. Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν νῦν οὕτω δουλοσύνην διέφυγον. This is the only passage where Phoenician ships appear at all in Herodotus' narrative of the expedition of Cambyses. Elsewhere we hear only of a Greek navy. It is a ship of Mytilene which sails into Memphis (13¹), and in 44² Cambyses ἔπεμπε ἐς Σάμον δεησόμενος Πολυκράτεος στρατὸν ναυτικὸν ᾧμα πέμψαι ἑαυτῷ ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον. It was for the navy that Cambyses levied the Aeolian and Ionian Greeks (2, 1²; 3, 1¹); and in ch. 25 Herodotus clearly speaks as though the fleet were entirely Greek: Cambyses there ἐστρατεύετο Ἑλλήνων μὲν τοὺς παρέοντας αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ τάξας ὑπομένειν τὸν δὲ πεζὸν πάντα ᾧμα ἀγόμενος, and on his return ἐκ Θηβέων καταβὰς ἐς Μέρμιν τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ἀπήκε ἀποπλέειν.

Whatever the truth or origin of the Phoenician episode, it seems at least to have no connection with Cambyses in Egypt. I notice that for other reasons the story has excited the suspicion of von Bissing (*PhW* 1934 322).

44¹. In 39¹ the Samian episode (39-60) opens thus: Καμβύσῳ δὲ ἐπ' Αἴγυπτον στρατευομένῳ, ἐποίησαντο καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι στρατηγὴν ἐπὶ Σάμον τε καὶ Πολυκράτεια. There follows the story of Polycrates' rise to power, and of his ring. Then with 44¹ comes the resumption: ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὦν τὸν Πολυκράτεια . . . ἐστρατεύοντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπικαλεσαμένων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα Κυδωνίην τὴν ἐν Κρήτῃ κτισάντων Σαμίων. Beginning with πέμψας δέ . . . παρὰ Καμβύσεα, Herodotus then narrates how Polycrates had attempted to rid himself of some disaffected citizens (44 f.), how these, after an unsuccessful assault on Samos (45), had brought upon him the Lacedaemonian invasion mentioned in 44¹ (46-56), and how subsequently, after many adventures, they founded Cydonia in Crete (56-59).

Blakesley alone has seen that the text of 44¹ is intolerable. The narrative beginning πέμψας δέ . . . (at least in its earlier part) contains the explanation of ἐστρατεύοντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπικαλεσαμένων κτλ., and refers to a previous time; but no reader or hearer could be expected to realize this. The connecting particle is not γάρ but δέ, the tense is the simple aorist (ἰδεῖθῃ), and the connection of the narrative with the events which it explains (the Lacedaemonian invasion) does not begin to appear until more than a chapter below (45²). Blakesley also saw that Bekker's γάρ for δέ is not sufficient. His own remedy is to suppose a *lacuna* after Σαμίων, words having fallen out which told how it happened that Polycrates had a body of disaffected subjects to

be got rid of. This accounts for δὲ and would explain the apparent abruptness, but leaves the greatest difficulty untouched.

Until a reader comes to ch. 59, 'the Samians who afterwards founded Cydonia in Crete' is a phrase which can have no meaning to him. The words ἐπικαλεσαμένων . . . Σαμίων are at present worse than useless. They introduce prematurely an unessential detail which the reader has no means of understanding, and they do nothing to identify the particular Samians concerned in bringing about the Lacedaemonian expedition. Herodotus cannot possibly have intended the passage to stand as we read it at present. I can only account for ἐπικαλεσαμένων . . . Σαμίων as a provisional note of Herodotus made before chs. 44-59 were written, to remind himself sketchily of their scope, but which he would have removed had he ever returned to perfect the joint between the story of Polycrates' ring and that of the rebellious Samians. Von Wilamowitz has pointed out a series of similar temporary props in Thucydides VIII (*Hermes* 1908 pp. 578/618).

There are other indications of imperfection at this point. The two classes of MSS., which most recently G. Pasquali in *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo* (Florence 1934) has shown to go back to antiquity, offer alternative forms not easily to be accounted for by ordinary corruption: Πολυκράτης δὲ πέμψας παρὰ Καμβύση α; πέμψας δὲ κήρυκα λάθρη Σαμίων Πολυκράτης παρὰ K. d. Moreover, Stein has pointed out that the sandwiching of a phrase as long as μετὰ ταῦτα Κυδωνίην τὴν ἐν Κρήτῃ κτισάντων between article and noun is abhorrent from Herodotus' normal style.

57. The exiled Samians sail against wealthy Siphnus. So wealthy were the Siphnians that they owned one of the richest treasure-houses at Delphi. (§ 3) ὅτε ὡν ἐποιοῦντο τὸν θησαυρόν, ἐχρέωντο τῷ χρηστηρίῳ εἰ αὐτοῖσι τὰ παρεόντα ἀγαθὰ οἷά τε ἐστὶ πολλὸν χρόνον παραμένειν· ἢ δὲ Πυθίῃ ἐχρησέσθι τάδε·

ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν Σίφνῳ πρυτανήμια λευκὰ γένηται
 λευκοφρύς τ' ἀγορή, τότε δὴ δεῖ φράδμονος ἀνδρὸς
 φράσασθαι ξύλινόν τε λόχον κήρυκά τ' ἐρυθρόν.

Herodotus then continues (58¹): τοῦτον τὸν χρησμὸν οὐκ οἶοί τε ἦσαν γνῶναι οὔτε τότε ἰθὺς οὔτε τῶν Σαμίων ἀπικυμένων. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τάχιστα πρὸς τὴν Σίφνον προσίσχον οἱ Σάμιοι, κτλ. But before this sentence there stand in our texts the following words: τοῖσι δὲ Σιφνίοισι ἦν τότε ἡ ἀγορὴ καὶ τὸ πρυτανήμιον Παρίῳ λίθῳ ἡσκημένα.

Only Stein and Macaulay have any comment. Stein explains that τότε is the time when the Siphnians consulted the oracle; but Macaulay is clearly right in referring it to the time when the Samians arrived: for if the Siphnian town hall and market-place had already been of marble when the oracle was given, the Pythia could not have said ὅταν . . . γένηται, and the Siphnians would at least have understood part of the prophecy. Yet insuperable difficulties remain. τότε now refers, without any help from the context, to a different time from τότε ἰθὺς in the next sentence; and the asyndetic resumption τοῦτον τὸν χρησμὸν is still separated by a harsh parenthesis from the oracle which it ought to follow immediately—as the translators betray when they find themselves compelled to insert 'however.' In plain terms, the sentence τοῖσι δὲ Σιφνίοισι . . . ἡσκημένα does not belong where it now stands.

We notice that it is *part* of an explanation how the conditions laid down by the oracle were fulfilled when the Samians inflicted disaster. The other half of that explanation is in 58², and there we find the place where the words now in 57⁴ originally stood. From the point reached above in quotation (58¹), Herodotus continues thus: ἐπεμπον τῶν νεῶν μίαν πρέσβευς ἀγούσαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν. τὸ δὲ παλαιὸν ἀπασαι αἱ νέες ἦσαν μιλτηλιφεές· καὶ ἦν τοῦτο τὸ ἢ Πυθίῃ προηγόρευε τοῖσι Σιφνίοισι, φυλάσασθαι τὸν ξύλινον λόχον κελεύουσα καὶ κήρυκα ἐρυθρόν. Now proceed: τοῖσι δὲ Σιφνίοισι . . . λίθῳ

ἡσκημένα. After that Herodotus goes on, with the resumptive ὦν, ἀπικόμενοι ὦν οἱ ἄγγελοι. . . . The words κήρυκα ἐρυθρόν came at the end of a sentence twice on one page; a sentence which followed the second κήρυκα ἐρυθρόν was accidentally transferred to follow the first. This is quite in the order of the day. Observe incidentally that the contrast τοῖσι δὲ Σιφνίοισι now has its full force, and τότε gets the proper sense naturally.

59¹ αὐτοὶ δὲ (οἱ Σάμιοι) Κυδωνίην τὴν ἐν Κρήτῃ ἔκτισαν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῦτο πλείοντες, ἀλλὰ Ζακυνθίους ἐξελῶντες ἐκ τῆς νήσου. ἔμειναν δ' ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ εὐδαιμόνησαν κτλ.

Translators render as though τῆς νήσου were Crete; and Abicht and Stein (the only commentators who have a note), though plainly surprised to find Zacynthians in Crete, try to suggest explanations for the phenomenon. But τῆς νήσου is Zacynthus itself. The transition Ζακυνθίους—τῆς νήσου is as common and natural as the reverse transition from a place to its inhabitants (as ἡ Ζάκυνθος—οἱ δὲ . . .). The Samians had sailed with the intention of expelling the Zacynthians from their island, but they stopped on the way (round Peloponnese from Hermione and Troezen) in Crete. The emphatic ἐν ταύτῃ distinguishes Cretan Cydonia from Zacynthus.

60¹ ἐμήκνυα δὲ περὶ Σαμίων μάλλον, ὅτι σφί τρία ἐστὶ μέγιστα ἀπάντων Ἑλλήνων ἐξεργασμένα κτλ.

Because it has never yet been seen that ἐμήκνυα is an 'epistolary' aorist, and refers therefore not to what precedes, but solely to the following chapter (60), Herodotus has always been made to say that his reason for dwelling at length on Polycrates' adventures, the war between Samos and Lacedaemon, and the subsequent wanderings of the Samian exiles (39-59), is simply that Samos contains three remarkable engineering works, now to be described briefly. It would be just as reasonable for a person to include in a history of Italy a long and careful digression on the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in Florence, and then conclude by saying that he did so because Florence contains three very remarkable sights: the Campanile of Giotto, the Ponte Vecchio and the Pitti palace, which he then dismisses in a page!*

What Herodotus actually does is to crave his readers' patience with this Samian digression for a little longer (cf. μάλλον τι § 4), because Samos has three notable works which he cannot leave without mention. ἐμήκνυα here is an exact equivalent of ἐρχομαι περὶ Αἰγύπτου μηχανέων τὸν λόγον, ὅτι πλείστα θωμάσια ἔχει in 2, 35¹.

64^{3,4} εἶρετο ὁ Καμβύσης ὅ τι τῇ πόλει οὖνομα εἴη. οἱ δὲ εἶπαν ὅτι Ἀγβάτανα. τῷ δὲ ἔτι πρότερον ἐκέχρηστο ἐκ Βουτούς πόλιος ἐν Ἀγβατάνοισι τελευτήσῃ τὸν βίον.

ἔτι is pointless. It was superfluous enough to say that a prophecy had been made to Cambyses 'before,' let alone 'even before.' The word may therefore be deleted, as its position between -ε and -π- explains its origin. Π is always liable to generate or absorb ΤΙ: in 6, 78², to take one instance, the MSS. vary thus: πολλῶ δὲ πλεῦνας α; πολλῶ δ' ἔτι πλεῦνας P; πολλῶ δέ τι πλεῦνας d.

64⁵ καὶ δὴ ὡς τότε ἐπειρόμενος ἐπύθετο τῆς πόλιος τὸ οὖνομα, ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορῆς τῆς τε ἐκ τοῦ μάγον ἐκπεπληγμένους καὶ τοῦ τρώματος ἐσωφρόνησε, συλλαβὼν δὲ τὸ θεοπρόπιον εἶπε· Ἐνθαῦτα Καμβύσεια τὸν Κίρου ἐστὶ πεπρωμένον τελευτῶν.

Commentators are silent, but all translators take ἐκπεπληγμένους and ἐσωφρόνησε together, as 'a shock which brought him to his senses,' with reference to the madness of Cambyses in Egypt (chs. 30 ff.). (As for Berguin's 'saisi par cette coïncidence de la révolte du mage et de sa blessure, il revint à des pensées raisonnables,' there is no coincidence between the revolt and the wound.) But ἐκπληξίς is not naturally a

* Jacoby (PW. Supp. II 222) has seen the not manage to think of a better excuse for his absurdity, but supposes that Herodotus could Samian episode!

shock attended by salutary effects, nor, as the context plainly says, was it the revolt or the wound which caused Cambyses σωφρονῆσαι, but this last occurrence, namely, his recognition from the name of the place, compared with the Egyptian oracle, that his death was near; the reference, moreover, to the madness in Egypt would be a distant one. The meaning therefore is: 'whereas he had been driven wild by the revolt of the magus, and by his wound coming on top of it, he now grew calm again,' and a comma should be placed for clarity after τρώματος. ἐσωφρόνησε denotes recovery from a pre-existing state of ἐκπληξίς.

The gain in truth and pathos by adopting this interpretation is obvious.

76³. The seven conspirators are disputing whether or not they dare attack the two magi. ὠθιζομένων δ' αὐτῶν ἐφάνη ἱρήκων ἐπὶ ζεύγεα δύο αἰγυπίων ζεύγεα διώκοντα καὶ τίλλοντά τε καὶ ἀμύσσοντα. This sight the conspirators hail as an omen, and proceed encouraged.

Clearly, the seven 'pairs' of hawks correspond to the seven conspirators, and the two 'pairs' of vultures to the two magi. The problem, which no one has yet mentioned, let alone solved, is: why 'pairs'? The fact that there are in reality 14 hawks and 4 vultures lessens the force of the omen; and try for a moment to imagine 7 pairs of hawks attacking 2 pairs of vultures. You instantly find yourself watching 4 vultures attacked by 14 hawks. If as a historical fact the conspirators *did* see 14 hawks and 4 vultures, then conceivably the point might be brought out by dividing the birds, quite artificially, into pairs: but no one will maintain that the details of this story are historical.

Having pointed out the problem, I cannot at present solve it, except to suggest that Herodotus may have made some blunder in using his source. Textual corruption, or a different interpretation of the word ζεύγος, seem alike out of the question.

84¹. The notorious 'Debate on the Persian Constitution' occupies chs. 80-82. In 83, Otanes, the defeated advocate of democracy, declares that, since one of the Seven must be chosen king, he will not compete for that honour, on condition of his house being free for ever. To this bargain the other six agree. οὗτος μὲν δὴ σφί οὐκ ἐνηγωνίζετο ἀλλ' ἐκ μέσου κατήστο. καὶ νῦν αὕτη ἡ οἰκίη διατελεῖ μόνῃ ἐλευθέρῃ κτλ. Then in 84¹ Herodotus continues: οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν ἐπὶ ἐβουλεύοντο ὡς βασιλέα δικαιοτάτα στήσονται. καὶ σφί ἔδοξε 'Οτάνῃ μὲν καὶ τοῖσι ἀπὸ 'Οτάνεω αἰεὶ γινόμενοι, ἣν ἐς ἅλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ἐλθῇ ἡ βασιληίη, ἐξαιρετὰ δίδοσθαι . . . τοῦδε δὲ εἵνεκεν ἐβούλευσάν οἱ δίδοσθαι ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐβούλευσέ τε πρῶτος τὸ πρῆγμα καὶ συνίστησε αὐτοῖς. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ 'Οτάνῃ ἐξαιρετὰ, τάδε δὲ ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἐβούλευσαν . . . περὶ δὲ τῆς βασιληίης ἐβούλευσαν τοιόνδε . . .

In its present context, the conditional clause ἣν ἐς ἅλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ἐλθῇ ἡ βασιληίη is unintelligible. After the foregoing it was certain that the kingdom would not fall to Otanes, since he was not competing. Commentaries have nothing to say; but, as usual, the translators betray by their contortions that something is amiss: 'to whichever of the remaining six candidates the throne might eventually fall' (Laurent); 'if any of their own number got the kingdom' (Rawlinson); '*une fois l'un d'entre eux mis en possession de la royauté*' (Berguin). None of these are genuine renderings. ἣν . . . τινὰ cannot here be equivalent to ὅντινα ἄν; for the antecedent of such a relative has no grammatical place in the sentence. (It would be otherwise, had δοῦναι, for example, been written instead of δίδοσθαι; but even so, ἅλλον remains pointless.) Nor can the meaning be simply 'when the kingdom fell etc.', ἣν being equivalent to ὅταν; for then the whole clause is otiose, and ἅλλον as strange as ever, if Otanes is from the outset not competing. Nor again can the words mean 'if the kingdom fell to someone other than the Seven.' This is possible grammatically, as ἅλλος is used with the genitive (of separation) in Plat. *Meno* 88b and

Xen. *Mem.* 4, 4²⁶ and perhaps in Hdt. himself (3, 8¹; 71⁶); but in the context it is intolerable. The conspirators were going to choose a king strictly from among themselves; and moreover, Otanes would surely deserve his presents just as much if one of the remaining six *did* obtain the kingdom.

The clause *ἦν ἐς ἄλλον τινά . . . βασιλῆην*, together with the strangeness of solemnly decreeing such a trumpery reward to Otanes after he has in 83² received altogether exceptional privileges, reveals the fact that 84¹ was written for a context in which 83, and consequently also chs. 80-82 (the Debate), which are inseparable from 83, did not precede and indeed were not dreamt of. Reading the whole chapter 84 from this point of view we see that it relates to a situation in which *all* the Seven were competing for the kingdom; and, apart from *οἱ ἕξ* in 86¹, which might easily be a subsequent correction, there is no other passage elsewhere in III which alludes to chs. 80-83, or presumes the knowledge of them. That is to say, the enigmatical Debate came from a different source from that to which Herodotus owed the rest of the story of the conspiracy and Darius' accession. This he has combined with his main source(s) without noticing a slight tell-tale discrepancy; and the fact that he could overlook it suggests that the main narrative was at that time already written. This discovery may be of some assistance in solving the problem of the Debate on the Persian Constitution, which cannot be of Persian origin, and yet is so emphatically claimed as such by Herodotus (80¹ *ἐλέχθησαν λόγοι ἀπιστοὶ μὲν ἐνίοισι Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέχθησαν δ' ὧν*).*

87. τὸν Οἰβάρεα τοῦτον ἐξείραντα τὴν χεῖρα.

There is no point in emphasizing the identity of Oebares here with Oebares in the story hitherto: for no other is involved. On the other hand, the fact that the hand brought to the horse's nostrils was the same which had been in contact with the mare is essential and deserves stressing. The original may therefore have been *ταύτην*, corrupted by attraction.

135 ult. *ἐντειλάμενος δὲ καὶ τοῦτω ταῦτα*, ὁ Δαρείος ἀποστέλλει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν.

This passage is *not* among the many ones where we can never know whether *παντα* is to be printed as *ταῦτα* or *ταῦτά*: for here *ταῦτα* (Abicht, Hude) is impossible. Darius first called the Persian spies, and instructed them (*ἐνετέλλετό σφι*) to explore the coasts of Greece under Democedes' guidance, and be sure to bring Democedes back with them (§ 1). He then called Democedes, and requested him to guide the Persians round Greece and be sure to come back again himself (§ 2, 3). It would be absurd for Herodotus to conclude: 'Then Darius gave D. the *same* instructions as he gave the Persians.' He actually says: 'But when Darius had *thus* charged D. too (i.e. as well as the Persians: *καὶ* pointing the correspondence of *ἐνετέλλετο* and *ἐντειλάμενος*), he sent them away.'

146³ τοὺς ἐπικοιῦντας . . . ὁ Χαρίλεως . . . ἐξῆκε ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας οὔτε προσδεκόμενους τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν δοκέοντάς τε διὰ πάντα συμβεβάναι.

Editors and translators without exception render: 'all things had been agreed upon.' This would require *συμβεβάσθαι*; for there is nothing to suggest that *συμβαίνειν* can be used in a passive sense like Latin *convenire*.† Moreover, the sense is wrong: everything had in fact been agreed upon, and the Persian grandees were not mistaken in so supposing. Translate therefore: 'supposing that all had sub-

* It is noteworthy that, though Otanes' exceptional position is a fact, the explanation given of it in ch. 83 cannot be right: see Howells I. 279.

† Lidd. and Sc. alone have qualms, and

remark (unintelligibly): 'though *πάντα* may be neut. Adj. after σ.' Presumably they mean 'neut. acc.,' *συμβεβάναι* being transitive. But the sense is then still open to the above objections.

mitted.' The Persians thought that all Samos was at peace with them; but they had reckoned without Charilaüs and his mercenaries. πάντα is tantamount to πάντας, but wider and more drastic.*

154¹ ὥς δέ οἱ (Ζωπύρῳ) ἐδόκει μόνιμον εἶναι ἤδη τῇ Βαβυλῶνι ἀλίσκεσθαι, προσελθὼν Δαρείῳ ἀπεπνθάνετο εἰ περὶ πολλοῦ κάρτα ποίεται τὴν Βαβυλῶνα εἰλεῖν. πυθόμενος δὲ ὡς πολλοῦ τιμῶτο, ἄλλο βουλευέται, ὅπως αὐτὸς τε ἔσται ὁ ἐλὼν αὐτὴν καὶ ἐωυτοῦ τὸ ἔργον ἔσται· κάρτα γὰρ ἐν Πέρσῃσι αἱ ἀγαθοεργίαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω μεγάθεος τιμῶνται.

The difficult phrase ἐς τὸ πρόσω μεγάθεος is treated substantially alike by all commentators and translators: 'services are honoured to (or by) an increase of (the benefactor's) importance.' The sense thus obtained is both trite and unessential to the narrative: Zopyrus was anxious to be the means of capturing Babylon, because in Persia such achievements lead to advancement. Linguistically the meaning is equally objectionable, and is not helped by the 'parallel' passages adduced: 1, 5³ προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου 'I will proceed with my history'; 3, 56¹ ὥς . . . ἐς τὸ πρόσω οὐδὲν προεκώπητο τῶν πρηγμάτων, ἀπαλλάσσοντο. It is also to be doubted whether μέγαθος thus could mean the importance of an individual.

The sole dissentient is Macaulay (whom Lidd. and Sc. follow); he takes ἐς τὸ πρόσω μεγάθεος merely as another way of saying μεγάλως: 'to a high pitch of greatness' (!).

A sense obtainable at least as legitimately from the Greek, which also satisfies what the context seems to require, would be this: 'For among the Persians good deeds are nicely valued on an ascending scale of their magnitude, according to their importance.' The sentence thus becomes an explanation of Zopyrus' care to ascertain from Darius exactly how much importance the monarch attached to the capture of Babylon. It was only after being assured ὅτι πολλοῦ τιμῶτο that he proceeded with his daring and self-sacrificing plan to get that credit for himself by mutilation. Blakesley had already, though without suggesting the above rendering, referred to 1, 137¹, where the 'calculus' of good and bad services is remarked as a peculiarity of the Persians: μὴ . . . ἐπὶ μὴ αἰτίῃ ἀνέκκεστον πάθος ἔρδειν· ἀλλὰ λογισάμενος ἦν εὐρίσκει πλέω τε καὶ μέζω τὰ ἀδικήματα ἔοντα τῶν ὑποργημάτων, οὕτω τῷ θυμῷ χράται. The case of Syloson (ch. 140) is an *exceßtio probans regulam*: for Darius there says to him (§ 4): σὺν κείνῳ εἰς ὃς ἐμοὶ οὐδεμίαν ἔχοντί πω δύναμιν ἔδωκας, εἰ καὶ σμικρά, ἀλλ' ὦν ἴση γε ἡ χάρις ὁμοίως ὡς εἰ νῦν κοθὲν τι μέγα λάβοιμι.

If the suggested rendering is correct, the expression ἐς τὸ πρόσω μεγάθεος might be explained as a fusion of the two ideas κατὰ λόγον μεγάθεος τιμῶνται and ἐς τὸ πρόσω κατὰ μέγαθος τιμῶνται.

IV. The σάγαις is mentioned four times in Herodotus. 4, 5³ can tell us nothing of its nature; from 1, 215¹ (ὅσα ἐς αἰχμὰς καὶ ἄρδεις καὶ σαγάρεις, χαλκῷ χρέωνται) and 4, 70 (ἀκινάκην καὶ οὐστοὺς καὶ σάγαριν καὶ ἀκόντιον), we learn at least that it was neither spear nor sword. That it was some kind of *axe* is stated in 7, 64², where we read of the Sacae: ἀξίνας σαγάρεις εἶχον, an apposition of genus and species of the βούς ταῦρος order. It is legitimate to supplement this information with a passage from Xenophon: *An.* 4, 4¹⁶ ἔχοντα . . . σάγαριν οἶαντες καὶ (αἱ) Ἀμαζόνες ἔχουσιν, and conclude that by σάγαις Herodotus meant such a double-edged battle-axe as is (twice) seen on the Dying Penthesilea sarcophagus from Salonica (illustrated in Roscher's lexicon p. 1923). Therefore, even if Hesychius tells us that the σ. was single-edged, and Q. Curtius (7, 8⁶) makes *iugum boum, asatrum, hasta, sagitta et patera* the equivalent of Hdt.'s ἀροτρον καὶ ζυγὸν καὶ σάγαριν καὶ φιάλην (4, 5³), we have no business with such guesses as that the σάγαις was like the Gurkha 'kukri,'

* Mr. J. D. Denniston plausibly suggests that the truth may be πάντας.

a curved knife broadening towards the point (How-Wells), or the Persian khanjar, a short curved double-edged knife (H. Rawlinson), or the old English bill (Lidd. and Sc.).

67^a φιλύρης ὦν φλοιῷ μαντεύονται· ἐπεὰν τὴν φιλύρην τρίχα σχίσῃ, διαπλέκων . . . καὶ διαλύων χρῶ.

The translators and lexicographers render φιλύρης φλοιῷ 'with the inner bark of the linden tree'; and though the commentaries are silent, it is evident from Stein's note that he also took the words thus. In that case, the next sentence would have to mean 'when he has split the linden tree in three and twisted it round his fingers etc.'! Either, then, φιλύρης is genitive of definition, φλοιὸς being the genus ('bark') and φιλύρη the species ('bass' or 'bast,' i.e. inner bark of the lime tree*); or else φιλύρη alone stood originally, and φλοιῷ, a much commoner word, is a gloss which has been accommodated in the text by altering the case of φιλύρη.

120^b.⁴ ἡμέρας καὶ τούτους ὁδῷ προέχοντας τῶν Περσέων ὑπεξάγειν . . . πρῶτα μὲν νυν ὑπάγειν σφέας ἰθὺ τῶν χωρέων τῶν ἀπειπαμένων τὴν σφετέρην συμμαχίην, ἵνα καὶ τούτους ἐκπολεμώσωσι· εἰ γὰρ^a μὴ ἐκόντες γε ὑπέδυσαν τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Πέρσας, ἀλλ' ἀέκοντας ἐκπολεμώσαι· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ὑποστρέφειν ἐς τὴν σφετέρην.

^a γὰρ Stein; γε d; δὲ aP.

Such is Stein's text, which Hude prints. Quite apart from the unlikelihood of γὰρ being corrupted into γε or δὲ, the sentence will not translate. For ἐκπολεμώσαι, Stein simply refers to 2, 172^b: ἤδη ὦν ἔφη λέγων ὁμοίως αὐτὸς τῷ ποδανιπτήρι περηγένοι· εἰ γὰρ πρότερον εἶναι δημότης, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι εἶναι αὐτῶν βασιλεὺς. But the difficulty is not the familiar infinitive (of indirect speech) in a γὰρ-clause; it is that ἐκπολεμώσαι must refer to the future, yet cannot possibly do so. The only way to extract any sense at all from the above text is to take γὰρ as 'videlicet,' and the whole γὰρ-clause in explanatory apposition to ὑπάγειν cf. 6, 86β² βούλομαι ἀναμνησθεὶς ποιεῖν πᾶν τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἔλαβον, ὁρθῶς ἀποδοῦναι. . . . I think this will commend itself to no one. With Stein's γὰρ there is no alternative but to emend ἐκπολεμώσαι with Madvig into ἐκπολεμώσεσθαι (so-called fut. med. in pass. sense), in order to surmount the difficulty of future time.

The text of aP, read by Abicht and earlier editors, is also impossible. For δὲ will not be introducing either a contrast or a further step but merely a restatement of ὑπάγειν ἵνα ἐκπολεμώσωσι in another form. εἰ . . . μὴ . . . ὑπέδυσαν refers to the absolute past, and resumes τῶν ἀπειπαμένων τὴν σφετέρην συμμαχίην: it cannot mean the same, for instance, as εἰ . . . μὴ . . . ὑποδύσειαν. Blakesley, thoughtful as usual, deleted ἵνα καὶ τούτους ἐκπολεμώσωσι, and wrote the following note: 'It is not easy to conceive that these words can have stood in the text contemporaneously with ἀλλ' ἀέκοντας ἐκπολεμώσαι. I imagine that the sentence originally ended with them, but that afterwards the author substituted the words which follow them; and that their existence at present arises from the combination of two different editions.'

Without assuming two independent corruptions, as is done in combining the emendations of Stein and Madvig, or making, with Blakesley, risky hypotheses which carry the trouble back to the author's own hand, it may be suggested that the vulgate could have come from an original which ran as follows: ἵνα καὶ τούτους, εἰ μὴ ἐκόντες γε ὑπέδυσαν τὸν πόλεμον . . ., ἀλλ' ἀέκοντας ἐκπολεμώσωσι. It only needed ἐκπολεμώσωσι to be repeated after τούτους, either inadvertently or to explain the construction, and all the other changes would follow naturally.

* This meaning, as well as 'linden tree,' only writer before Theophrastus who seems to occurs in Hellenistic Greek: Herodotus is the use the word.

127⁴ σοὶ δὲ ἀντὶ δώρων γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος δῶρα πέμψω τοιαῦτα οἷα σοὶ πρέπει ἐλθεῖν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ὅτι δεσπότης ἐφθασας εἶναι ἐμός, κλαίειν λέγω. τοῦτό ἐστι ἡ ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ῥῆσις. ὁ μὲν δὲ κῆρυξ οἰχώκεε ἀγγελέων ταῦτα Δαρεῖω . . .

None of the expressions κλαίειν (οἰμώζειν) λέγω, οἰμῶζε is recorded before Eupolis (first production 429 B.C.). It is therefore theoretically possible that these proverbial expressions took their rise from this passage of Herodotus and were popularized by the Old Comedy, which has many other allusions to Herodotus presuming a textual knowledge of him amongst the audience.* That this *was* so is a necessary implication—though editors appear not to have realized the fact—of deleting τοῦτο . . . ῥῆσις as a grammatical addition, as practically all editors since Valckenaer have done. For had Herodotus used in his fictitious speech an expression already current in Greek, there would have been no reason for it to be dubbed later ἡ ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ῥῆσις, and the name explained from this passage of Herodotus (references in Stein's commentary).†

There is, however, an alternative possibility. If Herodotus wrote τοῦτο . . . ῥῆσις as the closing words of Idanthysus' speech, 'Such is the message from the Scyths' (cf. I, 152³ ἀπικόμενοι οἶτοι ἐς Φάκαιαν ἐπεμπον ἐς Σάρδις σφέναν αὐτῶν τὸν δοκιμώτατον . . . ἀπερόντα Κύρῳ Λακεδαιμονίων ῥῆσιν, γῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος μηδεμίαν πόλιν σιναμωρεῖν), later readers may have referred the words to the phrase immediately preceding, and have taken them into use as a designation of a coarse expression in common parlance.

145^{4, 5} ἔφασαν . . . δέεσθαι οἰκίειν ἅμα τοῖσι μοῖραν τε τιμὴν μετέχοντες καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπολαχόντες. Λακεδαιμονίοισι δὲ ἔαδε δέκεσθαι τοὺς Μινύας ἐπ' οἷσι θέλονσι αὐτοὶ . . . δεξάμενοι δὲ τοὺς Μινύας γῆς τε μετέδωκαν καὶ ἐς φυλὰς διεδάσαντο. οἱ δὲ αὐτίκα γάμους ἔγμην . . .

Commentators (and most translators) refer φυλὰς to the three Dorian tribes, and render 'distributed them among the tribes.' There can be no doubt that this would require ἐς τὰς φυλὰς, just as below, where there is a certain reference to the Dorian tribes, we read ὁ Θήρας λεὼν ἔχων ἀπὸ τῶν φυλῶν ἐστελλε (148¹). The well-known omission of the article in unambiguous contexts with words like πόλις and τεῖχος (e.g. 6, 133³ ἐπολιόρκει Παρίους κατειλημένους ἐντὸς τεύχεος) does not cover omission in circumstances where a vital difference of meaning is produced. The difficulty of the commentators—that membership of the three Dorian tribes depended on descent—might be removed by supposing the reference to be to the *five* administrative Local Tribes (see C.A.H. III pp. 560 ff.): but the difficulty of the absent article remains.

Accepting as inevitable the rendering 'they divided them up into tribes,' what interpretation can we attach to it? It is recognized that the tale of the Minyae is unhistorical, but invented to make the connection of Sparta and Thera appear as close as possible. From 149¹ Οἰολύκον δὲ γίνεται Αἰγέως, ἐπὶ οὗ Αἰγείδαι καλέονται, φυλὴ μεγάλη ἐν Σπάρτῃ it is clear that for Herodotus the three Dorian tribes were not the only φυλαὶ at Sparta (cf. Grote pt. II ch. 6 = III p. 133). Apparently therefore he imagined that Sparta had two or three more tribes than usual during the brief presence of the Minyae. This would be assisted by his knowledge that *local* tribes were the basis of Spartan administration in his own time (cf. γῆς μετέδωκαν), and a recollection of artificial divisions of a people into tribes for constitutional reform, as by Demonax at Cyrene: 161³ ἀπικόμενος ἐς τὴν Κυρήνην . . . τριφύλους ἐποίησέ σφας.

* See the list in How-Wells I. 55, to which may be added Ar. Av. 1269~4, 33⁴.

† Diog. L. I, 101 παρέσχε δὲ (Ἀνάχαρις) καὶ ἀφορμὴν παροιμίας διὰ τὸ παρησιασθῆναι εἶναι, τὴν ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ῥῆσιν, must be understood as a mistaken explanation of the name by reference to

the one Scythian personality who was well known—mistaken, because if *any* coarse language was called Scythian, there was no reason to designate this *particular* expression ἡ ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν ῥῆσις (def. art.). This observation also disposes of Blakesley's note.

146² κτείνουσι δὲ τοὺς ἄν κτείνωσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι νυκτός, μετ' ἡμέρην δὲ οὐδένα.

As the phrase μεθ' ἡμέραν has been stepmotherly treated both by the commentators and by lexicographers, I venture to discuss it here at some length.

It has already occurred at 2, 150⁴ οὐ νυκτός ἀλλὰ μετ' ἡμέρην ποιούμενον; but these are its first appearances in Greek. Other occurrences in the classical period are: Eur. *Or.* 58 φυλάξας νύκτα, μή τις εἰσὶδὼν μεθ' ἡμέραν στείχουσιν . . . προύπεμψεν (cf. Hypoth. I. νυκτός μὲν Ἑλένην εἰσαπέστειλε, μεθ' ἡμέραν δὲ αὐτὸς ἦλθεν); Bacch. 485 τὰ δ' ἱερὰ νύκτωρ ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τελεῖς; Ar. *Plutus* 930; Xen. *Mem.* 3, 11⁸; An. 4, 6¹² νύκτωρ . . . μᾶλλον . . . ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν; 7, 3³⁷ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν . . . νύκτωρ δὲ; Plat. *Phaedr.* 32=251e οὐτε νυκτός . . . οὐτε μεθ' ἡμέραν; Aeschines 64, 36. Then, passing over an ephebic inscription of Drerus in Crete (SIG² 463, 41 μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε περὶ ἡμέραν), we pick the phrase up again in Hellenistic Greek, where it is extremely common. There are numerous instances in Polybius; Philo uses it 4 times in the *legatio ad Gaium* alone (13, 122, 171, 184); it is to be found in Josephus (e.g. *BJ* 2, 9²), in Plutarch (e.g. *Quaest. Rom.* 81; *Them.* 7⁴), in Dion Cassius (e.g. 56, 41⁴), Philostratus Senior (*Imag.* 1, 27), and Aelian (e.g. *VH.* 3, 11). Further copious references to Hellenistic authors are given in Lobeck *Paralipomena* 62 f. and Boissonade's *Marinus* p. 68.

In nearly all cases, μεθ' ἡμέραν is in antithesis to νυκτός or νύκτωρ, and plainly means nothing more precise than 'by day,' 'during the day-time.*' The problem is, how it comes to have this meaning. Matthiä 587c, Kühner-Gerth II 1 508, § 439 III 2b, Wecklein (Eur. l.c.), and Siefert-Blass (Plut. *Them.* l.c.) render 'after daybreak,' as if equivalent to μετὰ χρυσόθρονον ἡὺς h. *H. Merc.* 326, and Lidd. and Sc. place the phrase under μετὰ C III 2 'after.' This rendering would in itself be defensible in view of πρὸ ἡμέρας Xen. *H.* 1, 6¹⁰; Diphilus Βοιωτ. 1 and ἅμα ἡμέρῃ = ἅμα ἡοί often in Hdt.; but the use of the phrase, as illustrated above, hardly shows traces of such an origin, and the formation of an adjective μεθημερινός, found from Plato and Xenophon downwards, indicates that all recollection of it must then have been already lost. It is significant that the only writer who can be supposed to have taken the phrase to mean 'after light' is Josephus (l.c. νύκτωρ κεκαλυμμένος εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα παρεισκομίζετο τὰς Καίσαρος εἰκόνας . . . τοῦτο μεθ' ἡμέραν μεγίστην παραχὴν ἤγειρεν Ἰουδαίων).

The origin ought perhaps rather to be sought in the use of μετὰ to mean 'among,' *inter*, as in μετὰ πάντας ἀρίστους and μετὰ χειρὸς εἶναι. We thus have an exact parallel to the Latin *INTER*diu. The corresponding phrase 'by night,' μετὰ νύκτας, occurs in Pindar *N.* 6. 10.

V 33⁴ ὁ δὲ (Μεγαβάτης) θυμωθεὶς τούτοις, ὡς νῦν ἐγένετο, ἐπεμπε εἰς Νάξον πλοῖον ἄνδρας φράσσοντας τοῖσι Ναξίοις πάντα τὰ παρεόντα σφί περ ἡγήματα.

Commentaries are silent, and translators may be right in unanimously referring τὰ παρεόντα σφί πρῆγματα to the Naxians; 'to warn the Naxians of their imminent peril.' It is, however, equally possible to refer σφί to Megabates' side, and render: 'to inform the Naxians of what they (the Persians) had in hand.' This derives support from the precisely similar 6, 100³, where σφί certainly refers to the speaker's party: μαθὼν τούτων ἐκότερα ὡς εἶχε Αἰσχίνης . . . φράζει τοῖσι ἡκουσὶ Ἀθηναίων πάντα τὰ παρεόντα σφί πρῆγματα.

60 ἕτερος δὲ τρίπους ἐν ἑξαμέτρῳ τόνῳ λέγει· Σκαῖος πυγμαχῶν με ἐκνήβωλ' Ἀπόλλωνι | νικήσας ἀνέθηκε τείν περικαλλὲς ἄγαλμα. Σκαῖος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ Ἰπποκόωντος, εἰ δὲ οὐτός γε ἐστὶ ὁ ἀναθεὶς καὶ μὴ ἄλλος τῶν οὐνομα ἔχων τῷ Ἰπποκόωντος, ἡλικίῃν κατὰ Οἰδίπουν τὸν Δαῖον.

The construction is: Σκαῖος ὁ Ἰπποκόωντος (subject) ἂν εἴη ἡλικίῃν κατὰ Οἰδίπουν (predicate). But since commentaries give no help, translators have gone astray and

* So the translators of Herodotus, Schweighäuser (*Lex. Hdt.* II 98b), and Lidd. and Sc.

taken ὁ Ἱπποκόωντος as the predicate, with ἡλικίην κτλ. as a loosely attached qualification. This involves the silly statement: 'Scaeus should be the son of Hippocoön, unless he is some other Scaeus'—a sense implicit in all renderings offered hitherto, however disguised by such devices as Rawlinson's: 'This might be Scaeus, the son of H.; and the tripod, if dedicated by him, and not by another of the same name, would belong to the time of Oedipus.' Herodotus actually says: 'Now Scaeus, the son of H., supposing that Scaeus to be really the one in question, was contemporary with Oedipus.' It is the date, not the identity, of Scaeus in which Herodotus is interested, as his comment on the preceding inscription shows (59): ταῦτα ἡλικίην ἀν εἶη κατὰ Δάϊον τὸν Λαβδάκου.

92β¹ Ἀμφίονι ἔοντι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γίνεται θυγατὴρ χωλή· οὐνομα δέ οἱ ἦν Λάβδα. ταύτην Βακχιαδῶν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἤθελε γῆμαι, ἵσχει Ἡτίων ὁ Ἐχεκράτεος, δῆμον μὲν ἐὼν ἐκ Πέτρης, ἀτὰρ τὰ ἀνέκαθεν Λαπίθης τε καὶ Καίνειδης.

Blakesley alone has seen that δῆμον means 'of the commonalty.' Labda was in a similar position to Electra in Euripides' play of that name. While unable to marry a person of high rank, she could not be allowed to become the wife of an ignoble person, lest her kinsmen should be disgraced thereby: the only suitable husband was a man of ancient nobility reduced to poverty and lowliness. These two qualifications of Eëtion are indicated here by δῆμον μὲν ἐὼν etc. and ἀτὰρ τὰ ἀνέκαθεν etc. It is unnecessary, however, to follow Blakesley in deleting ἐκ Πέτρης as an annotation due to misunderstanding of δῆμον; the mention of a (probably poor and outlying) locality might fitly be connected with a statement of low rank.

The entire point of the sentence is destroyed by the rendering of all other commentators and translators: 'from the hamlet of Petra,' for which they compare 9, 73¹ Σωφάνης ἐκ (MSS.; corr. ἐὼν) δῆμον Δεκελεῆθεν.

92γ² When the Bacchiad assassins arrived to make away with the child of Labda and Eëtion, ἡ Λάβδα εἰδιυία τε οὐδὲν τῶν εἵνεκα ἐκείνοι ἀπικοίατο καὶ δοκέουσα σφεας φιλοφροσύνης τοῦ πατρὸς εἵνεκα αἰτέειν, φέρουσα ἐνεχείρισε αὐτῶν ἐνί.

The commentators have no note on τοῦ πατρὸς, but those translators who are not ambiguous take it to refer to the child's father, i.e. Eëtion. It should be obvious that Labda's father, the Bacchiad Amphion, is meant. Though he had been forced to marry off his daughter in low estate, she still retained a connection with the ruling caste, and friends of Amphion might well out of goodwill call to see his daughter's child, who indeed was their kin. Eëtion was a nobody, and in his child, as such, the Bacchiads had no reason to be amicably interested.

100 παρὰ ποταμὸν Καῦστριον.

Καῦστριον is not the adjective of Κάυστρος (as Ar. *Ach.* 68), but the Homeric form of the name (Καῦστρίον ἀμφὶ ῥέεθρα B 461). For a name of adjectival form cf. Lat. *Larius lacus*. There appears to be no example of a river described periphrastically by ποταμὸς and the adjective from its own name, whereas ποταμός in apposition to the name is one of the two regular modes (*with* the article in Attic, *without* it in Hdt., 6 passages of Thuc., Isoc. 7, 80, and Xen. *An.* 4, 7¹⁸). Otherwise the name, at its first mention in a context, must be accompanied by the article, an exception being those alluvial plains of Asia Minor which are described as πεδίων with the anarthrous name of the river: Μαιάνδρου πεδίων Hdt. 1, 18¹; 161; 2, 10¹; Καῦστρου πεδίων Xen. *An.* 1, 2¹¹; Καΐκου πεδίων Hdt. 6, 28².

VI. After the Ionian revolt was suppressed, the Persian fleet moved to attack Miltiades in the Chersonese (33). Here H. inserts a narrative of the whole Greek dynasty of Chersonese (34-39¹), concluding (39²) with the story of Miltiades' arrival and how he imprisoned the native chiefs by a stratagem. He then continues (40¹):

οἶτος δὲ (δὴ Krüger) ὁ Κίμωνος Μιλτιάδης νεωστὶ μὲν ἐληλύθει εἰς τὴν Χερσονήσον, κατελάμβανε δὲ μιν ἐλθόντα ἄλλα τῶν κατεχόντων (καταλαβόντων aP—a corruption due to recollection of κατελάμβανε) πρηγμάτων χαλεπώτερα. τρίτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐτεῖ τούτων Σκύθας ἐκφεύγει. Here there is parataxis: 'This M. was but newly arrived, when . . .'; τὰ κατέχοντα πρήγματα are 'the standing difficulties' implied in the preceding sentence by Miltiades' imprisonment of the chiefs, his maintenance of a mercenary force, and his marriage alliance with Thrace. Now, says Herodotus, 'other and more serious difficulties,' ἄλλα χαλεπώτερα, assailed him. What these are, he proceeds to relate: 'In the third year τούτων, i.e. τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων, or, more vaguely, "after his arrival," M. was driven out by a Scythian invasion.'

After describing the invasion and Miltiades' return, Herodotus comes to the second of the 'more serious difficulties,' already implied by μὲν, namely, the arrival of the Persian fleet (40⁹): ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τρίτῳ ἐτεῖ πρότερον ἐγεγόνει τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων, τότε δὲ πυνθανόμενος εἶναι τοὺς Φοίνικας ἐν Τενέδῳ, κτέ. This sentence has involved the interpretation of the whole chapter in considerable difficulty. If τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων is the same as τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων above—the most natural reading of the passage—then πρότερον plays havoc, as the Scythian invasion was not 3 years *before* Miltiades' arrival. On the other hand, we cannot take τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων as distinct from τῶν κατεχ. πρηγ., and refer it to the coming of the Phoenician fleet; for besides the clumsiness of this, it results in Miltiades being driven out by the Scythians 3 years after his arrival, say 510 B.C., and not recalled till 3 years before the arrival of the Persians, namely, till 496 B.C.!

The key to the difficulty is to observe that τότε, whichever way interpreted, deprives the following τότε δὲ of its force, which depends on the contrast of πρότερον and τότε δὲ, the first and the second of Miltiades' 'more serious difficulties.' Dobree had already seen that Herodotus wrote simply: ταῦτα μὲν δὴ [τρίτῳ ἐτεῖ] πρότερον ἐγεγόνει [τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων], τότε δὲ πυνθανόμενος κτλ. τρίτῳ ἐτεῖ τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων is a perfectly correct gloss on πρότερον (repeating τρίτῳ ἐτεῖ τούτων from above, and explaining τούτων from the preceding sentence as τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων), which has been inserted in the text in two portions, probably as a result of supralineation.

The current explanation of the difficulty (by Stein, similarly Abicht, Abbott, Macan, How-Wells, etc.) works backward from ταῦτα μὲν δὴ . . . κατεχόντων accepted as genuine, and renders τρίτῳ . . . ἐτεῖ τούτων (§ 1) as 'in the third (or second) year *before* the events under discussion,' i.e. the arrival of the Persian fleet. Later editors obtain this interpretation from the ordinary text; but Stein rightly saw that it requires the insertion of πρό in τρίτῳ . . . ἐτεῖ <πρό> τούτων, and the adoption of καταλαβόντων for κατεχόντων, since the Scythian invasion and M.'s flight (to which τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων is now referred) was not 'the standing trouble,' but a sudden calamity. Even so, this solution is untenable.

(1) The two requisite textual changes are bad criticism. There would be no accounting for the loss of a genuine πρό, and καταλαβόντων, as we have seen, is the inferior reading.

(2) ἐληλύθει and ἐλθόντα have to be referred not to Miltiades' arrival in Chersonese, but to his return after expulsion by the Scythians. But in the context no reader, much less hearer, would understand the words as πάλιν κατεληλύθει, and κατελθόντα.

(3) τρίτῳ γὰρ ἐτεῖ κτλ. is taken as the explanation of this reference to Miltiades' return, and of τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων, which alludes to his flight. This cannot be so. For the Scythian episode is twice *coupled* by μὲν . . . δὲ . . . with the Persian arrival, which is the ἄλλα . . . χαλεπώτερα itself.

(4) The reference of τούτων to the Persian arrival, which was last mentioned in ch. 33, is artificial. In ch. 40 the arrival of the fleet is *not* in the reader's mind.

(5) The above-mentioned awkwardness of τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων and τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων referring to different things, and of τότε anticipating τότε δέ, remains.

(6) Rightly or wrongly, H. believed that the Scythian invasion of the Chersonese was an aftermath of Darius' Scythian expedition: Σκύθαι γὰρ οἱ νομάδες ἐρισθέντες ὑπὸ βασιλέως Δαρείου συνεστράφησαν καὶ ἤλασαν μέχρι τῆς Χερσονήσου ταύτης. On Stein's explanation the interval between the expedition of Darius and the Scythian invasion is about 20 years (!); on the explanation suggested above, the interval is only a year or two, as Miltiades was already tyrant of the Chersonese when he accompanied Darius on the expedition (4, 137¹).

Two earlier attempts to solve the problem were no less unsuccessful than Stein's, and need not be dealt with at length. Blakesley refers ἄλλα . . . χαλεπώτερα and τούτων to 'the new dangers threatened by the Ionian rebellion and its consequences,' so that the Scythian invasion (τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων) occurs in the 3rd year of the Revolt, or 497, while τῶν τότε μιν κατεχόντων are 'the arrival of the Phoenician fleet at Tenedos and "the troubles which then came upon him."' Rawlinson's identification of τῶν κατεχόντων πρηγμάτων and τῶν τότε μ. κατέχ. with the Phoenician arrival and of ἄλλα . . . χαλεπώτερα with the Scythian invasion has been sufficiently criticized by How-Wells.

VII 16 The conversation between Xerxes and Artabanus is a delightful encounter between superstition and rationalism; and it is rationalism, as represented by Artabanus, which the event proves wrong. In 15³ Xerxes, who has awakened Artabanus under the impression of a dream which urged him on to invade Greece, seeks to prove that the dream is heaven-sent, i.e. not a subjective phantasm, but a phenomenon external to himself. His suggestion is this: εἰ θεός ἐστι ὁ ἐπιπέμπων . . . , ἐπιπτήσεται καὶ σοὶ τῶντὸ τοῦτο ὄνειρον . . . εὐρίσκω δὲ ὅδε ἂν γινόμενα ταῦτα, εἰ λάβοις τὴν ἐμὴν σκευὴν πᾶσαν καὶ ἐνδὺς μετὰ τοῦτο ἴξοιο ἐς τὴν ἐμὸν θρόνον καὶ ἔπειτα ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ ἐμῇ κατυπνῶσαις. This is sound, everyday magic: the subject is identified with the monarch by wearing his clothes and using his throne and bed; and, as usual, the *daemon*, however powerful, can be deluded by the simplest human trick.

Artabanus answers in the spirit of rationalism. Dreams, he explains, are a purely subjective affair, confused images of the past day's thoughts (16³). Xerxes' suggestion is therefore right; the dream, if attention is to be paid to it, must first be proved external: 16γ¹ εἰ δὲ ἄρα ἐστὶ . . . τι τοῦ θείου μετέχον, σὺ πᾶν . . . εἰρηκας· φανήτω γὰρ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὡς καὶ σοὶ διακελευόμενον. Artabanus, however, who is besides anxious to avoid the perilous usurpation of Xerxes' throne (α¹), cannot subscribe to the magical estimate of demonic intelligence (γ²); οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐς τοσοῦτο εὐθιγῆς ἀνέκει τοῦτο, ὃ τί δὴ κοτὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενόν τοι . . . ὥστε δόξει ἐμὲ ὁρῶν σὲ εἶναι, τῇ σῇ ἐσθῇ τεκμαιρόμενον. He maintains that an external phenomenon would visit him, independent of disguise (γ¹), but finally submits to Xerxes' wish (γ³): εἰ δέ τοι οὕτω δεδοκῆται γίνεσθαι καὶ . . . δεῖ με ἐν κοίτῃ τῇ σῇ κατυπνῶσαι, φέρε, τούτων ἐξ ἐμεῦ ἐπιτελευμένων φανήτω καὶ ἐμοί. μέχρι δὲ τούτου τῇ παρεούσῃ γνώμῃ χρήσομαι.

As quoted and paraphrased above, the argument is consistent and intelligible. But a sentence has been omitted, which stands in our texts immediately before γ³, last quoted; it is this: εἰ δὲ ἐμὲ μὲν ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ποιήσεται οὐδὲ ἀξιώσει ἐπιφανῆναι, οὔτε ἦν τὴν ἐμὴν ἐσθῆτα ἔχω οὔτε ἦν τὴν σῇν, σὲ δὲ ἐπιφοιτήσει, τοῦτο ἤδη μαθητέον ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιφοιτήσει γε συνεχῶς, φαίην ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς θεῖον εἶναι. It needs no proof that συνεχῶς φοιτᾶν means 'visit Xerxes consistently,' and not, as Stein and Abicht, who alone have a note, interpret it, 'visit me no less than you.' This is a vain attempt to salvage a sentence which is impossible in its present context. It runs counter to the ideas of both Xerxes and Artabanus, in that it envisages a test to see if Xerxes only is subject to the dream and rests the proof of its supernatural origin not upon

its objectivity, but on its persistent subjectivity! How could it be followed by a sentence which concludes *φέρε, . . . φανήτω καὶ ἐμοί*?

It is less easy to explain than to detect the intrusion. Perhaps the simplest suggestion is, that the sentence is one of Herodotus' later additions (cf. p. 76), made under the impression that he was elucidating a train of thought which through imperfect recollection he was in fact obscuring.

184 Herodotus' peculiar way of expressing the large numbers manipulated in this chapter reproduces graphically the means by which he made the calculations, namely, with the abacus. When he writes (§ 2) *ἑξακισχίλιοι καὶ πρὸς διηκόσιοι τε καὶ δέκα* and repeats it in the form (§ 4) *χιλιάδες τε ἔπεισι ἐπὶ ταύτῃσι ἑπτὰ, καὶ πρὸς, ἑκατοντάδες ἕξ καὶ δεκάς*, and again (§ 5) *καὶ πρὸς, χιλιάδες ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑκατοντάδες ἕξ καὶ δεκάς*, we see him taking one string of his abacus to represent 10's, the next 100's, and the next 1,000's. When the operation was completed, he noted down the number of beads at the significant end of each string. The highest decade for which the Greeks had a special name was *μυριάς* (10,000). Here, then, the reckoner had to start again, taking one string for unit myriads, the next for 10's of myriads, and a third for 100's. So, when in 185³ he wrote *αὐταὶ αἱ μυριάδες ἐκείνῃσι προστεθείσαι τῇσι ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίης γίνονται . . . μυριάδες διηκόσiai καὶ ἐξήκοντα καὶ τέσσερες, ἔπεισι δὲ ταύτῃσι ἑκατοντάδες ἑκακάδεκα καὶ δεκάς*, there were 2, 6, 4, 1, 6 and 1 beads respectively at the same end of six successive strings on Herodotus' abacus.

That this was the Greek method of surmounting the arithmetical inconvenience of an alphabetic notation, we knew already from passages like Sol. ap. Diog. L. 1, 59 *παρὰ πηλούς ταις ψήφοις ἐπὶ τῶν λογισμῶν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ἐκάστην ποτὲ μὲν πλείω σημαίνειν, ποτὲ δὲ ἥττω*, and Plut. *Αῤορῆ*. p. 691 *καθάπερ οἱ τῶν ἀριθμητικῶν δάκτυλοι νῦν μὲν μυριάδας νῦν δὲ μονάδα τιθέναι δύνανται*; but no other Greek writer exposed the method by which he reached his results as openly as Herodotus has done in this passage.

VIII 50¹ *ἀγγέλλων ἦκειν τὸν βάρβαρον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν καὶ πᾶσαν αὐτὴν πυρπολέσθαι.*

The lexicographers, the translators, and Macan (for other commentators are silent) all take *πυρπολέσθαι* to be a unique Middle. Why?

1081² *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπύθοντο τὰς νέας οἰχωκνίας, αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα ἐδόκει ἐπιδιώκειν. τὸν μὲν νῦν ναυτικὸν τὸν Ξέρξην στρατὸν οὐκ ἐπείδον διώξαντες μέχρι Ἀνδρου, ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀνδρον ἀπικόμενοι ἐβουλεύοντο. Θεμιστοκλῆς μὲν νῦν γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυτο διὰ νήσων τραπομένους καὶ ἐπιδιώξαντας τὰς νέας πλεῖν ἰθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον λύσοντας τὰς γεφύρας.*

Editors* have no note; but *ἐπιδιώξαντας* is corrupt. Themistocles urges the Greeks 'to sail straight for the Hellespont' (thus trapping Xerxes' army in Europe), to which course Eurybiades objects, as calculated to render a dangerous enemy desperate. Although the Persian fleet was heading for the Hellespont *ὡς τάχως εἶχε ἕκαστος, διαφυλαξούσας τὰς σχεδίας* (107¹), they naturally took the familiar coastwise route by which they had come, and which was secured for them. The Greeks, Themistocles says, must get in front of them, *διὰ νήσων τραπομένους*, 'taking a short cut across the Archipelago.' (That is the meaning of *διὰ νήσων*, though a straight line drawn from Andros to the Hellespont does not in fact encounter a single island.) But by so doing, the Greeks would not 'continue the chase of the ships' (*ἐπιδιώξαντας τὰς νέας*), but *abandon* it. That the two courses *ἐπιδιώκειν τὰς νέας* and *πλεῖν ἰθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον* are mutually exclusive is proved by the resumptive sentence in 111¹ *οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἐπειτέ σφι ἀπέδοξε μήτ' ἐπιδιώκειν ἔτι προσωτέρω τῶν*

* Except Macan, who saw the difficulty, but Herodotus' part apparently ascribes it to muddled thinking on

βαρβάρων τὰς νέας μήτε πλέειν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον λύσοντας τὸν πόρον, τὴν Ἄνδρον περικατέατο.*

The sense required instead of ἐπιδιώξαντας is ἐάσαντας; but it can hardly be claimed as more than a possibility that this was the actual word which has been displaced by ἐπιδιώξαντας, under the influence of ἐπιδιώκειν and διώξαντες above.

IX 54¹ καὶ οἱ μὲν παρηγόρεον Ἀμομφάρετον, μούνον Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Τεγεγέτων λελειμμένον.

So all editors print. But in 55¹ it is obvious that 'the Lacedaemonians and Tegeates' have not moved a step: ὡς ἀπίκετο ὁ κῆρυξ ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧρα σφέας κατὰ χώραν τεταγμένους; and 54¹ is then repeated thus: παρηγόρεον τὸν Ἀμομφάρετον ὃ τε Εὐρύναξ καὶ ὁ Πανσανίης μὴ κινδυνεύειν μένοντας μούνους Λακεδαιμονίους. So Stein and practically all the Mss.; but E (the Parisian excerpts) has Λακεδαιμονίων, which is read by many editors, including Hude,—wrongly, as we shall see; for it is an arbitrary correction to accord with the corrupt text of 54¹. But when we come to 56¹, we read, ὁ Πανσανίης, οὐ δοκέων τὸν Ἀμομφάρετον λείψεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστιχόντων, . . . ἀπῆγε . . . τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, and this no editor has sought to alter. Yet in 54¹, according to our present text, Amompharetus was *already* μούνον Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Τεγεγέτων λελειμμένον! We have therefore, unless with Macan we resort to 'rhetorical exaggeration' as an explanation, to accept μούνων from B, and λελειμμένων from D—if 'authority' for such a change is needed at all—and there write: καὶ οἱ μὲν παρηγόρεον Ἀμομφάρετον, μούνων Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Τεγεγέτων λελειμμένων.

122² ἐπὶ Ζεὺς Πέρσῃσι ἡγεμονίην διδοί, ἀνδρῶν δὲ σοί,^a Κῦρε, κατελὼν Ἀστυάγην, φέρε, γῆν γὰρ ἐκτίμεθα ὀλίγην καὶ ταύτην τρηχέαν, μεταναστάντες ἐκ ταύτης ἄλλην σχῶμεν ἀμείνω.

^a σοί DS.

No editor has ever yet adopted the reading σύ (probably because it rests chiefly on D, the eldest of the 'Roman' group, which was not rediscovered till 1921); yet it is manifestly superior to σοί. Not only does it secure all that Hude wished by his suggestion of κατελόντι, but it first gives ἀνδρῶν a proper meaning, in opposition to Zeus (θεῶν μὲν Ζεὺς). Were σοί correct, ἀνδρῶν would be pointless, and we should desiderate Περσέων in its stead. Moreover, as the context shows, ἡγεμονίη here means the mastership of the Persians over the surrounding nations; and this was given to the Persians by the exploits of Cyrus; Cyrus' own position as emperor is irrelevant. The reverent attribution of prime causality to God, and only of secondary to man, is familiar since Homer: A 760 ἀψ' ἀπὸ Βουπρασίου Πύλονδ' ἔχον ὥκας ἵππους / πάντες δ' εὐχέτόντο θεῶν Διὶ Νέστορι τ' ἀνδρῶν, and II 849 ἀλλὰ με μοῖρ' ὅλοῃ καὶ Διτοῦς ἔκτανεν νίος, / ἀνδρῶν δ' Εὐφορβος. The same idea is expressed in another form in 7, 139⁵, where Herodotus is crediting Athens with the salvation of Greece: αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ . . . βασιλέα μετὰ γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι. For the peculiar esteem in which the Persians held Cyrus, as the founder of their fortunes, cf. e.g. 3, 160¹ Ζωπύρου δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀγαθοεργίην Περσέων ὑπερεβάλετο παρὰ Δαρείῳ κριτῇ . . . ὅτι μὴ Κῦρος μούνος· τοῦτ' γὰρ οὐδεὶς Περσέων ἠξίωσε κω ἐωντὸν συμβαλεῖν, and the passages there quoted by Stein.

J. ENOCH POWELL.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

* Themistocles' secret message to the king (110³), that he ἔσχε τοὺς Ἑλλήνας τὰς νέας βουλομένους διώκειν καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἑλλήσποντῳ γεφύρας

λέγειν, is not inconsistent with this, nor in any case was Themistocles, in his dealings with the Persians, always careful to be strictly accurate.

SOME NEW READINGS IN EURIPIDES.

I. *THE Antiope*.—The papyrus fragments of the *Antiope*,¹ written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass² in 1892, whose readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the *Supplementum Euripideum*³ introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone (particularly unreliable where cartonnage is concerned, which is often blurred and occasionally distorted in the process of preparation) and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation *De Euripidis Antiope*⁴; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them.

Frag. A 1.]ησδε Schaal. The curved stroke still visible is too extended to be the top of the right-hand stroke of an η; the reading should be το]ησδε, as already suggested by von Arnim.

id. 22. Lycus demands that the Chorus should tell him where the young men and their mother (whose relationship is still unknown to him) are. Schaal prints σημήνατ' εἶπατε (correcting from the σημανατε of the papyrus). Though the papyrus is badly rubbed here, a few more letters may be distinguished; the papyrus gives:

σημανατεεἰπατεψ[. .]ν[. .]αγτονησελε[

There is scarcely room for ε]ν[εστ'], even supposing the papyrus to be squeezed at this point. Possibly the writer omitted a letter or, less probably, wrote ε]ν; if either of these assumptions is granted, the line may be restored, *exempli gratia*, to:

σημήνατ', εἶπατ' ὦ[ς ε]ν[εστ'] αὐτοὺς ἐλε[ίν.

For ἐλε[ίν compare ε]λωμεν in l. 16.

id. 23. ἀτιμάσας Schaal. Read ἀτιμάσας (so Mahaffy).

id. 27. . . .]ν.πλ[Schaal. Near the end of this badly preserved line Arnim had already discerned the letters εγμ. Though the whole line is beyond my powers of reconstruction, a little more may be read:

. . .]αιπο[.]αφ[. . .]στοφθεγμ[. . . .

¹ Now P. Lond. 485=Milne, Catalogue of Literary Papyri, 70. I wish to thank Mr. H. J. M. Milne and Mr. T. C. Skeat of the British Museum for very kindly checking my readings in this text.

² *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* 145, pp. 578-580.

³ Lietzmann, *Kleine Texte* 112, Bonn, 1913.

⁴ Diss. Berol., 1914.

Frag. B 1.]ρας ἡδομαι κα[κ]ῶν ἔκα[ς] Schaal. Von Arnim completed the line by reading φόνου δ' ἀποδ]ράς, not very appropriate if spoken, as he and others assume, by the shepherd enticing Lycus into the hut where Zethus and Amphion await him. The papyrus gives]σας, where, as Mr. D. L. Page has suggested to me, . . . σε κομ]σας is probably to be recognized.

id. 8. The shepherd is persuading Lycus to leave his bodyguard outside the cave.

δόμων δ' ἐπαινῶ] δορυφόρου[ς] ἔξω μ[έ]νειν Schaal. Von Arnim had read ἔξω [λιπών, and enough remains to make it certain that this is not correct. I should interpret the scanty traces as θνρ[, and the line might then run : λιπεῖν δ' ἄριστον] δορυφόρου[ς] ἔξω θύρας.

id. 12. The shepherd is answering Lycus' enquiry about the number of the strangers :

]οὔχ' ἔχουσιν ἐν χεροῖν Schaal. Von Arnim supplies παῦροί τε λόγχας τ'] κτλ. Before the οὔχ' a δ can be clearly read; as παῦροι or some equivalent is essential to the sense, von Arnim's line might be adapted as follows :

παῦροί γε λόγχας] δ' οὔχ' ἔχουσιν ἐν χεροῖν.

id. 15. Ν[υκτέω]ς Schaal. Read Νυκτεως.

Frag. C 44. In this, the final act of the play, Hermes intervenes to put a stop to the quarrel and to assign their future destinies to the disputants. After presenting his credentials as messenger of Zeus, he continues in ll. 44-45 :

καὶ πρ[ῶ]τα μὲν σφ[ί]
ὥς Ζεὺς ἐμείχθη [κούκᾱ]παρνήσῃ τάδε. (Schaal.)

Von Arnim's reading σφ[ί] δὴ λέγων ἄ]νθρωπος [ὥς]—based on Mahaffy's σφ [.]στερωπ[.]ος—apart from the unsuitability of the sentiment, is ruled out, as the papyrus at the end of the line is quite smooth and shows no traces either of ink or rubbing, so that [ὥς] is without justification. (Through a curious slip Mahaffy had read οὐ instead of ὥς at the beginning of l. 45; the correct reading, of which there can be no doubt, was restored by Schaal.) I read as follows :

καὶ πρ[.]ταμεν σφ[.]]σεξερωπερι

The letter Mahaffy read as τ is almost certainly a ξ, as a dot of ink below the level of the line indicates. The line may be restored :

καὶ πρ[ῶ]τα μὲν σφ[ί]ν μητρὸς] ἐξερῶ περι

or perhaps σφ[ων] is to be preferred. In l. 45 the ἀ]παρνῆται of Blass seems to me to be closer to the papyrus than the ἀ]παρνήσῃ of Mahaffy and Schaal.

id. 62. Hermes is addressing Zethus :

σὺ μὲν φύλας]σ[ε] πνεῦμα πολέμιον λαβών Schaal, correcting the πολεμίων of the papyrus. Of Schaal's initial φ I could find no trace, and read σνμεν . [. . .]ντο πνευμαπολεμωνλαβων. A really satisfactory explanation of this has, as far as my knowledge goes, still to be offered; *Phoenissae* 454—

σχάσον δὲ δεινὸν ὄμμα καὶ θυμοῦ πνοάς—

suggested to me that σ[χ]ασο]ν might be read here, and this is palaeographically possible. But λαβών remains unexplained, and even if this line is regarded as dependent on the ἐξαρτύετε of l. 61, no solution is at hand which preserves the reading of the papyrus.¹ It is worth noticing that whereas seven and a half lines

¹ Robinson Ellis in *The American Journal of Philology*, XII (1891), pp. 481 sqq., proposed reading τοσούτων ἔρματα. For this reading there is no warrant in the papyrus, but if desperate

are devoted to Amphion, Zethus receives only one and a half, and this discrepancy is the more remarkable as Hermes begins by speaking to them both together (l. 59), then turns to address each separately, and finally in l. 71 again speaks to them both; possibly the best solution is to assume that some lines have dropped out of our text after l. 62.

id. 63. Ζήθῳι [τάδ' εἶ]πον· [. . . .]ν δ' Ἀμφίονι
λύραν ἀ[νωγ]α κτλ. (Schaal.)

Von Arnim gave [τῇ]ν [ἐμῇ]ν, agreeing with λύραν, which, other considerations apart, is unsuitable as Amphion must almost certainly have had the lyre for the ἀγών scene with Zethus earlier in the play. The papyrus gives fairly clearly δεύτερον, though of the δ and ν little remains.

id. 78-79. The play ends with Lycus' invocation of Zeus:

ἐδειξας [ἐργωι] τάσδ' ἀβουλίας ἐμὰς
ἐς σφ[]δοκοῦντας οὐκ εἶναι Διός. (Schaal.)

In l. 78 neither ἐργωι (Schaal and von Arnim after Diels) nor εἰς φῶς (Blass) is at all satisfactory—the two letters before τάσδ' appear to be το—but of the two Blass' reading is perhaps preferable. The first six letters of l. 79 are (as already read by Mahaffy) εσσφρα, and Mr. T. C. Skeat suggested to me that some form or compound of σφραγίζω might have stood in the text at this point. The space after these six letters is very limited, but it is noticeable that the space occupied by different letters in this text varies greatly, e.g. οι or σι often take considerably less room than π or ν; here εσσφραγίσ[α]s—'as you have set your seal on them who seem to be no sons of Zeus'—would be palaeographically a possible reading. Against this must be set the facts that ἐνσφραγίζω is a post-classical word and that σφραγίζω, though used metaphorically by Euripides (*I.T.* 1372), is not found in this sense till comparatively late.¹ (For ἐσσ- instead of ἐνσ- in inscriptions of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. v. Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, p. 110, §§ 43, c.) Robinson Ellis on the basis of Mahaffy's reading proposed ἐς φράτορας (Antiope was the niece of Lycus), an attractive suggestion which has been ignored by every subsequent editor.

id. 85. Ἐρμῇι [δὲ πεισθεὶς Ἄρ]εος εἰς κρήνην [β]αλῶ (Schaal), which cannot be far from the sense of the passage. The papyrus appears to me to give Ερμη[. . .]τ . [. . .]τρεῖς Ἄρεος κτλ., but I can suggest no suitable restoration.

II. The *Cretans*. Two of the most difficult lines in Pasiphae's *apologia* (first published by Schubart-Wilamowitz²) are printed by the editors as follows:

τοιῶνδε λέκτρω[ν εἶνεκ' εἰς] πεδοστιβῆ
ῤινδὸν καθείσ[η] σῶμα Κύπρις ἀχθεῖται

correcting the reading of the parchment καθισ . . . In the places in this text where the ink has faded, the difficulties of the reader are greatly increased because the

measures are to be adopted in this passage (and πνεῦμα is in any case difficult), the emendation is attractive. We may perhaps assume that Zethus, in contrast to Amphion, carries, or is even given by Hermes, a sword; in which case Mr. J. U. Powell has suggested to me that Robinson Ellis' line might be improved by substituting [ἀθηκτ]ον for [τοσοῦτ]ον.

¹ Mr. Milne objects to this reading on the ground that 'εἰς σφω is necessary because of the address (to the twins) in the next line which

would be otherwise unheralded,' and thinks that the papyrus may have been corrected. We are then faced with the difficulty that in one and the same sentence Zeus is addressed in the vocative in l. 77 and Zethus and Amphion in l. 79. Mr. Milne has since suggested to me that we should either (a) emend to καὶ σφω, τέκνω or (b) assume that a line is missing after ἀβουλίας ἐμὰς in l. 78, which would have mediated the transition between one address and the next.

² *Berliner Klassikertexte*, V. 2, p. 73, ll. 17-18.

writing on the verso of the sheet is visible through the thin parchment and obliterates the original reading on the recto. Here the reading after καθισ (there is room for at least three letters before the gap) is confused by the end of l. 44; but the last letter of this line can be clearly read in the space next but one to the σ of καθισ, thus leaving room for one letter, of which some traces remain; an upright stroke and part of a cross-bar make it highly probable that τ should be read.¹ If καθιστ . . . is correct, we are left with the choice either of the infinitive or of some form of the present participle, and as the line ends almost certainly with a verb in the third person singular, the infinitive is to be preferred. Von Arnim² restores the lines thus:

τοιῶνδε λέκτροι[ν εἴνεκ' εἰς] πεδοστιβῆ
ῥινὸν καθέρ[ξ]ασ[θαί με σῶμ' ὅδ' οἶε]ται

and though his reading in l. 18 is at fault (what he read in the facsimile is really the end of l. 44), it is probable that his interpretation of the passage is correct. A further objection to the view of the original editors is that Pasiphae's speech is an attack on Minos and Poseidon, and a mention of the anger of Kupris (the word is used in a different sense in l. 7—λαθραῖαν ἐμπολωμένη κύπριν) would be irrelevant at this point. Following von Arnim, we might insert καθιστ[άναι] in place of his καθέρξασθαι, although the resultant line is clumsy and awkward in expression.

id. l. 52. The Chorus has implored Minos to defer punishment and not to act in haste; of his reply there remains only one line, which the Berlin editors print thus:

κ[.] . [.] μὴ 'ναβάλλεσθαι δίκην.

Of the single letter between the two brackets, a long, nearly horizontal stroke is left, almost certainly the bottom of a δ. The line might then be tentatively restored as

κ[αὶ δὴ] δ[έδοκται] μὴ 'ναβάλλεσθαι δίκην

or less probably δ[οκεῖ μοι].

III. The *Melanippe Vincita*.³ l. 5] . . κα οὐκ ἀρνούμεναι edd. In the transcript an iota has been omitted. Read:

] . . καὶ οὐκ ἀρνούμεναι.

Hence Mekler's κακά must be given up.

¹ Dr. W. Schubart very kindly checked my reading here as also that in l. 52 and in the *Melanippe Vincita*.

² *Supplementum Euripideum*, p. 23.

³ Text in Hunt, *Fragmenta Tragica Papyracea*, which includes the lines from Satyros' *Life of Euripides* (P. Oxy. 1176) together with the Berlin fragment (BKT. V. 2, p. 125).

C. H. ROBERTS.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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AESCHYLUS, *AGAMEMNON* 1148.

ὡς ὡς λιγέας μόρον ἀηδόνας·
περίβαλόν γέ οἱ πτεροφόρον δέμας
1148 θεοὶ γλυκύν τ' αἰῶνα κλαυμάτων ἄτερ·
ἐμοὶ δὲ μέμνει σχισμὸς ἀμφήκει δορί.

'A SWEET life without lamentation' renders Mr G. Thomson, who discusses the passage in *C.Q.* XXVIII 74 f. That is beyond question what this Greek will naturally and properly mean; if there were any doubt, his citations dispel it.

But as a description of the nightingale this would be, for the Greeks, a flagrant paradox, such as might be introduced by explicit statement, certainly, but never by a vague allusion. The similar paradox of Socrates about the swan at *Phaedo* 84e-85b is elaborately argued, and is broached as novel; it is extended parenthetically to the swallow and hoopoe as well as to the nightingale, and that as if anything a greater paradox—'not even the nightingale herself etc.' To me it seems evident that apart from Socrates even this paradox about the swan did not exist.¹ What is attested by Thomson's parallels here is that the swan was associated with Apollo; but that was well known, as Socrates indicates by his ἄτε οἶμαι τοῦ 'Απ. ὄντες; and to T.'s ref. one can add *Ar. Birds* 772, *Callim. Hymn* IV 249. But the nightingale had no such special² connexion with this (or any) god; Thomson has evidently understood the words which he quotes, ἄτε οἶμαι . . . ἔδουσι, of all four birds mentioned in the preceding context; they refer however to the swan only, as is proved by the remainder of the sentence καὶ . . . χρόνῳ. As for his claim that 'a similar sentiment with regard to the nightingale was expressed by Alcaeus,' that disappears upon an examination of his own reference. What *Himerius Or.* 14, 10 tells us is that the nightingale and the swallow and the cicada were once represented by Alcaeus as singing 'not about their fate as human beings' but entirely about Apollo. As this was on the special occasion of their attending upon the god's original advent at Delphi, they could hardly have done otherwise; they were present because it happened to be summer, and the poem here was marked by a 'summery voluptuousness.' Such as they are, both Thomson's references to the nightingale as singing otherwise than mournfully specifically contravene the ordinary account, and thus render our curt allusion to her habitual *insouciance* more incredible than ever. I find also another objection, equally fatal. Cassandra's words at this rate would amount to a blunt contradiction of the account of the nightingale which the chorus have just given; and a contradiction clearly could not be introduced by γέ as here employed.

The nightingale throughout Greek poetry is 'the type of unconsolable lamentation.' Accordingly it is hardly to be wondered at that Headlam was driven to accepting Schneidewin's desperate device; and it must be due to Headlam's influence that the sense 'apart from lamentation' has since been embraced by Mazon, Weir Smyth, and Lawson. But, to say nothing about the incredible ambiguity, such an exception stultifies the very statement to which it is here attached; indeed, the phrase 'a happy life but for [perpetual] lamentations' is itself slightly ludicrous. As Platnauer has said (*l.c. infra*), 'could anything be less like poetry?'

I can see no escape from the inference that ἄτερ is corrupt. The first to realize this was Weil, and the διαί which he inserted in the text is retained by Wecklein with the explanation that 'nach γλυκύν hielt man begreiflicherweise ἄτερ für nötig.' If such alterations had been made by scribes for such reasons, textual criticism would

¹ Except to the extent that, as is shown by T.'s ref., *Dionysius (de avibus* 2. 19), speaking as a naturalist and in the time of Hadrian, asserted that ἔδουσι δ' οὐχὶ θρηνηῶδες ὥσπερ αἱ ἀλκυόνες.

² A singing creature may naturally appear

here and there in association with a singing deity, as the nightingale stimulates Apollo to rivalry at *Ar. Birds* 217, or the cicada serves the Muses at *Plat. Phaedr.* 259c.

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be a waste of time. And on the contrary, the scholion (in all its inarticulateness) shows that *κλαυμάτων ἄτερ* said of the nightingale puzzled even a scholiast.

In C.R. XXXIX 148 Mr M. Platnauer proposed *κλαυμάτων· ἀτὰρ | ἔμοιγε κτλ.* To this Mr Willy Morel has replied (Bursian 234 p. 96) that αἰὼν *κλαυμάτων* is not Greek; but for an ostensibly exact syntactical parallel to Platnauer's three-word phrase one need not go outside Aeschylus, *δακρύων βίον ἀμβλωπόν Eum.* 954. Morel's other arguments are absurd. My parallel, however, is no more than syntactical. Although you can speak of weeping as an indulgence (*Il.* IV 102, *Eur. Suppl.* 79 ff.), 'a sweet life of lamentations' remains an oxymoron; this I feel makes the syntax¹ harsher; the phrase is blunt, and rendered blunter by the pause; and the preservation of a 'stichic' or line-by-line monotony, with the use of a simple antithetic δὲ, at the other two places where Cassandra brings out the contrast of her own fate, 1160 and 1172 (where the δὲ at least seems sound), would make me at least² very reluctant to tamper with ἐμοὶ δὲ.

These emendations—and there are no others worth considering—represent the nightingale as enjoying her mournful cries. This too, although no such paradox as Thomson's, is yet for Greek poetry a considerable paradox; so that I am doubtful whether there is either room for it in this line, or place for it in this dirge. But on one point I am no longer doubtful; I do not see how such a conception can have formed any part of this reply to the preceding utterance of the elders. 'You are as sad as the moaning nightingale.' 'The nightingale? Alas for her fate! At least³ the gods gave her a feathery form and a pleasant life of lamentation.' This is no rejoinder but, once again, a contradiction. How can Cassandra speak thus, when it is her own present predicament (anything but γλυκὺς)—her own lamentation—that has suggested the comparison? How can she answer thus to their ταλαίνας φρεσὶν Ἴτυν Ἴτυν στένονα⁴?

Moreover even the associations of the phrase γλυκὺς αἰὼν make it antithetical to tears (*Od.* V 151-3) and trouble (*Hdt.* VII 46⁶).

This brings me to my second step. No one could possibly have made more genuine, repeated, violent, and exhaustive⁶ efforts to save *κλαυμάτων* than I. *κλ. μέτα*—but no, the gods did not give the *κλαύματα*, these were her own contribution. *κλ. ἄκη* or ἄκος, compare τῶν ἀτυχημάτων λύσειν in Aphthonius (*q.v.*) *apud* Headlam; but no, Procne was not a Niobe, and in all the numerous ancient references to her fate⁷ I can find no indication that she lamented *before* her metamorphosis; rather the fleeing sisters were transformed to save them from the pursuit of Tereus, who however still pursued (*Aesch. Suppl.* 62). *κλ. ὑπερ* (*causa*, cf. *Soph. Ant.* 932)—but again this should have been *πημάτων ὑπερ*. My next conclusion therefore is that

¹ At *Soph. El.* 19, although the night is not black with stars, it must be black to be starry; *ibid.* 758 the antithesis of epithets μέγιστον . . . δειλάς makes all the difference.

² 'ἔμοιγε'; however it may be with others. To my taste, the γε in ἔμοιγε impairs the pathos of the line; but I do not presume to invite others to think so. I note however that Denniston, *Greek Particles* p. 51, speaks of ἀτὰρ in Attic as 'colloquial in tone,' 'avoided in formal language,' and on p. 52 as associated with 'a break-off, a sudden change of topic.' I had observed that all Aesch.'s three *exx.* are with a verb in the 2nd pers.; *P.V.* 343 (but let me tell you); 1011 (but really, you know); *Pers.* 333 (but look here, but I say).

³ I regard Enger's γε for γάρ as certain, for the reasons given in Headlam's note.

⁴ I may say that I punctuate 'φεῦ' ταλ. φρ. "Ἴτυν Ἴτυν' στέν. κτλ. I do not see how one can do otherwise.

⁵ Here How and Wells make an extraordinary comment; it is no explanation of a passage which needs none; but it would be an exact and necessary explanation, if γέσας were γεννάμενος and αἰῶνα 'eternity'! Nor can I see (with orthodoxy, *vid.* Rawlinson's tr.) that γεῦσαι τι is γεῦσαι τινά τινος. God made life as such taste sweet; his φθόνος appears in his accompanying dispensations.

⁶ Mr Denniston, my main victim, will bear this out; I owe to him the refutation on logical grounds of an attempt not mentioned here.

⁷ These are given in the best general account of the myth, Pearson's introduction to the fragments of Sophocles' *Tereus*.

κλανμάτων also is corrupt. Nobody is going to legitimize the Schneidewin-Headlam sense by proposing κλ. βίη, and the only alternative sense is 'sweet by reason of lamentations,' which is incompatible both dramatically and poetically with 1140-1146 (not -5 merely), and incompatible, to my taste, and in such a context, with γε. Indeed, I cannot think that a Greek poet would ever have described the nightingale as happy in her lamentations; even the paradox of Socrates does not assert that.

For a moment, ignore the infected area; assume instead of κλανμάτων ἄτερ a lacuna. I should then conjecture that the whole sentence had been descriptive of the alleviations of the metamorphosis; and that the missing phrase had embodied some picturesque detail balancing πτεροφόρον. Now, as it happens, not only the earliest and most striking description of the nightingale, but the generality of parallels to our passage in the dramatic poets, mention with deliberate variation of terms one such detail, simple and yet poetically almost essential. *Od.* XIX. 520 δενδρέων ἐν πετάλοις καθεζομένη; *Eur. Hel.* 1107 ἐναύλοις ὑπὸ δενδροκόμοις (with διὰ ξοῦθ' ἂν γενῶν, cf. *Agam.* 1142, and with θρήνων ἔμοι ξυνεργός); *Phoen.* 1515 ff. (an ὄρνις not specified, but the parallelism is unmistakable) ἀκροκόμοις ἀμφὶ κλάδοις ἐξομένα (with ἔμοις ἄχρσι συνφδός); *fr.* 89 κισσός, εὐφνὴς κλάδος, ἀηδόνων μουσεῖον; *fr.* 775, 21 ff. ἐν δένδρεσι (with Ἴτυν Ἴτυν); *Ar. Birds* 214 f. διὰ φυλλοκόμου μίλακος (with Ἴτυν and γέννος ξουθῆς); 742 ἰζόμενος μελίας ἐπὶ φυλλοκόμου (with γέννος ξουθῆς).

Returning to the corruption, I infer that, if we are on the true trail, there will be a word with the meaning *branch* bearing a close resemblance to κλαῦμα; and there is, and that a common one, κλῆμα. Read κλημάτων ὑπο 'under cover of the vine-shoots.'

The nightingale does in fact sing in the covert,¹ and ὑπο is the preposition applied to this in *Eur. Hel.* l.c. and *Soph. O.C.* 673—where Jebb renders 'in the covert of green glades.' (Note ἡ λίγεια, cf. our λιγείας.) It is true that the case in those two places is the dative, but the constructions are employed as alternatives;² and Aeschylus has six clear instances of ὑπὸ with *gen. loci*, the normal (and notoriously common) Attic.

The tree or plant in which the nightingale sings is apt to be specified; ash, ivy, bryony, see above. But Aeschylus as an Athenian would associate the bird especially with its most famous local haunt, the grove at Colonus; and there it sang among vines. See *Soph. O.C.* 670-80; but the neater parallel is 16-18:—

βρύων
δάφνης, ἐλαίας, ἀμπέλον· πυκνόπτεροι δ'
εἶσω κατ' αὐτὸν εὐστομόν' ἀηδόνες.

And so also in parks elsewhere, e.g. at Amasia, *Anth. Pal.* IX. 668, 9-11.

That κλημάτων in our passage or indeed in any passage about the nightingale should be corrupted into κλανμάτων may be said to be more likely than not; and ὑπὸ and ἀπὸ are constantly interchanged. But κλανμάτων ἀπο here was not natural Greek; so a reviser with the best intentions altered ἀπο to ἄτερ in order to make articulate what seemed, and indeed was, the only sense which *that expression* could suggest in this association with γλυκὺς αἰών. κλημάτινος *Theogn.* 1360 and κληματώεις *Nic. Al.* 530 show that our word was poetical, and it is authenticated for tragedy by κεκλημάτωται *Soph. Fr.* 255, 4.

A. Y. CAMPBELL.

UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL.

¹ See 1316 for an opposite picture, also, of course, derived from nature.

² The distinction, if any, is purely technical; it is regarded as negligible by Kühner-Blass I p. 522 [see (b) and π.], but is nicely determined

by Brugmann-Thumb⁴ (p. 519), who note that the dative became eclipsed after Homer; cf. L. and S.⁸ s.v. ΑΙ2 fin. and the authorities cited there.

NOTES ON THREE PASSAGES FROM THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK VIII.

1156a 6-10. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι, τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τάγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν.

ACCORDING to the current division of the text of *E.N.* into chapters, a new chapter begins with διαφέρει. As Ramsauer complained, this division obscures the connection of thought. These words form the conclusion of the argument, which commenced in 1155b 17 (where a chapter-division is properly marked), and has led through the analysis of the φιλητόν to the establishment of a rough definition of φιλία in 1156a 3-5. The argument is not complete until the inference from the triple nature of the φιλητόν to the triple nature of φιλία has been made, and Aristotle has further justified his definition by pointing out that it applies in some form at least to each of the three divisions of φιλία.

In 1156a 6-10 the argument reaches the desired conclusion. ταῦτα in a 6 = τὰ εἰρημένα = τὰ φιλητά = τὰ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, and τὸ χρήσιμον: and the particles ἄρα and δὲ in a 6 and a 7 mark the inference from the σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων which is here concluded. In a 8-10, καθ' ἕκαστον¹ . . . φιλοῦσιν, Aristotle justifies the rest of the definition by pointing out that each of the three marks which go to form it holds good in the case of each φιλητόν.

The decisive break in the argument, then, comes at φιλοῦσιν. In the sentences which follow, Aristotle proceeds to examine the εἶδη φιλίας whose existence he establishes here. A new paragraph should therefore be printed as commencing with οἱ μὲν οὖν, and the chapter-division should be made at this point also. a 6-10 will stand better as a separate paragraph than if there is no division after εἰρημένων at all. This arrangement allows chapter II to stand as a self-contained whole, dealing with the division of φιλία into εἶδη on the basis of the distinction of the three φιλητά.

If this view of the argument is correct, the difficulty which recent editors have found in the interpretation of a 9-10 largely disappears. Of the three marks which (with the φιλητά) constitute the definition, Aristotle can say without further ado that two of them, μὴ λανθάνειν and ἀντιφίλησις, occur in the εἶδος which corresponds to each separate φιλητόν: in a 9-10, he claims that βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ, the third mark, is found in each εἶδος, but appears to qualify the statement by adding ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν.

Aristotle has said that the well-wishing in φιλία should be disinterested—ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, 1155b 31—and, by incorporating εὐνοεῖν into his definition (for the translators seem to be correct in regarding καὶ βούλεσθαι τάγαθὰ in 1156a 4 as simply an interpretation of εὐνοεῖν), has made this a part of the definition (εὐνοία = βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, 1155b 32). But, as the editors have in the main seen and pointed out, in the two lower εἶδη φιλίας the βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ is not really ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. We thus arrive at an impasse.

The solution becomes visible when we consider the use which Aristotle actually makes of his definition. He does not use it as a logical γένος at all. His discussion henceforth centres on the single trait of βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ: the other two marks are assumed as constant. And it is from the discussion of βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ that we discover what Aristotle means when he speaks of εἶδη φιλίας. They are not logically

¹ Sc. φιλητόν, not εἶδος.

determined species of a genus: exactly what they are is to be made clear in the course of the next three chapters, and Aristotle himself is obviously somewhat embarrassed in his efforts to explain their exact relationship to each other. It is noticeable that he does not put forward the explanation of *E.E.* 1236a 15-22 (which Aspasius produces in his commentary on *E.N.* 1155a 6-10), that the other *εἶδη φιλίας* are so called τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι, as is the case with such words as *ιατρικός*. This seems to be connected with his change from the title *πρώτη φιλία* to describe the primary *εἶδος* in *E.E.* to *τελεία φιλία* in *E.N.* The distinction between the *εἶδη φιλίας*, like that between the *φιλητά*, is really, though he never clearly expresses it thus, based on τὸ ἀνάλογον. But for the moment it is perhaps sufficient to say that he means to signalize three types of *φιλία*, each of which differs from the others in an important way. He casts the preliminary discussion of these types in the mould of genus and species; and it may be worth observing that the expression in this form of a thought, which in this case is really unsuited to this form, can be taken as a good example of the so-called 'biological' tendency of his mind.

Mr. Rackham renders *ταύτη ἣ φιλοῦσιν* in a 10 as 'in respect of the quality which is the ground of their friendship': he explains this 'i.e. they wish each other to become more virtuous, pleasant, or useful as the case may be; so that there is a different species of well-wishing in each case.' Burnet says 'The *φιλία* which has τὸ ἡδύ for its object is, if we may coin the phrase, *βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν*. On the other hand, if the *φιλητόν* is τὸ ἀγαθόν, it will be *βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀγαθῶν*.' These renderings bring out fairly clearly the point at issue. If Aristotle is contending that there is a *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ*, what are we to understand by the *ἀγαθά*?

If I am right in my discussion of the course of the argument, Aristotle must be saying that there actually is in each type of *φιλία* a *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ*: and he has not yet withdrawn his contention that it is *ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*. So far there has been no restriction of the meaning of *ἀγαθόν* in this phrase: it has meant 'whatever appears good, either as means or end, to the person in question.' The editors in general have attempted to restrict its meaning here. In so doing, they take *ταύτη ἣ* in a 10 in a different sense from that which they give to it in a 16-18 below: which is not impossible in dealing with Aristotle, but is obviously undesirable if it can be avoided. Below, it is taken as meaning 'because, on the grounds that.' Taking it in this sense in a 10, we obtain the rendering 'those who love, because (inasmuch as) they *do* love each other, wish each other well.' This is what is required, if the argument is to be rounded off at *φιλοῦσιν*. What Aristotle points out in the discussion which follows is in what sense it is true to say that they do love each other: and we find that they do wish each other well in exactly the same sense as they love each other. All that he is concerned to say in a 10 is that in each type of *φιλία*, precisely because and in so far as it is *φιλία*, there is *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ*: which, precisely because and in so far as the friends love one another, and not a *φιλητόν* logically distinguishable from them as persons, is directed toward each friend by the other. This distinction of the *φιλία* of the good, where the *φιλητόν* is the man himself (i.e. he is *φιλητός* in himself), and the two 'lower' *εἶδη φιλίας*, in which the *φιλητόν* is something (pleasure or utility) which is dependent upon the existence of the 'lover,' and exists only relatively to him, is not yet clearly made. Certainly it exists in embryo in the words *ταύτη ἣ φιλοῦσιν*: but the point in a 10 is not that the *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ* exists *only* in so far as the *φιλία* is directed toward the person of the friend, but that *because* there is *φιλία* directed toward the friend in each *εἶδος*, there is *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ*. And the question of how far the *φιλία* is truly directed toward the friend, and not to the 'lover's' own self, has yet to be raised.

Admittedly, Aristotle cannot really mean here that the *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ* is in every case *ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*: but he does contend here that it is *βούλησις ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*. Otherwise, he would have admitted a serious breach of reasoning in

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1155b 27-31, when he excludes the *φίλῃσις* felt for *ἄψυχα* on the grounds that it is clearly not disinterested: he can only be saved there, if he be understood to mean, what he does not say clearly, that the difference between the *φίλῃσις* for *ἄψυχα* and that between men is that in the case of the *ἄψυχον* the object of the well-wishing cannot enjoy the benefit of the well-wishing, whereas our human friends can. A favourite bat derives no subjective benefit from being oiled: but our business partner, though logically we wish him to do well for exactly the same reason as we wish the bat to keep well—for our own benefit—can derive benefit from the good turns we do him. So here, Aristotle is involved in a serious self-contradiction if, as the accepted rendering implies, he means that one wishes one's friend to become more useful for his own sake. The question of disinterestedness must at the least be left open here: and if Aristotle's point be taken to be the existence, not the method, of the well-wishing, the appearances can be saved thus far.

This view of the passage was originally suggested to me by Mr. L. H. G. Greenwood, of Emmanuel College: and it is supported by the paraphrase of Heliodorus, where the second chapter of the paraphrase runs continuously to a 10.

1156a 16. καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς.

So Grant and Burnet, the words representing the MS. reading. Ramsauer and Stewart read ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν. Bywater and Fritzsche omit ὁ. Bonitz reads ἐστὶν <ὅσπερ ἐστίν>.

Bonitz's insertion makes the sentence exactly equivalent to the following οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν: when the sole difference between ll. 17-19 and 15-16 would be the explanation in 18-19 of the adjectives *χρήσιμος* and *ἡδύς*, as against their mere statement in 16. But they have really been explained before, in ll. 10-14: so that it is reasonable to expect that if in ll. 17-19 there is any clarification of an earlier expression, it will lie in οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν: and this presupposes a more obscure expression in l. 16.

Grant explains his reading by a reference to 1170b 14-17, and the statement that 'the existence of the friend is, according to Aristotle, the chief blessing of friendship.' But this consideration seems irrelevant to the argument here, and could hardly be made to serve as evidence so early in the discussion, when it has to be proved at considerable length in Book IX. Burnet himself explains his text as an abbreviated form of ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν. This is surely very harsh, coming as it does before the fuller form which would explain it: the abbreviation should surely, if it is to be comprehensible at all, not precede but follow the full expression. Stewart and Ramsauer explain their reading as equivalent to ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν: it is true that Aristotle gives ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν as its explanation, but I cannot see how the two phrases can be simply equated without some further explanation, which neither Ramsauer, Stewart, nor Aristotle provides. Mr. Ross appears to agree with their reading, which he renders 'in so far as the other is the person loved,' appealing, to justify this interpretation, to *E.E.* 1237a 40-b 2, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τῷ φιλουμένῳ ἐστὶ χρῆσθαι ἢ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ἢ φίλος. The omission of the ὁ, with Fritzsche and Bywater, rests upon the same interpretation of the sense.

It appears to me certain that this interpretation is the right one: only if Aristotle has said that in the two 'lower' *εἰδὴ φιλίας* the actual affection is not directed to the man himself, but to some further object, is he justified in concluding that these *φιλίαι* are *φιλίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. Burnet objects that if *φιλούμενος* be regarded as predicate, it will not be equivalent to *φιλούμενος ἢ ἀγαθός*, which is what the sense requires. Against this is the fact that in the *E.E.* passage quoted, Aristotle is referring to the *πρώτη φιλία*; and it is in fact true that only in the *πρώτη* (=τελεία) *φιλία* is the man *φιλούμενος* in the full sense, *κυρίως* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός).

Richards suggested that an adjective had fallen out before ὁ φιλούμενος: this supposition allows ὁ φιλούμενος to be the subject of ἐστίν; which, as these three words have to be supplied again as subject in construing the following words, is certainly easier Greek. He suggested <τοιούτος>, <ἀγαθός>, or <ποιός τις>, of which Mr. Rackham adopts the last. This gives an excellent sense; for the following sentence has three explanations, and each may now have an adjective to explain. But it is difficult to see how any of the three adjectives proposed could disappear: and I would suggest that φιλητός be inserted, as being more likely to disappear. The good friend is styled φιλητός at 1156b 29 and 31, and 1157b 28: and the explanation ἡ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν fits it admirably, making quite clear that the φιλητόν here is the man 'as being the man he is.' I therefore propose to read here καὶ οὐχ ἢ <φιλητός> ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρησμός ἢ ἡδύς.

1156b 17-24. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτη δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν· μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη.

Ramsauer bracketed πᾶσα . . . ἐστίν, but there seems to be no need to treat the passage so drastically. As Burnet says, 'it puts the whole matter (the pre-eminence of the τελεία φιλία) in a scientific form, and shows that all four advantages of φιλία (relative and absolute good and pleasure) not only belong to the φιλία of the good, but belong to it καθ' αὐτήν, and that this is the reason for its permanence.' It does, however, contain many difficulties. Scholars are not agreed as to the meaning of καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα (l. 20); and this question affects the sense, and therefore the reading and punctuation, of the three following lines.

Burnet follows Grant and Aspasius in deleting the comma after τῷ φιλοῦντι: this reading involves taking καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα as an interpretation of τῷ φιλοῦντι. But Burnet's attempt to explain καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα as meaning 'pleasure based upon a similarity' must fail; for τῷ φιλοῦντι must refer to δι' ἀγαθόν as well as δι' ἡδονήν, and in fact, as Burnet himself points out in the preceding note, with this reference it covers φιλία διὰ τὸ χρησίμουν.

The majority of editors retain the comma after τῷ φιλοῦντι: καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα will then be taken as meaning that all φιλία is based upon similarity of some sort. But as Mr. Rackham, who adopts this interpretation, admits, 'whether similarity between the parties is an element in all friendship, . . . is nowhere clearly decided, and it can hardly be predicated of some friendships considered below.' In fact, such a passage as 1159b 12-15, ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ χρησίμουν γίνεσθαι φιλία, ὅσον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὲς εἰδότη· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὲς ὢν, τούτου ἐφίμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο, seems to me to tell decisively against this interpretation, unless no other can be found involving less difficulty.

Grant follows Aspasius in taking καθ' ὁμοιότητα as meaning 'per analogiam.' Burnet urges against this that it 'implies the doctrine that φιλία δι' ἡδονήν ἀπλῶς is true φιλία, whereas from 1158b 6 we see that all φιλία based upon pleasure is only φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα.' This is true: but I believe that Aspasius was right, and the difficulty lies in Aristotle's carelessness of expression. If for δι' ἡδονήν he had said διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, we should at once find no difficulty in taking ἀπλῶς as being equivalent to διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. Now Aristotle says clearly in *E.E.* 1238a 30-32, ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατ' ἀρετήν ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἡδονήν τῆς ἀρετῆς: and again we can see from such a passage as *E.N.* 1158a 25-27, διὸ (οἱ μακάριοι) τοὺς φίλους ἡδέεις (ζητοῦσιν). δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς (sc. ζητεῖν) τοιούτους (sc. ἡδέεις) ὄντας, καὶ ἐτι αὐτοῖς (sc. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἡδέεις)· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, that in the case of the good φιλία διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν and φιλία διὰ τὸ ἡδύ coincide; and in the case of the good, the

ἀγαθόν and ἡδύ are ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν and ἀπλῶς ἡδύ respectively. The rest of mankind are friends διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλλήλοις or διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλήλοις (=τὸ χρήσιμον)—i.e. τῷ φιλοῦντι, l. 20.

καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα can then be an interpretation of τῷ φιλοῦντι: its exact meaning is a more difficult question. The phrase is given again as an explanation of the relation of the two 'lower' εἶδη φιλίας to the perfect φιλία, at 1156b 35-1157a 3, and at 1157a 30-33, b 4-5. We have been told at 1156a 16-17 that the 'lower' εἶδη are φιλίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός: and this phrase is meant to express the result reached by the analysis of the φιλητόν, that in them the affection is directed to the subjective benefit (good or pleasure) which the friends seek, and therefore 'happens' to be directed to the one friend personally by the other, just because and in so far as he 'happens' to be the person who provides the true object of his friend's desire. In καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα Aristotle offers an alternative formula: the 'lower' εἶδη φιλίας are called φιλίαι 'in virtue of a certain similarity which they bear to the τελεία φιλία.' The two formulae are both, of course, logical terms: but each of them here bears its literal sense as well as the technical one. Aristotle is at some pains later to explain wherein exactly the 'similarity' consists.

To return to the text:—This interpretation allows the δὲ of ταύτη δὲ (l. 21) to have its full adversative force: it marks the opposition between the two forms of φιλία whose object is valid only relatively to the subject, and which are consequently only φιλίαι καθ' ὁμοιότητα, and the τελεία φιλία which possesses all the requirements by virtue of the essential nature of the friends themselves (καθ' αὐτούς). τὰ εἰρημένα are the qualities of absolute and relative goodness and pleasantness, which are now said to inhere in the nature of the friends: and Aristotle means to contrast the τελεία φιλία, where this is the case, with those forms which are based on the adventitious fact that the friends find one another good (= useful) or pleasant. Hence the adversative δέ.

Aristotle explains this remark by the words, which have been variously punctuated, ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοιοι (? ὅμοια) καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν· μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά κτλ. This is Mr. Rackham's punctuation, which I propose to follow for the moment. The first sentence is the crux. To take the question of reading first: MS. authority is clearly in favour of ὅμοιοι, but ὅμοια was known to Aspasius as a variant. ὅμοια gives a comprehensible sense: but seems really too easily comprehensible. Reading ὅμοια, we should have to take the sentence as an explanation of καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα; and to explain the remark that the two 'lower' φιλίαι are so called 'in virtue of a certain resemblance' to the perfect φιλία by the further statement that 'they do in fact resemble it' seems more than a trifle weak. It seems best, then, to regard ὅμοια as accommodated to Aspasius' view of καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα, and to reject it accordingly. Stewart's attempt to explain it on other grounds seems definitely unsatisfactory.

Reading ὅμοιοι, we have to explain how the fact that ταύτη (=?) the friends resemble each other in the other things as well (and what are these?) explains the statement that the perfect friends possess all the requisites of φιλία in virtue of being what they are (καθ' αὐτούς). Taking ταύτη as equivalent to καθ' αὐτούς, which seems its natural reference, we have to ask what τὰ λοιπά are. We know that the perfect friends are κατ' ἀρετὴν ὅμοιοι: they are alike καθ' αὐτούς, in fact, in respect of being absolutely good. τὰ λοιπά, then, are τὰ εἰρημένα minus τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν: as τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν = τὸ ἀπλῶς ἡδύ (which is stated in the next sentence, but is, I think, assumed already in the words καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα) we are left with the qualities of relative goodness and pleasantness. Can these inhere in anyone καθ' αὐτόν? I think so: where both friends are absolutely good, they are both also good for each other. This does not mean that they will be e.g. rich: this is not what Aristotle meant by calling

them ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι in b 14; they might be rich, and might by their wealth aid each other, but then this aspect of their friendship would not be based upon their essential nature. The thought seems to be that expressed at 1170a 11-13, γίνονται δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ θεογονίς φησιν. As Aristotle seems to say at *E.E.* 1238b 1-9, the essential goodness of the really good man renders him capable of appreciating the aims of his friend, and helping him to carry them out in the right way. (This does not mean that we are to 'moralize' the idea of ἀρετή here). Where both friends are alike in their goodness, it follows that they are also, by virtue of being what they are in themselves, alike in their capacity to do each other service. That they are also ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις because of what they are in themselves (καθ' αὐτούς) follows from the proof given in ll. 15-17, immediately preceding the passage under discussion.

I should therefore follow Mr. Rackham in printing a full-stop at λοιπά. With the next sentence Aristotle, having shown that the perfect φιλία is possessed of all its requisites καθ' αὐτούς, passes to the fresh point of the affection contained in the perfect φιλία, and shows that it is pre-eminent in this respect also. μάλιστα and ἀρίστη are not carelessly used synonyms: μάλιστα indicates quantity—the actual depth of the affection—ἀρίστη quality—in the sense of being directed toward the friend καθ' αὐτόν.

I have assumed as certain Ramsauer's δὴ for δέ in l. 24: the MS. text, especially if one accepts the variant δὴ in l. 23, gives no true argument.

GEOFFREY PERCIVAL.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

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ARTHMIUS OF ZELEIA.

AMONG the shining examples of the panhellenic spirit of Athens in the spacious days of the Persian Wars, which Attic orators of the fourth century were fond of parading before their degenerate audiences, was an act of the Athenian Ecclesia, by which one Arthmius of Zeleia was declared an outlaw in the territory of Athens and her allies, 'for that he had brought the gold from Media into Peloponnesus.' This Psephisma is cited twice over in the speeches of Demosthenes.¹ On the principle that the Devil may quote Scripture, Aeschines cast it back into Demosthenes' teeth.² From Aeschines we learn further that Arthmius had visited Athens in the course of his errand, and that he had narrowly escaped execution at the hands of the irate citizens. The proceedings against Arthmius were also recorded by Dinarchus,³ by Plutarch⁴ and by Aelius Aristides.⁵

The only information which the ancient authors give as to the date of Arthmius' mission comes from Plutarch and Aristides, who mention that the resolution against him was passed on the motion of Themistocles on the eve of Xerxes' invasion. This statement, however, has been proved doubly wrong. (1) A newly discovered scholium to Aristides (first published by Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Conjectanea*, p. 20) corrects Aristides by pointing out that the author of the decree was not Themistocles, but Cimon, and in proof of this it refers to Craterus' *Ψηφισμάτων Συναγωγή*, a documentary source of the highest value. It is now generally agreed that the scholiast was right on this point. (2) From the fact that the ban on Arthmius was made to extend beyond Athens to the territory of her allies, Grote inferred that it must belong to the time of the Delian League, for this was the only field of alliance within which the Athenians could have enforced their resolution.⁶ All recent writers on the subject have followed Grote in dating the decree after 477, the year in which the League was founded.

Of the various alternative dates for Arthmius' expedition the most acceptable, on first impression, is that of Busolt⁷ and Colin.⁸ Assuming that 'to Peloponnesus' must mean 'to Sparta,' these two scholars argue that Arthmius' activities must have formed part of the diplomatic counter-offensive which the King of Persia launched against Athens at the time of the Egyptian Expedition, when a grandee named Megabazus made a vain attempt to enlist the Spartans against Athens,⁹ and other Persian emissaries solicited Spartan aid, albeit with no greater success.¹⁰ Accepting the view that Cimon was recalled from ostracism after the battle of Tanagra, they fix the date of his decree, and of the Persian manoeuvres that provoked it, at 457 or 456.

Colin goes on to point out that in this case Cimon's act was not a manifesto of Greek solidarity against the Persians, and he concludes that Demosthenes deliberately misled his hearers, when he cited it as a showpiece of Athenian solicitude for the welfare of all Greece.

The equivocation which Colin here imputes to Demosthenes was certainly not beyond the capacity of the great orator. Yet on further reflection it may appear that he did not, after all, misdate the decree against Arthmius. The chronology on which

¹ *Philippic* III, § 41; *Falsa Legatio*, § 271 (where it is said more loosely that the gold was brought 'to Greece').

² In *Ctesiphontem*, § 258. The text of the decree against Arthmius was preserved on a bronze slab on the Acropolis.

³ *C. Aristogitonem*, § 24.

⁴ *Themistocles*, ch. 6.

⁵ *Panathenaicus* (ed. Dindorf I, p. 310); *Τὰ περ*

τῶν Τερράπων (*ibid.* II, p. 392).

⁶ Vol. IV, p. 357 n. 3, in the 1903 edition.

⁷ *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. II, p. 653 n. 3.

⁸ *Revue de Philologie*, 1933, pp. 237 ff. Busolt and Colin give good reviews of previous discussion on the subject.

⁹ Thucydides I, 109.

¹⁰ Diodorus XI, 74. 5-6.

the case against Demosthenes rests is not established beyond dispute. It is based on the assumption that Cimon had returned to Athens after Tanagra. Now the recall of Cimon in 457 is indeed attested by three ancient authors,¹ and has been accepted by several modern scholars.² But all the ancient writers bring it into connexion with an accommodation between Athens and Sparta (the 'Peace of Cimon'), which was not actually negotiated until 451 or 450;³ and the complete self-effacement of Cimon in the eventful period after Tanagra is an obvious source of embarrassment to those who believe in his repatriation after this battle. On these grounds several recent writers have concluded that Cimon was not invited back to Athens in 457, but remained in exile until the expiration of his term of ostracism in 452 or 451.⁴ At best, therefore, it remains problematical whether Cimon was in a position to place a ban upon Arthmius in 457 or 456.

To meet this objection against the dating of Busolt and Colin, an attempt has been made by Swoboda⁵ and Beloch⁶ to postpone the decree against Arthmius to 451 or 450, by which time Cimon had certainly returned home. If this were the correct date for his decree, Demosthenes' sophism in the use of it would be all the more glaring. But, as Colin has pointed out, a Persian mission to Sparta in 451 or 450 would have had but the faintest chances of success. If Megabazus failed to make an impression on the Spartans in 458 or 457, when they were just preparing for war against Athens on their own account, *a fortiori* Arthmius could scarcely hope to embroil them anew with Athens at the end of the 'fifties, when they were obviously war-weary and ready to accept Cimon's overtures. The chronology of Swoboda and Beloch is therefore a doubtful improvement upon that of Busolt and Colin.⁷

But a more serious objection, to which both of the above theories are exposed, arises out of Aeschines' remark, that Arthmius spent some time in Athens after his arrival in Greece. If Arthmius' purpose was to suborn Sparta to hostile action against Athens, why did he begin operations with a stay in the latter city? Would his presence here not have been mere futile bravado? Perhaps, however, he had another objective, the formation of a medizing party in Athens. But with this end in view his visit could hardly have been less opportune. At the time in question no Athenian politician of any consequence would have listened to Arthmius' overtures, for Pericles, the only serious rival of Cimon, was the author of the Egyptian Expedition, and at this stage of his career he was no less a Persophobe than Cimon himself. Arthmius' visit to Athens defies explanation, if it took place in the 'fifties. It is therefore difficult to believe that Cimon's proceedings against him were taken at this period.

Thus we are driven to find a date for Cimon's resolution preceding his sentence of ostracism. According to Grote, who discerned the hand of the Spartan regent Pausanias behind the comings and goings of Arthmius, the latter's expedition to Greece took place during the period of Pausanias' stay at Byzantium or Colonaë, i.e. between 477 and 470. This view, however, has met with little favour. The

¹ Theopompus, fr. 88 (ed. Grenfell and Hunt); Plutarch, *Cimon*, chs. 17-18; Cornelius Nepos, *Cimon* 3. 3. The muddled passage in Andocides 3. 3 gives no clear date for Cimon's recall.

² So Busolt, III. 1, p. 316 ff.; Ed. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. III, p. 597; Glotz-Cohen, *Histoire grecque*, vol. II, p. 154; Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 357; and (with some reserve) Wells, *Studies in Herodotus*, p. 142.

³ In addition to the 'Peace of Cimon,' Diodorus (XI. 80. 6) mentions a special truce of four months after Tanagra. But he does not ascribe this armistice to Cimon, and in any case

he has made a bad blunder here, for it is perfectly plain from Thucydides that the Athenians carried on hostilities after Tanagra without interruption.

⁴ So Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. II, 2, pp. 210-11; E. M. Walker, in *Cambr. Anc. Hist.* V, pp. 468-9. Walker pertinently asks why Cimon was not sent to retrieve the Egyptian Expedition.

⁵ *Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Österreich*, vol. XVI, pp. 55 ff.

⁶ Vol. II. 1, p. 175 n.

⁷ Meyer (vol. III, pp. 606, 608) suggests c. 454 B.C., thus making the worst of both worlds.

chief reason advanced against it is that Cimon's decree against Arthmius could only have been passed at a time when the Delian League had become in effect an Athenian empire, i.e. not before 470, for the Athenians could never have presumed to make their writ against Arthmius run on allied territory without previously consulting their partners, so long as these were indeed partners, and had not become subjects.¹ This objection would carry great weight, if it could be proved that the Athenians really did act over the heads of their confederates. But there can be no assurance that such was their procedure: for all that can be shown to the contrary, it is quite possible that a parallel resolution to that of the Athenian Ecclesia was in fact passed by the federal parliament that used to meet at Delos in the early days of the League.² The terms of the ban on Arthmius do not, after all, provide any clue as to its date.

Another apparent difficulty in the way of Grote's chronology is that in the 'seventies Athens and Sparta were on good terms, and that Arthmius' prospects of driving a golden wedge between them were even more remote at that time than in 451 or 450. This obstacle, however, may be turned in more ways than one.

(1) If, as Grote surmised, Arthmius visited Greece as the agent of Pausanias, his reason in carrying gold to Sparta should not be far to seek. Though the conversations into which he entered with the King of Persia had no official authorization from the ephors, who summoned him home twice over to stand his trial for medism, his double acquittal shows that an influential party at Sparta was in sympathy with him.³ This party could hardly have contemplated medism in the full sense of that term; but presumably it would be prepared to make peace with the Great King and to withdraw its support from the Athenian offensive against him. Similarly Pausanias' engagements to the King must at the least have included a break-up of the war-alliance between Sparta and Athens. Under these conditions it is easy to understand why he should have dispatched Arthmius with a campaign fund to Sparta. It also becomes more clear why Cimon eventually expelled Pausanias from Byzantium. This operation, which Cimon could scarcely have ventured to undertake without Sparta's consent, may be regarded as the joint response of the two patriot cities to Pausanias' attempt to estrange them, and as a practical counterpart to the manifesto against Arthmius.

(2) But a wider détour is open to us. It has generally been assumed that Sparta was the goal of Arthmius' mission. Yet none of the ancient authors mention Sparta explicitly in this connexion: they merely state that the gold from Persia went 'to Greece' or 'to Peloponnesus'.⁴ Now Sparta was not the only Peloponnesian city to have dealings with the Great King in the period of the Persian Wars. In 480-79 Argos was in collusion with the Persian invaders of Greece: it kept Mardonius informed of Sparta's movements and even undertook to take the field against Sparta on his behalf.⁵ In the early years of Artaxerxes' reign—probably c. 462-1 B.C.—an Argive embassy visited Susa in order to confirm the existing

¹ The first clear case in which the Athenians are known to have extended their jurisdiction over their allies is in the act regulating the affairs of Erythrae. (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 29, ls. 25-30.) This decree is usually dated at 455 or 450 B.C.

² In the Second Athenian Confederacy provision was made for joint action in the case of offences against the federal constitution. (Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 101, ls. 51-63.) Presumably similar arrangements were made at the inception of the Delian League.

³ Busolt III. 1, p. 90. Kahrstedt goes so far

as to assume that Pausanias acted under instructions from the home government and concluded a peace between Sparta and Persia. (*Hermes*, 1921, pp. 320 ff.) The difficulties in this theory have been exposed by Judeich. (*Ibid.*, 1923, pp. 1 ff.)

⁴ One of the older scholia to Aristides (ed. Dindorf III, p. 327) asserts that the gold was sent 'eis Aaxedaia'pora.' But this passage is utterly confused and carries no weight.

⁵ Herodotus VII. 148-52; IX. 10. This writer's testimony is all the more convincing, as he was a reluctant witness to the medism of Argos.

friendship with Sparta.¹ In the interval between these two dates Argos was certainly a promising field for Persian intrigues against the patriot Greek states. At the end of the 'seventies the Argives formed a war-coalition with the Arcadians and engaged in a hard-fought tussle with the Spartans.² No definite proof, to be sure, can be given that this attack upon Sparta was financed by Persia; and indeed the King at that time no longer had any compelling reason to incite other Greek states against the Spartans, for these had abstained from all active operations against him since 478-7. On the other hand the Spartans were giving the Athenians a free hand to carry on the war against Persia, and were shielding them against possible attacks in the rear from Corinth or Aegina. It was therefore in the King's interest to neutralize Sparta more effectively by keeping her in play in Peloponnesus. Furthermore, there is no doubt that a second coalition which Argos led into the field against Sparta in 394 was welded together with Persian gold.³ It hardly seems too rash to suggest that the earlier Argive war against Sparta was fomented by Persia, and that Arthmius (with or without Pausanias' co-operation) played the same part now as Timocrates of Rhodes, the bearer of the 'golden archers,' in 397-6.⁴ This explanation, however, is only offered as a *δευτερος πλοῦς*. On the whole it appears more likely that Arthmius' gold was sent by Pausanias to support his party at Sparta.

There remains one problem.—With what object could Arthmius have visited Athens in the first decade after Xerxes' invasion? If he was the agent of Pausanias, there can be little doubt that he was the bearer of a message to Themistocles.⁵ It is well known that when Pausanias was finally unmasked and executed by the ephors, Themistocles was implicated in his fall. On the evidence of certain papers which they claimed to have discovered in Pausanias' dossier, the ephors denounced Themistocles to the Athenians as a medizer, and the former saviour of Greece went into exile without any attempt to defend himself. In view of the precipitate manner in which Themistocles threw up his case, it may be taken for granted that, up to a point, he had been hand in glove with Pausanias. Presumably he had seconded Pausanias' efforts to dissolve the war-alliance between Athens and Sparta; we may further surmise that he was preparing the way for a peace between Athens and Persia; possibly he had a hand in the intrigues (if such there were) with Argos, the city to which he betook himself after his ostracism at the end of the 'seventies. But whatever the precise nature of Themistocles' 'medism,' his conversations with Pausanias sufficiently explain Arthmius' sojourn in Athens: this emissary was their go-between. It must, however, be assumed that Arthmius covered his tracks, so as not to compromise Themistocles seriously at the time of his visit to Athens. The full extent of Themistocles' complicity with Pausanias did not become known until the Spartan government incriminated him.

The information which the ancient authors have left us about the intrigues of Arthmius is not sufficient to explain their object and occasion beyond a peradventure. Yet it gives better support to Grote's dating of the affair than to the chronology of more recent scholars. But the same conclusion by which Grote's good judgment is vindicated also serves to clear the character of Demosthenes. Though the orator probably did not grasp the full implications of the ban upon Arthmius, and therefore did not reveal the whole truth about it, we may after all believe that what he did say was nothing but the truth.

M. CARY.

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON.

¹ Herodotus VII. 151. On the date of this embassy see Walker, *Cambr. Anc. Hist.* vol. V, p. 75.

² Herodotus IX. 35. The date of this war cannot be determined precisely.

³ Xenophon, *Hellenica* III. 5. 1.

⁴ For this date see Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxy-*

rhynchus Papyri, vol. V, pp. 204-5.

⁵ Grote, who did not know the new scholium to Aristides, and therefore believed that the author of the ban upon Arthmius was Themistocles, was unable to see the *affaire* Arthmius in this light.

¹ Cf. *ization phanes*

THE COMIC FRAGMENTS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE STRUCTURE OF OLD ATTIC COMEDY.

ARISTOPHANIC Comedy falls structurally into marked divisions, episodic and epiirrhematic. The first is a very simple method of composition consisting of short iambic scenes, connected by choral stasima which are more or less relevant to the action. As a general rule these episodes occupy the second half of the play between the Parabasis and Exodos, and, since they show the hero enjoying the fruits of his earlier struggles, contribute little to the development of the plot. Many of the Comic Fragments in trimeters are probably taken from episodes, but any attempt to classify them would add nothing to knowledge of a play from the structural viewpoint. The case is otherwise with the epiirrhematic parts of Comedy. These are of complicated structure, marked by the use of the syzygy, i.e. the correspondence of odes and epiirrhemes on the plan abab and also by the use of the tetrameter, which is confined to these sections.¹ They may be further differentiated among themselves by the metre used. In the Parodos anapaests, iambs and trochees are found, in the Agon iambs and anapaests, in the parabatic syzygy only trochees, in the ἀπλοῦν anapaestic and aeolic tetrameters.² Taking the use of the tetrameter as guide it is possible to classify certain of the Comic Fragments, and subject matter and the criterion of metre often give some indication of the particular epiirrhematic section from which they are taken. Prologue and Exodos stand outside the scheme of both episodic and epiirrhematic composition, being structurally self-contained. The former consists of iambic trimeters, not a simple means of differentiation, but sometimes subject matter affords convincing points of analogy with the Aristophanic Prologue. The Exodos shows a great variety of metres, but here again subject matter and Aristophanic analogy are of great value in classification.

An attempt is made here, working on the three indications of metre, subject matter and Aristophanic analogy, to assign certain of the Comic Fragments to these five fundamental sections of Comedy, Prologue, Parodos, Agon, Parabasis, Exodos and to consider their bearing on the structure of Old Comedy in general.

PROLOGUE.—Mazon has postulated three divisions of the Aristophanic Prologue, Parade, Recitation and Exposition.³ In the first two characters of subordinate importance discuss the situation without disclosing details. In the Recitation an explanation of the plot is given either directly to the audience or in the course of the dialogue. The exposition consists of several short scenes which further develop the plot and pave the way for the entrance of the chorus in the Parodos. With the exception of *Acharnenses*, *Nubes* and *Ecclesiazusae*, which open with the Recitation, Aristophanic Prologues show all these three divisions.

A good example of Parade and Recitation occurs in Plato's Ὑπέρβολος. In frag. 166 a slave and his master are talking together and mystifying the audience, till with frag. 167 the latter explains the secret. This is a direct explanation to the audience, such as occurs in Aristophanes' *Vespæ* and *Pax* in a Recitation following a Parade. There is a similar address to the audience in a colloquial vein very reminiscent of *Vespæ* v. 78 ff., *Pax* v. 45 ff. in Pherecrates' Πευδηρακλῆς frag. 154. To the Recitation may also be assigned Pherecrates' Κραπάταλοι frag. 80. It seems

¹ Cf. Mazon, *Aristophane*, p. 177. The generalization is borne out by examination of Aristophanes' extant plays.

² All Aristophanic ἀπλὰ are anapaestic, the eupolideans of the *Nubes* excepted.

³ Cf. Mazon, *Aristophane*, p. 171.

clear from frags. 81, 91, 94 (cf. Kock's commentary) that at least part of the play had its scene in Hades and frag. 80 by analogy with *Ranae* v. 117-34 describes various ways of reaching it. Probably therefore like its Aristophanic counterpart it is taken from the Recitation of the Prologue. Another fragment reminiscent of Aristophanes is Theopompus' *Στρατιώτιδες* frag. 54, in which a woman expresses her readiness to endure hardships (sic) in much the same strain as *Lysistrata* v. 113-4.¹ Frags. 55, 56 show that the play probably treated the women's acquisition of military power, and I suggest that this fragment comes from a Prologue similar to that of *Lysistrata*.

Other plays seem to have opened directly with the Recitation. This is so in two mythological plays, probably travesties of Tragedy, in which Aristophanes seems to have parodied Euripides' use of the Prologue as an undramatic programme. *Λημνίαι* frags. 356-9 show the common Euripidean features of invocation of the land and the genealogical tree preceding a relation of the circumstances relevant to the action. *Φοινίσσαι* frag. 558 is perhaps a slighter example of such description of the plot. Of a similar monodic type seem to have been the Prologues of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae* II and Philyllius' *Ἡρακλῆς*, but these are particularly noteworthy in that they were delivered by abstractions. *Καλλιγένεια* delivered the former (frag. 335), while frag. 8 of the latter also shows a day of festival personified, *Δορπία*, as the speaker. Such a use of a personified abstraction to introduce the play points the way to similar Prologues in New Comedy.²

There remain two Prologues which are of particular interest from the spectacular point of view. Pherecrates' *Μυρμηκάνθρωποι*, according to Kock's conjecture, which is strongly supported by the surviving fragments, treated the story of the ants whom Zeus turned into men in consideration for Aeacus, who had lost his subjects through the flood. Frag. 120 shows that Deucalion and presumably Pyrrha too took some part in the play. I venture to suggest that frag. 114 ordering the use of a distaff for a mast and frag. 117 mentioning the growing tempest are taken from the Prologue and show Deucalion and Pyrrha on board ship, crossing the flooded seas, and destined to be cast up on Aegina. This was quite a feasible feat of stage-craft, for Charon's boat appears in the *Ranae* and such a spectacular device was calculated to impress the fact of the flood on the audience. Deucalion and Pyrrha, to all appearances, cannot have been very important characters in the actual plot, but they form distinguished scenic accessories for the presentation of the flood and correspond in some degree to the comparatively subordinate characters met in the Parades of *Equites*, *Vespaie*, *Pax*.

Similarly in the *Ὀδυσσεύς* of Cratinus frags. 138-9 seem clearly delivered on board ship. Hephaestion quotes these as coming from the exordium of the play, but the metre precludes the idea of the Prologue. Anapaestic tetrameters however are a common metre of the Parodos, so it seems to follow that the play opened with a Parodos, delivered by Odysseus and the chorus of his comrades. Cratinus had to manoeuvre Odysseus' and the chorus's arrival in Sicily by sea, since they could not come by land, but what was more important still he had to leave them a means of escape for the end of the play. Though this was a Parodos it is likely that the usual principle of the Prologue was kept up, i.e. to mystify the audience as long as possible in order to rouse their curiosity, and a protracted, amusing nautical conversation must surely have achieved this result. It is also known that this play and Aristophanes' *Αἰολοσίκων* contained no choral odes,³ but that does not exclude the possibility of short verses delivered in recitative by the chorus,⁴ so I would suggest that when the

¹ Kock prints this with an interrogation mark, following Jacobs. *Addit.* 261, but in view of Comedy's constant gibes at drunken women I venture to suggest that the lines have more point if taken as above.

² Cf. Menander's *Περικειρομένη*, Plautus' *Aulularia*, *Trinummus*, *Rudens*.

³ Platonius XIII, 40.

⁴ Cf. *Αἰολοσίκων* frag. 10.

mystification had gone on long enough the chorus explained itself in frag. 144.¹ This is not part of a *pnigos*, for that always consists of one hypermeter, while these are paroemiacs, but it might well replace the usual choral ode of the Parodos. Such a scene provides an extremely novel and spectacular opening for the play.

PARODOS.—In this, the first of the three epirrhematic divisions of Comedy, the chorus was introduced and characterized and often the Agon was motivated. The tetrameter was the basic metre, but the rules of epirrhematic composition were less strictly observed than in the Agon and Parabasis. Symmetry was disregarded, *pnige* were not necessarily in correspondence and the *syzygy* might be contracted to the brevity of e.g. the *Equites* Parodos or multiplied in such complicated designs as the Parodoi of *Vespae* and *Pax*.

One very striking point in Aristophanes' use of the Parodos is what may be termed his protraction of the chorus's entrance. Before the chorus is actually visible to the audience they are described by an actor, who sights them approaching off stage,² a very necessary precaution in the case of such unusual figures as e.g. Clouds. It seems from frag. 379, where the Clouds are described as vanishing towards Parnes, that this device was also used in the first *Nubes*. Probably the movements of the approaching Clouds, while still invisible to the audience, were described by the actors and the audience's expectations would be quickened when at one point the Clouds disappeared again, possibly in anger at some coarse remark of Strepsiades. Again in Aristophanes' *Hpwes* frag. 304 seems to describe the chorus's movements in the entrance. An extended use of protraction is found in the *Aves*, where after some description of the as yet invisible chorus its members enter singly or in groups, each being criticized and described by the actors as they appear. This too is paralleled in the Fragments. In Aristophanes' *Nῆσοι* frag. 388 shows one actor pointing out to another the chorus standing in the *εἰσόδος*, while frag. 395, a tetrameter, seems to be taken from the Parodos when the chorus are already entering. On the analogy of other plural Aristophanic titles the chorus here consisted of islands personified, and this fragment appears to describe one of these islands advancing with dejected mien. Probably each island was named or described as she entered for the instruction of the audience. Similarly in Eupolis' *Πόλεις* frags. 231, 2, 3 are descriptions of three different members of the chorus of cities, Tenos, Chios and Cyzicus, who probably entered singly, carrying symbols for identification which would have been unintelligible without explanation. It is noteworthy that all these examples of protraction of the chorus's entrance come from plays, the *Equites* excepted, in which the chorus consists of personified abstractions or non-human characters. When these strange characters are to be differentiated among themselves the poets seem to use the device of introducing the choreutae singly or in groups with appropriate comments by the actors.

Another play containing an unusual chorus was Pherecrates' *Μυρμηκάνθρωποι*, which, according to Kock's suggestion, must have shown the entrance of the newly created chorus of antmen. Frag. 121 seems to describe this, and the metre, an anapaestic hypermeter, suggests that it is part of a *pnigos*. This exemplifies an Aristophanic trick of stage-craft.³ When the chorus represents indefinite multitudes, but cannot exceed its conventional number of twenty-four, the actors speak as if multitudes were actually present and so hypnotize the audience into accepting the chorus as an adequate substitute. Another point of interest is that this *pnigos* seems to come from the middle of a Parodos, for according to its expression the *μυρμηκάνθρωποι*

¹ Kock refers this to the Exodos and quotes Euripides' *Cyclops* v. 708-9 in support, but there is little verbal similarity between the two extracts and the Cratinus fragment would be inappropriate at the Exodos. A poet does not hide the

identity of his chorus till the very moment when they are leaving the orchestra.

² Cf. *Equites* v. 242 ff., *Nubes* v. 323 ff., *Aves* v. 260 ff.

³ Cf. *Aves* v. 294 ff., *Thesmophoriazusae* v. 280-1.

are still in the first stages of creation, so that the chorus cannot all have entered yet. Pniges occur in the middle of the Parodos in *Vespae* and *Pax*, where the structure is complicated. Here the relation of this pnigos to the structure of the Parodos as a whole cannot be determined, but it is interesting to find the suggestion that Pherecrates too varied the practice of having one pnigos and that at the end of the Parodos.¹

Other fragments also hint at variety of structure. In Cratinus' *Xείπωνες* frag. 235 seems to show the chorus of wise Centaurs introducing themselves on their first appearance. It is a dactylic hexameter and adds yet another type of choric metre to the wide variety found in Aristophanic Parodoi.

In Hermippus' *Στρατιῶται* frag. 58, composed of acephalous glyconics,² may be assigned to the Parodos. This is a dialogue in which the first speaker seems to be greeting a chorus of Athenian allies levied for service, and Kock suggests that the second speaker is the leader of the chorus just addressed. The greeting given to the chorus indicates that they cannot have been present long and the description of them put in the mouth of an actor is such as might be expected in the Parodos.³ The nearest parallels to this passage are the ionic dialogue system between chorus and subchorus in *Vespae* v. 291-315 and the short iambic verses in the dialogue of Dionysus, Xanthias and the chorus in *Ranae* v. 435-43. The fragment shows that lyrical dialogue was not such a rarity in the Parodos as might be thought from the study of Aristophanic Parodoi alone.

In Eupolis' *Μαρίκᾱς* frag. 192, a minor ionic tetrameter shows, according to Meineke, the chorus rejoicing that Maricas has returned from some expedition. The line is a parody of Aeschylus, *Persae* v. 65 and is probably to be assigned, like its original, to the Parodos. Apart from the actual wording, which certainly seems to indicate the jubilant appearance of the chorus, this is further supported by the metre. Aristophanes only uses minor ionics three times and in each case in a Parodos or Subparodos.⁴ The likelihood that this fragment is taken from the Parodos, coupled with the Aristophanic examples, gives reasonable grounds for supposing that minor ionics were regarded as a particularly suitable metre for the Parodos.

AGON.—The Agon is a strictly formal debate of epirrhematic structure in which the chorus deliver odes, katakeleusmoi and sphragis,⁵ but are excluded from actual participation in the argument. The epirrhemes are shared by the agonists, with whom a third figure is often found. This is the *βωμολόχος*, a buffoon who provides comic relief by his humorous irrelevancies. Often the Agon proper is preceded by the Proagon, a short scene in iambic trimeters in which the conditions of the coming contest are arranged.

In Aristophanes' hands the Agon is of great importance. His comedies centre upon some absurdly brilliant and quite impracticable proposition. This is conceived by the hero at the beginning of the play, but then he has to contend against opposition which generally crystallizes in the Agon and forms the crux of the play. In this case the Agon is a real debate both in form and content. Aristophanes also utilizes the convenient frame of the Agon to conceal what is really a scene of pure exposition. Such an Agon occurs in *Aves*, *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae* as opposed to the acrimonious debates of other plays.

Aristophanic Agones deal with a variety of subjects, *Equites* and *Vespae* with

¹ Cf. *Equites*, *Nubes*, *Aves*, *Lysistrata* for the normal usage, *Vespae* and *Pax* for analogy to this.

² All metrical analysis is taken from J. W. White, *Verse of Greek Comedy*.

³ Cf. *Nubes*, *Aves*.

⁴ *Vespae* v. 291-315, *Thesmophoriazusae* v. 101-29,

Ranae v. 324-35, 340-53.

⁵ This may be replaced by an epirrhematic of two tristichs (*Lysistrata*) delivered by the two agonists or omitted entirely (*Nubes*, *Ranae*, *Ecclesiazusae*, *Plutus*).

comparatively normal politics, *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae* with rather more fantastic political reforms, *Ranae* with literature, *Nubes* with education and rhetoric and *Aves* and *Plutus* with Utopian projects. Similar subjects are found along with others in the Comic Fragments, in which metre also proves a useful aid to identification, since the Aristophanic Agon is always composed of anapaestic or iambic tetrameters, alone or in combination, so that the trochaic tetrameter may be left out of account.¹

A political innovation of the fantastic type of *Lysistrata* seems to have been discussed in the Agon of Theopompus' *Στρατιώτιδες*. Frags. 55 and 56 touch on the question of women's military service, and it is possible, on Aristophanic analogy, that the whole Agon was one of exposition. Politics were probably also discussed in Plato's *Πρόσβεις*, if Kock is right in taking the title as a reference to the embassy sent to Persia in 394. I suggest that frag. 124 is taken from an Agon and shows a third person, possibly the *βωμολόχος*, encouraging one of the agonists in his attempts to get the better of the other. Philonides' *Κόθορνοι* is generally taken as referring to a chorus of men like Theramenes, for his nickname was *Κόθορνος* and he seems to have had a part in the play.² Körte³ has suggested that the fragment published by Demianczuk⁴ is taken from an Agon and to be assigned to Theramenes or his adversary. Such an Agon with Theramenes as an agonist must surely have been political in content. Eupolis' *Μαρικᾶς*, being an attack on Hyperbolus,⁵ doubtless treated politics, and I suggest that frag. 190, in which somebody tries to defend Maricas from attack, is taken from an Agon. His mother seems to have taken part in the play,⁶ and no more suitable person could be found to defend her son. This postulates an Agon in which Maricas was one of the agonists, while his mother played the usual third figure or *βωμολόχος*.

Agones on literary subjects were apparently very popular in Attic Comedy. The earliest example comes from the *Ἀρχίλοχοι* of Cratinus. This title, on the analogy of *Ὀδυσσεῖς*, would mean Archilochus and a chorus of his supporters. Frag. 2, however, talks of a swarm of *σοφισταί*, explained as poets by Clement of Alexandria, and these from the latter's comment and the wording of the fragment itself seem to have been present on the stage, while Diogenes Laertius relates that in this play Cratinus employed the word *σοφισταί* in praise of τὸν περὶ Ὀμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον. Meineke assumes that a keen altercation was held between Homer and Hesiod and others, but the conditions of Attic Comedy precluded the appearance of more than three or four actors on the stage at the same time, and three or four poets can hardly be called a swarm. I suggest that the fragment refers to a chorus or rather a half chorus of poets who supported Homer and Hesiod, and compare the differentiation of the half choruses in *Acharnenses* and *Lysistrata*. The altercation then would take place between Homer and Archilochus, each supported by his half chorus, with Hesiod as a tertius gaudens. This is supported by frag. 6, which I would assign to the antode of the Agon. Meineke identifies τὴν Θασίαν ἄλμην as Archilochus because of his connection with Thasos and his pungent wit. ὁ τυφλός must surely be Homer. Kock takes it purely in the proverbial sense, but the use of the proverb gains in point immensely if the blind man meant is really, not just metaphorically, blind.

In Aristophanic Agones the antagonist who is destined to lose the contest always begins the epirrheme, while the agonist begins the antepirrheme. In this case it is unthinkable that Archilochus, Cratinus' model,⁷ should be defeated, so presumably

¹ The scantiness of the fragments unfortunately admits of no distinction between Agon and Sub-agon.

² Frag. 6.

³ Burs. *Jahresh.*, 1911, p. 251.

⁴ Demianczuk, *Supp. Com.*, p. 73.

⁵ Cf. Quintilian I, 10, 18.

⁶ Frag. 194, *Nubes* v. 555, Schol. V. The fragment is inconclusive, but the evidence of the Scholiast makes it practically certain that she did appear in the play.

⁷ Platonius XIII.

Homer as potential victim opened the Agon, encouraged by an ode sung by the half chorus of his supporters. As lovers of epic poetry these would naturally use the heroic hexameter, so fixing the metre for the antode sung by the supporters of Archilochus (frag. 6). There is another hexameter, frag. 7, mentioning the spot called Δῶς Θᾶκοι, and Kock suggests that this is where the Agon may have taken place. I would add the suggestion that the line is taken from the ode of the Agon, which described the circumstances of the coming debate in grandiloquent language, forming a marked contrast to the deliberately commonplace style of the antode. One point of difference from the similar literary Agon of the *Ranae* may be noticed. There each agonist, practically speaking, holds the floor during his own epirrheme, but here in the antode stress is laid on the exhibition that Archilochus has already given, so that the Agon was probably more like those of the *Equites*, in which victim and victor begin each their own epirrheme but actually share them in rapid quick-fire of dialogue.

In Pherecrates' Κρατάλοι frag. 94 is an anapaestic tetrameter delivered by Aeschylus in praise of his art. Since Aeschylus was dead and the second part of the play was laid in Hades it seems very probable that the line comes from an Agon similar in scene and, to some degree, in content to that of the *Ranae*. Another such Agon seems to have occurred in Plato's *Σκευαί*. Frag. 128 forms part of a heated dispute which I would refer to a Proagon, while the anapaests of frag. 130 suggest that it comes from an Agon. In this strictures are passed on the dancing of the present-day chorus. Choral dances are also mentioned in the anapaestic tetrameters of Aristophanes frag. 677-8. Aeschylus was famed for his composition of dances for the chorus¹ and had written a play Φρύγες ἢ Ἐκτορος λύτρα, so it seems clear that he is the first speaker and one of the agonists in an Agon of a literary type. The second speaker is that familiar figure, the βωμολόχος, with his garrulous personal illustration and anecdote.

Aristophanes' Δαιταλείς was the forerunner of the *Nubes* in treating the subject of education. The title points to a feast of the official banqueters who were chosen to dine together in the temple of Heracles. Apparently a father brought his two sons to the feast, one educated in the old-fashioned way, the other trained by the sophists.² It seems that a formal Agon on the merits of the two types of education was finally instituted, but it is uncertain whether this lay between the two brothers or the 'improbis' and his father; the tone of the fragments perhaps favours the latter idea.³ Frags. 200, 201, 211 suggest a Proagon in which the conditions of the Agon were arranged. This Agon seems to have consisted of dialogue. In the anapaestic epirrheme frag. 223 shows the father, like Strepsiades, bidding his son sing one of the old-fashioned songs. In frag. 222 he puts questions about obsolete Homeric words, while the son retaliates by asking him the meaning of antique law terms. Frags. 216, 218 of the iambic epirrheme show the father bewailing his son's corruption, frag. 230 his criticism of public policy. In frag. 219 the 'improbis,' like Pheidippides,⁴ seems to glory in his crimes. From the analogy of Aristophanic Agones in which the metre of the epirrheme is adapted to the character of the speaker⁵ the father might be expected to open the anapaestic epirrheme, the son the iambic, but it is of course impossible to tell this from the fragments.

The most interesting example of an Agon dealing with a promised Utopia comes from Crates' *Θηρία*. It seems as if a representative of the beasts who presumably composed the chorus offered men a life of luxury provided that they

¹ Athenaeus I, 21c.

² Cf. *Nubes* v. 529. Frag. 198 shows the 'improbis' airing his sophistical knowledge, while frags. 205, 206, 221 show his effeminate way of life.

³ Galen, *Lex Hippocrat.* prooem. v. 706 in quoting frag. 222 says that it is the father who is putting the questions to his son.

⁴ Cf. *Nubes* v. 1328 ff.

⁵ Cf. *Nubes*, *Ranae*.

would abstain from animal flesh. Frag. 17 impressing this necessity of vegetarianism is obviously taken from a debate, and the anapaestic metre and intrinsic probability suggest that it is taken from the formal Agon. Frag. 14 seems to belong to the other epirrheme of this Agon, for it is iambic and describes the benefits that the speaker offers mankind, while frag. 16 is probably part of its pnigos. At first sight it might be concluded from Aristophanic analogy that this was an Agon of exposition, designed to paint the pleasures of a new golden age, and that the opposition was purely nominal, but this was not so. After quoting frag. 14 Athenaeus goes on: ἐξῆς δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τὸν ἐναντίον τούτῳ παραλαμβάνων λόγον φησὶν and quotes frag. 15, iambic trimeters describing fresh luxuries. Kock takes this as showing that there were two speakers, one praising luxury, the other praising the simple life, but both speakers alike seem to vie in offering a life of ease. I suggest that two speakers, one the representative of the beast chorus, are trying each in opposition to the other to convince a third, the B. of frag. 17, of the merits of their own particular scheme. This Agon then would resemble to some extent that of the *Equites*, where the two agonists wrangle for Demos' favour. The special interest of frag. 15 is that it shows that the Agon cannot have been decisive, since it is renewed in an iambic trimeter scene as in *Equites* and *Ranae*. This use of the indeterminate Agon as the first in a series of contests is a literary device which detracts from its original hieratic significance, so it is very interesting to find it used in this way by an earlier poet like Crates.

Telecleides' Ἀμφικτύονες frag. 1 contains fifteen anapaestic tetrameters describing a golden age. Metre and subject matter suggest an Agon, and since the fragment is a monologue and shows no hint of polemics it seems very probable that this was an Agon of exposition like that of the *Aves*. Frag. 130 of Pherecrates' Πέρσαι contains ten anapaestic tetrameters couched in very much the same terms, so these should probably be referred to a similar Agon.

A novel Agon appears in Aristophanes' Ὀραιοί. The iambic tetrameters of frag. 569 suggest that this was an Agon in which the goddess Athena disputed with a foreign god, possibly Sabazius (frag. 566), about the value of the benefits which each could confer on the city.¹ Frag. 23 of Pherecrates' Ἀντόμολοι, anapaestic tetrameters, also shows the gods speaking, this time in criticism of mankind. Subject and metre support the idea of an Agon in which a god argued against men's impiety, and frag. 24, also anapaestic, has the genuine ring of an irrelevant personal illustration contributed by a βωμολόχος.

There remain less tangible indications of the presence of an Agon in certain plays. Frag. 32 of Phrynichus' Μοῦσαι seems to come from a Proagon, since it instructs in the fashion of voting. Frag. 68 of his *incertae fabulae* is a pnigos, whose subject matter consisting of recrimination suggests that it is the pnigos of an Agon. Another example of such a pnigos occurs in Cratinus' Βουκόλοι, frag. 17. Among the ἀδέσποτα of Old Comedy frag. 57 (Kock) seems to come from one of the odes of an Agon, and frag. 3 (Demianczuk) is the only example of a katakeleusmos among the fragments.

Three of Aristophanes' plays lack an Agon,² but this negative feature can only be confirmed in one lost play. The incomplete Hypothesis of Cratinus' Διονυσολίξ-ανδρος has enabled Demianczuk to supply a plausible reconstruction of the whole plot.³ The only possible subject for an Agon seems to be the beauty competition between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite, but such a triple contest is completely alien to the spirit of epirrhematic composition. It follows that there can have been no Agon in the strict sense of the word, though possibly a triple debate after the style of that in the *Thesmophoriazusae*.

¹ Kock compares Cicero, *Leges* II, 37.

² *Acharnenses*, *Pax*, *Thesmophoriazusae*.

³ *Suppl. Com.*, p. 31.

PARABASIS.—The Parabasis consists of two divisions, first the commation, ἀπλοῦν and pñigos, then a symmetrical and eurhythmic¹ epirrhematic syzygy. ἀπλᾶ are anapaestic or aeolic, while the epirrhemes are always trochaic, so that the exclusion of the iambic simplifies classification of the fragments. The ἀπλοῦν is generally devoted to sounding the poet's own praises in the realm of either literature or politics, but the syzygy is usually delivered by the chorus in their own character, although this too may be entirely usurped by the poet.² The Parabasis is essentially undramatic, filling a pause in the action, and the only play in which Aristophanes really tries to circumvent this and connect the Parabasis with the rest of the play is the *Aves*, where the chorus delivers both ἀπλοῦν and syzygy in character.

The Comic Fragments offer so many examples from the Parabasis that it seems best to take the poets in chronological order, noting their individual peculiarities. Cratinus in the Parabasis of the Διονυσιαλέξανδρος seems to have treated of literature, if Körte's restoration περὶ τῶν ποιη<τῶν>³ is accepted in the Hypothesis, for this seems the best of the proposed restorations. Frags. 324A, B, C, specimens of the cratineum, contain personalities against contemporary poets, as also the anapaestic frag. 307, and may be assigned to literary ἀπλᾶ. The same is true of frag. 308 (accepting Kock's restoration), an anapaestic tetrameter against vulgar Comedy. Μαλθακοί frag. 98 seems to come from a eupolidean ἀπλοῦν in which the chorus of effeminate are describing their own dainty habits. This is noteworthy as the first of a series of ἀπλᾶ in which the chorus speak in character, confirming the usage of *Aves* and *Thesmophoriazusae*. There is one example of a commation in frag. 323, prosodiac tetrameters hailing the audience in very scornful terms, while Πυλῆα frag. 169 seems to be the pñigos of a parabolic ἀπλοῦν, exhorting the audience in Aristophanic vein.

To pass to the syzygy, frag. 321, a lyric invoking Pan, probably comes from one of the odes, for invocations to the gods are found in Aristophanic parabolic odes, possibly a survival of earlier hieratic ritual.⁴ Another such ode occurs in Τροφώνιος frag. 222, invoking the Muse also commonly invoked by Aristophanes.⁵ In Διδοσκαλῆαι frag. 36, according to Kock's plausible suggestion, the poet addresses his Muse, whose beautiful songs have stirred up envy against her. The trochaic metre points to an epirrheme, not the ἀπλοῦν, so that this is an example of the poet's speaking on his own behalf in the epirrheme, instead of leaving it to the chorus.

Crates' Παιδιαί frag. 24, an anapaestic tetrameter complaining of the ease of writing Tragedy, probably comes from a literary ἀπλοῦν in which Crates painted the difficulties of the comic poets as opposed to the tragic. Lysippus' Βάκχαι frag. 4, anapaests asserting the poet's originality, is probably to be assigned to the ἀπλοῦν in which the poet inveighed against the plagiarism of his contemporaries.

Pherecrates seems to have made an extensive use of the eupolidean, since all the following fragments assigned to the ἀπλοῦν are in this metre. Μυρμηγκάνθρωποι frag. 122 is interpreted by Kock, comparing Metagenes frag. 14, as figurative praise of the poet's own literary merits. Δουλοδιδάσκαλος frag. 47 seems to give political advice, while frag. 29 mentions the custom of morning drinking, so that this perhaps censured the effeminacy and luxury of the day. Ἴππος ἢ Πάννυχις is a good example of the chorus's speaking in character, since in this a chorus of women complain against men's monopoly of certain trades. Frag. 191 of the *incertae fabulae* seems to be one of the opening lines of the ἀπλοῦν, for it bids the audience give ear. The commation proper as opposed to the stichic tetrameter of the ἀπλοῦν occurs in Κοριαννῶ frag. 79, pherecrateans, which the poet describes as a new discovery.

¹ Zielinski (*Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie*, p. 349) uses the term to describe an epirrheme containing a number of lines divisible by four.

² Cf. Pax, *Ranae*.

³ *Hermes* 1904.

⁴ *Equites*, *Nubes*.

⁵ *Acharnenses*, Pax, *Aves*, *Ranae*.

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Probably Pherecrates, seeking to win the audience's favour for his play, first tried to attract their attention by using a novel metre for his commation. Κραπάταλοι frag. 96 is the last part of a longish eupolidean pnigos in which the poet in true Aristophanic fashion exhorts the audience to give him the prize.

In Telecleides' Ἀμφικτύονες frag. 4 seems to be part of a logaoedic commation in which the audience is addressed with much the same mixture of compliment and gibe as in Cratinus, frag. 323. Frag. 2 comes from the following anapaestic ἀπλοῦν and is an appeal to the Athenians to desist from their suicidal litigiousity.

Eupolis' Βάπται frag. 78, eupolideans asserting Eupolis' share in the composition of the *Equites*, shows that this ἀπλοῦν was, at least in part, concerned with literature. Χρυσοῦν γένος frags. 290-2, attacking Cleon and the democracy, offer specimens of the epionic, obviously from a political ἀπλοῦν. The most complete example of this type, however, occurs in the Δῆμοι. Frag. 120, explained by Kock as an attack on some demagogue, seems to come from a eupolidean ἀπλοῦν, while Egypt has partially preserved the antode and antepirrheme, recognizable as such instead of ode and epirrheme because they are immediately followed by an iambic scene.¹ The antode is written in iambic dimeters and consists of the most scurrilous personalities. Scurrilous odes are met with in Aristophanes, but they are set off by wit and phantasy and music. Here there is wit,² but the metre is of the simplest and the language unornamented. The twelve extant lines of the antepirrheme consist of an attack on some demagogue unknown. The Parabasis is consistent with the political nature of the whole play, but though the chorus may ostensibly have spoken in character, it seems as if Eupolis himself must virtually have been the speaker throughout. Ἀλγες frag. 14, anapaests delivered by a chorus of goats³ and describing their pasturage, seems to come from a ἀπλοῦν in which the chorus spoke in character. There is also a similar but more complete example in the Κόλακες. Frag. 161, generally accepted as eupolideans, refers to Callias and his luxury and was probably delivered by the chorus of flatterers in a ἀπλοῦν describing themselves and their patron. I would suggest that frag. 162 is perhaps taken from the commation of this ἀπλοῦν, for pherecrateans have already been found as a metre for the commation and the wording favours the idea that the chorus are introducing themselves. Frag. 159 forms one of the epirrhemes, sixteen stichic aeolic lines in which the chorus give a detailed account of their mode of life. It is very interesting to find a definite example of this metre in an epirrheme, since these are usually trochaic, the more elaborate metres being reserved for the ἀπλοῦν. Among the *incertae fabulae* frag. 361 is in the same metre, and Bergk was led by this metrical similarity to assign it to the other epirrheme of the Parabasis.⁴ In the Ἀστράτευτοι ἢ Ἀνδρογύνη frags. 37, 38 are both quoted as specimens of the cratineum taken from the Parabasis. Frag. 37, an address to the audience, clearly comes from the ἀπλοῦν, but frag. 38 is not a cratineum and cannot also be assigned to this. It is of the same aeolic metre as the epirrheme of the Κόλακες, so Bergk has made the attractive suggestion that it comes from one of the epirrhemes in this Parabasis.⁵ The sentiment is well suited to a chorus of effeminate describing their way of life. Another interesting fragment from an epirrheme is frag. 357 of the *incertae fabulae*. This is trochaic and shows the poet censuring his audience for their acceptance of foreign poets in preference to the native variety, another instance of the epirrheme usurped by the poet.

Among the fragments of Aristophanes there are signs of three literary ἀπλά. Ἀμφιδάρεως frags. 30, 31 show the poet defending his art. The metre is the same as that of the epirrheme of the Κόλακες, but the way in which the poet delivers his

¹ Cf. Demianczuk, *Suppl. Com.*, pp. 43 ff.

² Cf. Körte, *Hermes* 1912, pp. 276-313 for a detailed and illuminating commentary.

³ Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 662e.

⁴ *De reliquiis Com. Att.*, pp. 340, 353.

⁵ *De reliquiis Com. Att.*, pp. 339 ff.

literary criticism to the audience in the first person affords strong presumptive evidence that the fragments belong to the ἀπλοῦν. *Δαναΐδες* frag. 253, anapaests, describes the conditions of earlier Comedy. 'Ανάγνωρος frag. 54, a eupolidean, censures some poet's plagiarism from Aristophanes, but frag. 55, if Kock's explanation be accepted, touched on politics, so that this would be an example of treatment of the two topics in the one ἀπλοῦν. In the 'Ολκάδες frags. 412-5, 417, anapaests, seem to enumerate the various products brought by the chorus of trading ships, so that they probably come from a ἀπλοῦν delivered by the chorus in character.

Plato's *Ξάντριοι* ἢ *Κέρκωπες* frag. 90 offers another kind of metre, the platonicum, permissible in the ἀπλοῦν, for the greeting to the audience shows that it is parabolic. *Παιδάριον* frag. 92, eupolidean, is quoted by Suidas as coming from the Parabasis and contains the direct address by the poet in the first person. Metagenes' *Φιλοθύτης* frag. 14 seems to come from an anapaestic ἀπλοῦν in which the poet praises his own works.

Among the *ἀδέσποτα* of Old Comedy frag. 47 is probably part of an anapaestic commation, addressing the audience in the scornful manner which seems to have been fashionable. Frag. 53, a eupolidean, seems to come from a ἀπλοῦν touching on literature, for it mentions how a certain poet, perhaps the writer himself, used to please his audience.

Something must also be said of the Subparabasis. In Aristophanes' hands this is a symmetrical syzygy with epirrhemes that are either trochaic or paeonic. The chorus may deliver it in character, so making it approximate to the ordinary stasimon, or else the poet may use the parabolic privilege of expressing his own views.¹ The clearest example in the Comic Fragments is Eupolis' *Κόλακες* frag. 160. These are paeons in which the poet descants on his own literary merits. It seems that Eupolis, although sacrificing his right of self-expression in the parabolic ἀπλοῦν to the dramatic unity of the play, could not bring himself to forego it entirely and therefore diverted the Subparabasis to his own ends. I would also refer to the Subparabasis Aristophanes' *Γεωργοί* frags. 110, 111 on analogy with the *Acharnenses*. There is the same stichic paeonic metre and the same impression of rejoicing now that peace has been made. Again *Thesmophoriazusae* II frags. 333, 334, paeons devoted to literary criticism, are probably from the Subparabasis, in which the poet neglecting considerations of dramatic probability seized the opportunity for expressing his own views.

EXODOS.—The Aristophanic Exodos offers three main types, the lyrical κῶμος, the trimeter scene ending with a conventional anapaestic formula by the chorus, and the type in which the chorus speed the agonists with processional lyrics. In considering the fragments there is no definite criterion of metre, but the subject matter is a valuable aid to classification. Cratinus' *Ὀδυσσεΐς* frag. 145 sounds like the last words of a play, and Kock would restore in some such fashion as:

<ἡγείσθ' ἔξω· μετρίως δὲ δοκεῖ>
νεοχμὸν τι παρήχθαι ἄθυρμα.

This then would be a closing anapaestic formula delivered by the chorus as in *Nubes* and *Thesmophoriazusae*. Cratinus' *Χείρωνες* frag. 237 is quoted as coming from the Exodos, and is probably taken from a passage in dactylic hexameters such as is found in the Exodos of the *Ranae*. It is interesting to find the poet praising his play in this fashion at the end.

In Eupolis' *Δῆμοι* frag. 119, anapaestic tetrameters, in which the chorus bestow εἰρεσιῶναι on the heroes who graciously accept them, Kock sees the last lines of the play. His tableau of the chorus stretching out their arms from the orchestra in farewell is very effective, but it is hard to believe that this fragment was the end. There is no analogy in Aristophanes of a play that ends in this static manner or with

¹ Cf. *Equites*, *Vespae* and in a much lesser degree *Nubes* and *Aves*.

THE COMIC FRAGMENTS

191

a single word, for the poet had to deal with the problem of manoeuvring an exit for both chorus and agonists. I would suggest then that the chorus may have escorted the heroes on their way with a processional lyric, as was probably the case in the *Ranae*.

The instances quoted are from the nature of the case slight and fragmentary, but at least they are of interest in giving some hint of the structural tendencies of Old Comedy in general.

M. WHITTAKER.

GIRTON COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE ORIGINS AND METHODS OF ARISTOTLE'S *POETICS*.

A NEW examination of Aristotle's *Poetics* has confirmed my conviction that a number of old and new puzzles can be solved by the same analytical method which in recent years (though not entirely unchallenged) has been successfully applied to a good many of his writings, giving us a better insight into the growth and successive elaboration of his thought.¹ The importance of the *Poetics* seems to me to justify any attempt to discover the original train of thought and to distinguish it from later additions (each of which was made of course by the philosopher himself). Readers will be aware of the enormous number of books and papers dealing with the problems of this work² and will forgive me for referring to a selection only.

Before going into details we might do well to remember two principal facts concerning the composition of the work. The first is that chs. VI-XXII are confined to the treatment of tragedy and chs. XXIII and XXIV to that of epic poetry. Ch. XXV, being *περὶ προβλημάτων καὶ λύσεων*, and ch. XXVI may be left aside for the purpose of this paper. The second is that ch. VI deduces in a particular way, which we are going to describe later, the essential elements of tragedy, and in doing so determines the contents of the remaining chapters. The six elements thus deduced are *μῦθος*, *ἦθος*, *διάνοια*, *λέξις*, *μελοποιία*, and *ὄψις* (1449b 31-1450a 10). Of these *μῦθος* is dealt with in chs. VII-XIV, XVI-XVIII, *ἦθος* in ch. XV, *διάνοια* in XIX, *λέξις* in XX-XXII. We need not be surprised that *ὄψις*, which is called *ἀτεχνότατον* (1450b 17³), remains outside the *τέχνη ποιητική*. There is indeed more reason, perhaps, to be astonished that *μελοποιία* is likewise left without treatment, but we need not enter into this question.

TWO SETS OF CHAPTERS ON *μῦθος*.

Scholars have wondered why Aristotle, after concluding his treatment of *μῦθος* in ch. XIV and turning to *ἦθος* in XV, comes back to *μῦθος* in XVI-XVIII, and in these chapters communicates to us some theories about recognition in tragedy etc. Bywater, for instance, says with regard to this fact: 'This (16) and the next two chapters form a sort of appendix. They discuss a series of special points and rules of construction which had been omitted in the sketch of the general theory of the *μῦθος*. If these afterthoughts seem out of place here, it is to be remembered that there is an even stronger instance of matter out of place in 15, 1454a 37.' It is obvious that Bywater is quite right in connecting the question with which we are at present concerned with that of 1454a 37 sqq.; we shall return to this point later on. He is likewise right in calling these chapters 'afterthoughts' and in admitting that they are out of place here; and if he goes on to say that an 'excursus on the different forms of discovery' is for several reasons 'justified,' he does not seem to me to revoke what he has said beforehand or to impair the significance of his objections. These objections seem to gain more weight if we bear in mind the words with which Aristotle concludes not only ch. XIV, but the whole group of chs. VII-XIV, as he turns to the next point: *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων*

¹ See W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles, eine Grundlegung der Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (English translation by R. Robinson, Oxford, 1934). See further *Neue Philologische Untersuchungen* IV and VIII and cp. with regard to Aristotle's theology W. K. C. Guthrie, *C.Q.*, 1933, 162 and 1934, 90 ff., and with regard to the logical writings Professor J. L. Stocks' paper (*C.Q.*, 1934, 90 ff.).

² Cp. L. Cooper and A. Gudeman, *A Bibliography of the Poetics of Aristotle in Cornell Studies in English* XI (1928), Yale University Press.

³ See also 1453b 1 ff., 1454b 15 ff. Cp. about *ὄψις* I. Bywater in *Festschrift für Th. Gomperz* (Wien, 1902), 166.

⁴ *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), 233.

συστάσεως καὶ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μύθους, εἰρηται ἱκανῶς. περὶ δὲ τὰ ἡθῆ τέτταρά ἐστιν ὃν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι. I do not think that Aristotle could state in a clearer way than he does in the words quoted that he had finished with the μῦθος.

Further there is no reference to chs. XVI-XVIII in VI-XIV. ἀναγνώρισις is dealt with in XI and in XVI, but while the latter treatment begins with the words ἀναγνώρισις δὲ τί μὲν ἔστιν, εἰρηται πρότερον, εἶδη δὲ ἀναγνωρίσεως . . . the former does not mention any intention of returning later to the same subject. The best form of ἀναγνώρισις is described in XI 1452a 32 ff. as well as in XVI 1455a 16 ff., but in XI Aristotle evidently does not deem it necessary to find the best way by enumerating the different εἶδη and selecting one out of them. It is true that Aristotle in ch. XI looks upon recognition from a point of view different from that of XVI,¹ but in XI he is at pains to define ἀναγνώρισις and to describe its various forms, and there is not the slightest hint that he regarded this treatment of ἀναγνώρισις as being incomplete or less complete than that of περιπέτεια, which precedes, or of πάθος, which follows.

Ch. XVII brings in a new aspect of τραγωδοποιία; it deals with the actual composition of a tragedy and tells the playwright how he has to set to work when writing a new tragedy. There is nothing like this in chs. VII-XIV.

Ch. XVIII contains a curious mass of several different statements and precepts. None of them is worked out fully, nor does Aristotle seem to have cared very much for order or system when writing down these 'afterthoughts.' There is little connection between 1455b 24-32, where every tragedy is divided into two parts, and 1455b 32-56a 7, where the genus of tragedy is divided into four species, while 1456a 7-10 seem to be much more closely connected with 1455b 24-32² than with the sentences immediately preceding. The terms δέσις and λύσις were not introduced in chs. VI-XIV, which claim, as we have seen, to contain a complete treatment of μῦθος. The enumeration of four εἶδη τραγῳδίας: πεπλεγμένη, παθητική, ἡθική and probably (see 1459b 7 ff.) <ἀπλῆ> in 1455a 32 ff. can hardly be made to agree with the division of μῦθοι into two classes in X, and rather seems to be a correction made when the simpler classification did not appear to be sufficiently comprehensive.

This second and, as I have tried to prove, later set of μυθικὰ προβλήματα begins no doubt where Aristotle has finished his treatment of ἦθος, but that does not necessarily mean that it begins with the first words of XVI, where Bywater and others would have it begin. Do the sentences XV 1454a 37-b 8 actually belong to the treatment of ἦθος? The question is to a large extent a textual one, and much depends upon whether we read in 1454a 37 ff. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν, which has the support of mss., or rather ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ ἦθους, which was a conjecture of Ueberweg, but has acquired greater authority since it is said to be confirmed by the Arabic translation.³ Personally I still cling to μύθου, partly because the sentence φανερόν οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰς λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν looks to me more natural than if μύθου is replaced by ἦθους, partly because I am hardly convinced that Aristotle really wanted the solution of the μῦθος to depend upon the ἦθος of the characters (whereas μύθου is supported by 1450b 29-34); yet, if we adopt μύθου, we cannot help concluding that 1454a 37-b 6 is no longer a part of the chapter on ἦθος, and it is in fact by no means due to Aristotle himself that this chapter is usually extended as far 1454b 18. It is also hard to find anything that b 6-b 8 (which states that there should be no ἄλογον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν) and b 15-b 18 (which deal with the impressions made upon the senses of the

¹ Also the recognition occurring in Eur. *Iph. T.* is mentioned in both chapters, but looked upon from different standpoints.

² Both passages are concerned with the δέσις and λύσις which must occur in any tragedy. We can, however, not go any further here owing to the corruption in 1456a 8.

³ See I. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Uebersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles etc.*, Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. II (1932), 179-83. Tkatsch translates the passage in question: 'Et manifestum quod exitus fabularum oportet ut accidat iis et superveniant iis tantum e more ipso.'

spectators) might have in common with *ἦθος*. On the other hand b 8-b 15 cannot possibly be subtracted from the treatise on this subject. The best suggestion I can make is that everything we read from 1454a 37 to b 18 must be regarded as notes made quite unsystematically by Aristotle in the course of years, which were meant partly to complete the theory of the tragic *ἦθος* immediately preceding, partly the theory of *μῦθος*. As far as these notes concern the *μῦθος*, everything we have said with regard to XVI-XVIII is true with regard to them as well.

THE TREATMENT OF EPOS.

Chs. XXIII and XXIV treat of epic poetry. We think that we are justified in inferring from the first sentence of ch. VI *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐν ἐξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς καὶ περὶ κωμωδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν* that a separate treatment of the *ἔπος* was intended by Aristotle from the beginning (although the sentence preceding the one just mentioned runs as follows: *ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπονδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ περὶ ἐπῶν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ*). Nor is there any objection to our assuming that ch. XXIII was a part of the work as it was conceived at first; it is based upon those notions of the *ἔν* and the *δλον* upon which Aristotle theorizes in VII and VIII.

The situation is different with ch. XXIV. Its first sentence: *ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀπλὴν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἡθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν* refers no doubt to ch. XVIII, especially to 1455b 32 ff. Therefore it must be considered as a part of the same later stratum to which we realized ch. XVIII belongs. The question remains whether the same is true with regard to the second part of ch. XXIV beginning at 1459b 17. Its main idea (or at least the idea of the larger part of it) is expressed in the first sentence: *διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μήκος ἢ ἐποποιία καὶ <κατὰ> τὸ μέτρον*. A similar view is found in ch. V (1449b 9 ff.): *ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μεχρὶ μὲν . . . ἡκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν· ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει. . .* Yet while Aristotle in 1449b 13 ff. thinks it sufficient to say that *ἡ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ*, he is in XXIV at pains to limit the extension (*ὅρος*) of the *ἔπος* as much as possible, partly by referring to what he has said about *ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος*, partly by introducing new points of view. This contradiction is in favour of those who would sever ch. XXIV from XXIII and ascribe ch. XXIV to the later stratum. We have further to remember that ch. V, after stating how epic and tragic poetry differ in metre as well as in extension in time, goes on to say briefly that some of the *μέρη* which constitute tragedy constitute the *epos* as well, while some others are limited to and characteristic of the former only. We cannot say whether Aristotle, when stating this, intended to enumerate the *μέρη* peculiar to tragedy later on, but as it is, such a statement is found in XXIV (1459b 9), which for various reasons appears to be late; so it is more likely to supersede than to complete the brief hints which occur in V.

We may add with a view to confirming our theory about ch. XXIV that the treatment of the *μέρη* τῆς τραγωδίας seems to have no organic position in the particular section where we find it (1459b 7-16). The whole passage runs as follows: *ἔτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀπλὴν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἡθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν. καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔξω μελοποιίας καὶ ὤψεως ταῦτά. καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δεῖ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων. ἔτι τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὀμηρος κέχρηται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἰκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ἐκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δ' Ὀδύσεια πεπλεγμένον· ἀναγνωρίσεις γὰρ διόλου· καὶ ἡθικόν. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις¹ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ ἅπαντας ὑπερβέβληκεν*. As the first sentence introduces τὰ εἶδη—the different kinds of epic poetry—so the second one

¹ *πρὸς γὰρ τοῦτοις*, which is the reading of the better mss., gives no reasonable sense. So we cannot help adopting *πρὸς δὲ τ.* with Dr. Gude-

man, though it is not at all certain that it has not sprung from mere conjecture.

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brings in τὰ μέρη of an epic poem. If of these μέρη ὄψις and μελοποιία have no place in the epos, we are left to understand that μῦθος, ἦθος, διάνοια and λέξις apply to it no less than to tragedy. In the next sentence we learn that peripety, recognition and emotional scenes are amongst the necessary elements of epic; this means that we are again concerned with the εἶδη; for these elements are characteristic either of the παθητικόν or of the πεπλεγμένον εἶδος (see 1455b 32 ff., 1459b 15). The next sentences draw our attention to τὰ μέρη (especially λέξις and διάνοια) again. That which follows allows more than one interpretation, but καὶ γὰρ . . . καὶ ἠθικόν deal definitely with the εἶδη, and it is only in the last nine words (πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κτλ.) that Aristotle returns to the μέρη.¹ It is curious to see Aristotle passing again and again from one subject to the other, and I doubt whether there is any parallel to this in the whole set of his works. Moreover there is a change of construction between the first mention of the εἶδη and that of the μέρη (καὶ τὰ μέρη . . . ταῦτά scil. ἐστίν), and another somewhat harsh change in the sentences: καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δὲ καὶ . . . ἐτι δὲ τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. To mention things like these might seem hair-splitting pedantry, and I frankly admit that not one of the facts I have as yet pointed out in regard to this passage has by itself much weight. Yet they become important if we venture to leave out the sentences referring to the μέρη and to read the passage without them: ἐτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ. ἢ γὰρ ἀπλὴν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἠθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν. καὶ γὰρ περιπετειῶν δὲ καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεων καὶ παθημάτων. οἷς ἅπασιν Ὀμηρὸς χρήται καὶ πρῶτος καὶ ἱκανῶς. καὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ἑκάτερον συνέστηκεν ἢ μὲν Ἰλιάς ἀπλοῦν καὶ παθητικόν, ἢ δ' Ὀδύσσεια πεπλεγμένον, ἀναγνωρίσεις γὰρ διόλου, καὶ ἠθικόν. It can hardly be denied that the sentences run much more smoothly thus, and that the whole passage gains a good deal in vigour and compactness. And though we must not state anything dogmatically, it is at least possible that Aristotle when he first wrote this passage was attending only to the εἶδη,² and that the short sentences we have carved out are later additions (inserted by καί, ἐτι, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις). It may have occurred to him that it would be well to remind his listeners by some brief hints of what was said in ch. V about the μέρη, that they were partly the same in tragedy and epic. It is however no injustice to Aristotle to say that while the remarks concerning the εἶδη show a genuine train of thought based on a shrewd and original observation, those referring to the μέρη are, if not just meaningless, yet rather trite and destitute of any peculiar idea or observation.

CHAPTERS XX AND XXI.

We do not mean to enter upon the much discussed question, whether chs. XX and XXI are a part of the original conception of the *Poetics*. Standing where they stand they claim to be a part of the theory of λέξις (λέξις itself being one of the six principal εἶδη with which the critic of tragedy has to deal, see above, p. 192). But the theory of λέξις might just as well begin with ch. XXII, and chs. XX and XXI, concerned as they are with the elements of language, the different kinds of letters and words, have not altogether wrongly been said to form a treatise of their own. It is true that the fundamental theories of the *Poetics* could equally well be conceived without treating these subjects at all. But there is no evidence on the other hand that Aristotle when he worked out these chapters intended them for any place in his writings other than

¹ I cannot agree with Professor Bywater's rendering (in his edition and in the Oxford translation of Aristotle) of this passage: ' . . . Its (scil. epic poetry's) parts too must be the same, as it requires peripeties, discoveries, etc. Lastly the thought and diction in it must be good in their way.' 'Lastly' conveys to the reader the impression that there is a third thing besides the εἶδη and the μέρη in common to epic and tragedy. It does not appear, then, that thought and

language are amongst the μέρη. Moreover peripeties and discoveries must not be classed under the parts (μέρη), but under the εἶδη; see above. A. S. Owen's summary in his 'Analytic Commentary' (*Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*, Oxford, 1931), 40, is open to nearly the same objections.

² He had just, as it was pointed out above (p. 193), added an account of the four εἶδη τραγωδίας to his earlier treatment of tragedy.

that in which we find them. Nor are we able to fix the date at which they were written. The situation being thus, we can only say that chs. XX and XXI may have been written down along with the rest of Aristotle's theory of λέξεις (which means also with the original body of his theory of μῦθος, ῥηθος etc.), but that they need not have been written along with them.


THE METHODICAL STRUCTURE OF THE POETICS.

The group of chapters that remains when later additions are taken away is distinguished by methods of investigation which are singularly characteristic of Aristotle, so that the larger part of it strikes the reader at first sight as a particularly consistent body of coherent thought. Not that the methods applied in I-XIV are all of the same kind or that everything follows by strict necessity from premises that are proved beforehand; it is rather the difference and *παλίντονος ἀρμονία* of the author's methods which demand our interest.

We cannot help uniting to this enquiry into Aristotle's methods some remarks concerning the composition of the whole work.

Chs. I-III contain an elaborate classification of the μιμήσεις, or rather three classifications based upon different *διαφοραὶ τῶν μιμήσεων*. Now we need only call these classifications by their good Platonic name of *διαίρεσεις* and remember how fond Plato was of looking upon the *ποιήσεις* as *μιμήσεις* to conclude that we are on Platonic ground in this part of the *Poetics*. The methods of the first three chapters are indeed by no means more characteristic of Aristotle than of any other pupil of Plato's. There are even some hints in Plato's dialogues that the Academy had worked out amongst other *διαίρεσεις* also some *διαίρεσεις μιμήσεως*.¹ For the rest those who consult Dr. Gudeman's recent edition of the *Poetics*² will be grateful to the editor for exhibiting on p. 108 in a synoptical table the complete scheme of *διαίρεσεις* (though he does not call them by this name) *μιμήσεως* embodied in I-III. This table will be considered amongst the most valuable features of this, otherwise not very valuable, edition even by those who would prefer to see some details of these *διαίρεσεις* arranged in a slightly different fashion.

This table is a modification of the table in Dr. Gudeman's edition; it exhibits the first *διαίρεσις μιμήσεων*.



¹ See *Soph.* 235c ff., 267a ff.; *Crat.* 423 ff. *Rep.* III, 392d ff. shows that the notion of *μίμησις* was originally more limited. It is worth while to compare the theories of *μίμησις* underlying

Legg. II, in particular 669a ff., with those of Arist. *Post.* I.

² *Aristoteles περὶ ποιητικῆς mit Einleitung, Text, adnotatio critica, exegetischem Kommentar etc.*

(I admit that there may be some doubt as to whether ἡ μίμησις διὰ φωνῆς is rightly separated from that ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ.—διαφορά [scil. εἰδοποιός = *differentia specifica*] is a technical term of the Platonic διαίρεσις, the most notorious instances of which are Plato's *Sophistes* and *Politicus*, where this method is constantly applied. 1447b 13 ff. Aristotle's διαίρεσις comes into conflict with a vulgar classification. The same happens occasionally in the course of Platonic διαίρεσις, see e.g. *Polit.* 262. Of γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά Aristotle treats in *Top.* Δ.)

Chs. IV and V interrupt the systematic treatment by a historical sketch describing the origin and development of the most important εἶδη ποιήσεως. It is based upon the same conception of the ποιήσις as a μίμησις (IV 1448b 4 ff.) as the classification in the preceding chapters, but is dominated by the Aristotelian notion of ἐντελέχεια inasmuch as it traces the development of tragedy and comedy up to the point where they reached their proper form and nature (φύσις). Yet chs. IV and V, though not being systematic in the sense of I-III, seem to contribute to the definition, which follows in the beginning of the next chapter and is meant to gather up the main results of the foregoing enquiry (ἀπολαμβάνοντες αὐτῆς [scil. τραγωδίας] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν γινόμενον ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας). There is in fact in the famous definition of tragedy ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένην λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ (Tyrwhitt; ἐκάστου mss.) τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν at least one element, μέγεθος ἐχούσης, that should rather be referred to the historical sketch which makes it clear how tragedy acquired its μέγεθος (IV 1449a 19 ff.) than to the systematic exposition. I am also more inclined to regard σπουδαίας as a reference to IV 1448b 24 ff. διεσπασθῆ δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεία ἦθη ἡ ποιήσις· οἱ γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων (cf. XXXIV ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητῆς Ὅμηρος ἦν κτλ.) than to the distinction made in II between those μιμούμενοι βελτίονας and those μιμούμενοι χείρονας. Yet 1448b 28 appears itself to be written with a glance back to ch. II, and it is worth considering that if we refer πράξεως σπουδαίας to ch. II, ἡδυσμένην λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τ. μορίοις to ch. I,¹ and δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας to the distinction made in ch. III (ὡς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν cp. 1448a 20 ff.), we find Aristotle's promise to compose the definition of the tragedy from τὰ εἰρημένα to a large extent fulfilled.

Still τελείας (in πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας) is not prepared, but rather smuggled into the definition by a certain kinship with σπουδαίας, but it is just the word τελείας which is to become of fundamental importance in ch. VII, where the definition of tragedy is referred to by the sentence κείται δ' ἡμῖν τὴν τραγωδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος. It is then remarkable that the only word—at least in the former part of the definition—that had not been foreshadowed in I-V is taken up in VII. Moreover it is reinforced by another one, ὅλης, which—in spite of κείται—was neither led up to nor came in that definition. Both τέλειον and—to a still greater extent—ὅλον are the foundation of the following treatise on μῦθος. They pretend to be elements of the definition, which for its own part claims to be the outcome of the preceding differentiation of the μιμήσεις, but they are actually neither deduced from nor led up to in I-V, and the one of them that crept into the definition did so not because of but in spite of the assertion that the definition was ἀνειλημμένη ἐκ τῶν προτέρων. This means that there is a discrepancy between the methodical scheme of the *Poetics* and their actual contents. The traditional

(Berlin and Leipzig, 1934).—Cp. also R. P. Hardie, *Mind*, N.S. IV, 356 ('a definition resulting from a division after the familiar manner of Plato in his later dialogues'), and W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (2 1930, London), 277.

¹ The εἶδη mentioned in this sentence are explained in the immediately following one as ῥυθμός, ἁρμονία, μέλος, which are important in the first διαίρεσις ἅς ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

Platonic classification of *μιμήσεις*, by which Aristotle undertook to define the nature of tragedy, does lead to some of the elements of the definition, but the doctrine about the *δλον* (ch. VII) and the *έν* (ch. VIII), or about *ἀρχή*, *μέσον* and *τέλος* and the important theory *ὅτι οὐ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο* (ch. IX) and whatever else is contained in VII, VIII, IX have in spite of appearances grown in a way quite independent of the definition of tragedy, and a connection between them is only reached by very artificial means.

On the other hand chs. VII, VIII, IX are in close connection with each other. A good part of them is dominated by Aristotle's conception of the *δλον* and the organic *τάξις*, elaborately worked out and illustrated by the comparison with an animal's body (ch. VII 1450b 23 ff., 34 ff.). Scholars have realized that this idea is a descendant of the Platonic postulate expressed in *Phaedr.* 264c.¹ Still, considering that the notion of the *καθόλου* (ch. IX) is an ingredient of the Platonic *εἶδος*,² and an offshoot of it (which received a life of its own, when the complex Platonic conception was abandoned by Aristotle) and that only he appreciates the ideal truth of *οἷα ἂν γένοιτο* who stands near to the Platonic position, I should not hesitate to say that the whole body of thought contained in chs. VII-IX has originated in the application of the Platonic *εἶδος* to the phenomenon of poetry—though not the same application, of course, which Plato himself made in *Rep.* X with the result that the value of poetry was much minimized; but there are hints that even for Plato there was more than one way of judging poetry by the standards implied in the *εἶδος*.³

Nearly the same is true with regard to the *κάθαρσις παθημάτων* and the whole theory of *παθήματα*. Chs. XIII and XIV are based upon the conviction that tragedy has to be a *μίμησις φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλκεϊνῶν*. Aristotle here tries to develop the consequences implied in this fundamental conviction. But this conviction itself is nowhere actually deduced nor in any way proved. The definition of tragedy finishes at 1449b 27 in *δε' ἐλέον καὶ φόβον περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*, but that results *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων* as little as *πράξεως τελείας καὶ ὁλης*.⁴ It evidently was an established truth for Aristotle before he set himself to work out the *Poetics*. It is due to ch. III of Rostagni's introduction to his edition of the *Poetics*⁵ that we know how this set of ideas grew in Aristotle's mind in reaction to Plato's uncompromising condemnation of *πάθος* in poetry. Moreover Rostagni has some good arguments to support his theory that Aristotle had before writing the *Poetics* discussed the relative problems in the dialogue *περὶ ποιητῶν* and that it was in this dialogue that he first suggested the idea of *κάθαρσις* as a solution of them or as a compromise between Plato's rigorous attitude and the fact that passions were indispensable in tragedy.⁶

¹ Cp. Finsler, *Plato und die aristotelische Poetik* (Leipzig, 1900), 50; Bywater, l.c., 178; Rostagni, ad loc. (1450b 35 ff.). See also Pl. *Leges* II, 668e ff.

² Cp. *Neue Philolog. Untersuchungen* IV, 81 ff.; J. L. Stocks, *C.Q.*, 1933, 122.

³ See *Rep.* III, 401b c, 402b ff., *Legg.* II, 661b. Cp. J. Tate, *C.Q.*, 1928, 20 ff., 1932, 161 ff. Concerning the relation between *εἶδος* and poetry Platonists had to choose between two views. The one was that maintained by Plato in *Rep.* X. Yet Aristotle is not inclined to support the doctrine that the poet's work is but a *τρίτον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*. He would not place temporal things between the poet and the *εἶδος*, but rather bring the poet face to face with the idea. In the *Poetics* he does not even speak of the *εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ* (scil. of the artist) as e.g. in the *Metaphysics* (Z 7, 1023b 1, 23; cp. R. P. Hardie, *Mind*, N.S.

IV, 353 and S. H. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* [⁴ 1920], 157 f.), but thinks of the poet as contemplating a *καθόλου*, a process of intrinsic unity, from which everything accidental is kept away.

⁴ Cp. L. Cooper, *The Poetics of Aristotle* (in *Our Debt to Greece and Rome*), 30. Attempts have been made, even of late, to eliminate this part of the definition (see A. H. Gilbert, *Philosoph. Rev.*, 1926, 304 f.).

⁵ *La Poetica di Aristotele* (Torino, 1927) XLI ff.

⁶ *Riv. di Fil.* IV (1926), 433; V, 1. Rostagni does not fail to do justice to J. Bernays' famous explanation of *κάθαρσις*, which is, with some modifications, embodied in his own theory. This explanation is indeed, as J. Bywater has proved (*J. of Ph.* XXVII, 267 ff.), much older than Bernays.

This granted, it becomes fairly easy to understand that Aristotle was at pains to return to this subject in the *Poetics* and to make use of this idea of tragedy as a *μίμησις φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλπεινῶν* in order to limit as much as possible the scope of *μῦθοι* suitable for tragedy (chs. XIII, XIV). The problems in question are as Platonic in origin as the theory of the *μῦθος* as a *δλον* and the *διαίρεσις μιμήσεων*, but they are independent of each other, a fact which the definition pretending to be *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων* tries in vain to conceal.

We must now go back once more to ch. VI. We stated above that this chapter deduces those *μέρη τραγωδίας* with which Aristotle has to deal in the rest of his treatment on tragedy. But in what way does it deduce them? By a method very different from the *διαίρεσις* carried out in chs. I-III.

1449b 31: *ἐπεὶ δὲ πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τὴν μόριον τραγωδίας ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος, εἴτα μελοποιία καὶ λέξις· ἐν τοῦτοις γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.* (The next sentence defines *λέξις* and *μελοποιία*.) *ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις, πρᾶττεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν—διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι φαμεν ποιὰς τινας—πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, ἦθος καὶ διάνοιαν . . . ἐστὶ δὲ τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἢ μίμησις.* (Next follows the definition of *μῦθος*, *ἦθος*, *διάνοια*.) *ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγωδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ' ὅ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγωδία. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μῦθος καὶ ἦθος καὶ λέξις καὶ διάνοια καὶ ὄψις καὶ μελοποιία.* Thus the *εἶδη*, with which the *Poetics* will have to deal, are obtained by a demonstration (or even a mere assertion) that each of them *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ*. I have not found any other instance of this procedure, but I should nevertheless venture to call it a method as characteristic of Aristotle as it is alien to Plato; for Aristotle has been the first to look out for *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχοντα* and *καθ' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν* (i.e. elements essentially and necessarily inherent in the notion of something) and he has based his theory of scientific demonstration—contained in *Anal. Post. I*—upon these principles.¹ We do speak in Aristotelian terms if we say that by stating that *μῦθος*, *ἦθος* etc. are *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχοντα* he gives them the nature of *καθ' αὐτὸ ὑπάρχοντα*, i.e. of essential and indispensable elements inherent in the very notion of tragedy. They are by necessity deduced from the definition, a fact which we see most clearly in the very elaborate syllogistic demonstration of the sentence 1449b 36 ff.: *ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι μίμησις* (this refers to the first part of the definition, v. 24), *πρᾶττεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, πέφυκεν αἷτια δύο τῶν πράξεων εἶναι, ἦθος καὶ διάνοιαν.* Aristotle, having thus deduced six essential elements, calls them *εἶδη* and *μόρια κατὰ τὸ ποίον*, and then proceeds to deal with them and evidently regards them as much more worth treating than the *μόρια κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* (*πρόλογος* κτλ.), enumerated in ch. XII (see below p. 200 f.). *Μῦθος* being one of these six elements, Aristotle is furnished with an appropriate heading for some doctrines concerning composition and plot which he is going to expound.

This then would be the train of thought on which the *Poetics* were originally based: by carrying out a Platonic *διαίρεσις* and supporting it by historical observations (or speculations) Aristotle arrives at the definition of tragedy. Hence he deduces *κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* six intrinsic *μέρη* of tragedy, with three of which he is going to deal. *Μῦθος* being the most important one of them, Aristotle utilizes, in order to regulate its composition, some of the elements into which the Platonic *εἶδος* had been broken down and, to regulate its choice, the motifs connected with the

¹ See for instance *Anal. Post. A 4, 73a 21*: *ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐπιστητὴν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην . . . ἐξ ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.* See further b 16 ff., b 23 ff., b 27: *φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι δεῖα καθόλου (καθόλου*

is one of the principal notions of Aristotle's *Apo-deictic*) *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν*; b, 74b 6 ff.: *τὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς πράγμασιν* and other passages of ch. VI such as 74b 13 ff., 75a 28 ff.

κάθαρσις. As to epic, Aristotle thought it sufficient to repeat and adapt one of the main doctrines which he had formulated for tragedy.

About the methods applied in chs. VII-XI little remains to be said. They consist on the whole of general statements, definitions, reflections, yet occasionally we find remarks upon the tragedians' practice. The object of chs. XIII and XIV is to select the most suitable subjects for tragical *μῦθοι*. In them Aristotle proceeds by theoretically stating the existing possibilities, excluding those which for one or the other reason seem objectionable and thus leaving only those approved of. 1453b 14 ff. and b 27 ff. are the best instances of this procedure, but it obviously underlies also the train of thought of 1452b 34 ff., though Aristotle does not think it necessary to enumerate the possibilities before he goes on to exclude the unsuitable ones.

All the methods hitherto described, whether diaeretical, deductive, proceeding by exclusion or based on Aristotle's notion of development, have something theoretic or rather speculative about them, especially if they are compared with those of chs. XVI-XVIII, which we proved to be later.

The *εἰδη ἀναγνωρίσεως* enumerated in XVI are simply gathered up from the practice of ancient tragedies; there is nothing to remind us of the strict, logical way in which the *εἰδη* were deduced in VI. The second half of ch. XV and ch. XVI contain a good many precepts, but they are simply stated without any deductive reasoning and without resorting to the fundamental theories expounded before. 1455b 32 ff. make a further step toward classifying tragedies in accordance with what Aristotle found existing in practice, and they are much more detached from the fundamental tenets and much more empirical than the classification in ch. X. The terms *δέσεις* and *λύσεις*, introduced in the beginning of ch. XVIII, seem to me to be more extrinsic and more extrinsically defined than *περιπέτεια* or any other term that is defined in the previous chapters. If the conviction that every tragedy has to be a *ῥηλον* still underlies 1456a 25 ff., it certainly remains much more in the background. Ch. XVII is very closely connected with the view expressed in ch. IX that *ἡ ποιήσις* is *τῶν καθόλου*, but Aristotle has never gone as far into the actual making and composing of a tragedy as in this chapter in which he teaches the playwright in detail how he has to set to work.

CHAPTER XII (THE QUANTITATIVE ELEMENTS OF TRAGEDY).

We have deliberately left ch. XII to the end; for its case is somewhat singular. Many scholars, amongst whom are Bernays, Ueberweg, Gomperz, Sussehl, have considered it to be spurious; others, who look upon it as a genuine work from Aristotle's hand, have objected to its place.¹ The chapter enumerates and defines the *μέρη τραγῳδίας κατὰ τὸ ποσόν*, i.e. *πρόλογος*, *ἐπεισόδιον*, *ἐπίλογος*, *χορικόν* (*πάροδος* and *στάσιμον*). It differs from the neighbouring ones by its very empiric character. There is nothing speculative in it; the theorist seems to be absent. Yet this argument is not altogether decisive. Is it absolutely impossible that Aristotle at the same time as he dealt with some more speculative problems about the *μῦθος*, such as he had taken over from the Academy, could also face facts and acknowledge them just as they were? And does this chapter really interrupt his train of thought? The one train of thought that begins in ch. VII by stating that the tragic action needs must be an *ῥηλον*, is finished in 1451b 32 or—some definitions being added—in 1452b 13; another one, which is equally concerned with the *μῦθος*, starts in ch. XIII. Was not 1452b 14 ff. just the right place to mention some bare facts independent of both? And is not the knowledge of what a *πρόλογος* or a *στάσιμον* is meant to be

¹ Cp. Gudeman, l.c. 229.

indispensable for anyone about to compose a *μῦθος*? But perhaps in stating this we are on the verge of the really decisive argument: In the preceding chapters we have never lost sight of the *μῦθος*. Everything we read from VII onwards is said with regard to this subject. The sentences dedicated to the *ὅλον* are summed up in 1450b 32 as follows: *δεῖ ἄρα τοῖς συνεστῶτας εἰς μῦθους μὴδ' ἐπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἀρχεσθαι . . . , ἀλλὰ κεκρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις ιδέαις*. Next comes the question of the *μήκος* (see 1451a 5: *οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μήκος . . .*). Ch. VIII begins: *Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἰς οὐχ . . .* (see further 1451a 31 [χρη]) . . . *οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστίν, μῶς τε εἶναι . . .*). The same predominance of *μῦθος* is found in ch. IX, which deals alike with the construction and the choice of suitable *μῦθοι*.¹ One might further compare sentences such as the first of ch. X or the sentence of ch. XI which is meant to lead from the definition of *περιπέτεια* and *ἀναγνώρισις* to a third *μέρος μύθου* (1452b 9). Yet chs. XIII and XIV also are characterized by the sentence with which they begin: *ὦν δὲ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἃ δεῖ εὐλαβεῖσθαι συνιστάντας τοὺς μῦθους . . . ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη λεκτέον τοῖς εἰρημένοις*. So we do not go too far by stating that the *μῦθος* is not only the principal subject, but the one and only subject of this whole set of chapters from VII to XIV. If this is borne in mind, the same assertion becomes true which had to be rejected as long as it was based upon too superficial a view of the matter. Ch. XII does indeed interrupt a train of thought conceived as an *ἐν* and *ὅλον*, as it is apparently written without any reference or regard to the *μῦθος*. We may now venture to say that it was added later when Aristotle decided to complete the treatment of the *μόρια οἷς δεῖ ὡς εἶδεν χρῆσθαι* (1452b 14; see above p. 199) by taking into account also those external *μόρια* (*κατὰ τὸ ποσόν*) and mentioning them in a note, however short. Whereas the *μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποῖόν* are deduced in a rather careful and elaborate way, those *κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* are simply stated. They are more likely than anything else in Aristotle's *Poetics* to have played an important part in the *τέχναι* (or at least in the technical efforts) of the tragedians themselves, as *προοίμιον*, *στάσιμον*, etc. are the very things around which the work of an ancient playwright could not help centering. It is the final stage of the *Poetics* in which Aristotle comes into contact with the traditional *τέχναι*, which he, when starting this work, had endeavoured to supersede. It is the same stage, at which he would concern himself also with the technical details of the recognition (XVI), acknowledge as existing several different types of tragedy (XVIII) besides the best one, on which he had theorized in XIII f., and condescend to speak of *δέσις* and *λύσις* as the two halves of any tragedy, which terms are nearer to the stage and the actual play-writing than such logical and logically deduced notions as *ἀρχή*, *μέσον* and *τέλος*.

It may be well to give a short summary of our results. The classification of *μυήσεις* (chs. I-III), the historical sketch (IV, V), the definition of tragedy and the deduction of its six essential *μέρη* (VI) belong to the earlier stratum, and so does the first treatment of *μῦθος* (VII-XI, XIII f.), the chapter on *ἦθος* (XV, 1454a 16-36), parts of the treatment of *λέξις* (ch. XXII) and the first chapter on epic (XXIII). As later additions I regard the enumeration of the external *μέρη* in ch. XII and the second set of *μυθικά προβλήματα* in which recognitions are once more classified, the terms *δέσις* and *λύσις* introduced, *ἐμβόλημα* repudiated etc. (1454a 37-b 18 and chs. XVI-XVIII). The second chapter on epic (XXIV) is also likely to be late. As to the chapters on the elements of language (XXI, XXII) I should welcome any argument that might prove them to be late, but am unable to assert anything at present.

F. SOLMSSEN:

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ See for instance 1451b 27 ff. and b 33 ff.

SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

Classical Philology. XXX. 1. January, 1935.

Jefferson Elmore, *A New Dating of Horace's De Arte Poetica*: the date 28/7 A.D. removes the difficulties of the reference to Cascellius (whose birth E. places in 110, against Mommsen's 104) and of the age of Cn. Piso's sons. J. W. Hewitt, *The Image in the Sand*: Arist. *Nub.* 975 conceals a reference to erasure of traces of the body as a precaution against *Spurzauber*, though Ar. wilfully misrepresents the reason: H. finds in this a trace of Pythagoreanism in the education of the δίκαιος λόγος and attempts to detect others in the prohibitions against crossing the legs, giggling, etc. E. T. Salmon, *Rome's Battles with Etruscans and Gauls in 284-2 B.C.*: extracts a coherent account by comparison of the Polybian and Livian traditions. E. E. Burriess, *The Place of the Dog in Superstitions as revealed in Latin Literature*: catalogues taboos, magical beliefs, etc., largely from Pliny. J. N. Hough, *The Development of Plautus' Art*: postulates three stages in P.'s use of Greek models, classifies the plays as well-constructed non-farces, poorly constructed farces and well-constructed farces, and finds that the order of plays reached on this basis agrees with accepted chronology. A. E. Pappano, *The Pseudo-Marius*: a vivid and well-documented account of the career of the impostor Amatius in 45/4 B.C. J. E. Powell, *Notes on the Oedipus Tyrannus*: 132-3 are spoken by the Priest, so that σὺ refers to O. and ἐπιστροφὴν to his resolve in 131: 420-1 Κιθαिरῶν is the subject of both clauses and λιμὴν and σύμφωνος both predicates: 463 for εἶπε read ἦδε (from αἶδω): 677 read ἴσως and assume a following line lost: 718 ἄρθρα ποδοῖν merely periphrastic for πόδες: 704-5 the third road is that from Thebes: 865-70 νόμος and φύσις are sharply contrasted: 1469 ff. Ant. and Is. must have entered with Cr. before O. expressed his wish to hold them. J. H. Drake, *Again Hoc Age*: maintains against Rolfe (*C.P.* 28-47) that *hoc age* in Pl. *Capt.* 444 = 'do this'—i.e. pledge his faith by hand-grasp. Howard Comfort, *The Date of Catullus liii*: Calvus's attack on Vatinius cannot be dated 56 B.C., for Cat. was still abroad when the conference at Lucca was in progress and after Lucca an attack on V. would have been impolitic. A. W. Fraser explains χαμαλὴ πανπεράτη of Ithaca as 'grounded in the sea (as opposed to floating islands like that of κ 3), most elevated of all.' L. R. Lind (1) summarizes the case against Virgil's military service, (2) defends δεδονημένος in Nonnus, *Dion.* 1. 69.

Eranos. XXXII. 1934. Fasc. 1.

J. Svennung gives critical notes on Cato *De Agri Cultura*. Cato frequently uses different forms of the same word, is fond of *parataxis*, has ellipse of subject and governing verb, and uses singular after plural referring to the same thing. In *Miscellanea* he adds to the Latin Dictionary *cicula*, dim. of *ciccus* 'trifle,' and *capriare* 'to smell like a goat.' V. Lundström gives specimens of the language of Columella. The genitive of starting-point (*postridie eius diei*) is found in 'intra dies triginta sublatæ messis,' varied by 'intra dies triginta quam desecta est (messis).' *Qua* has MS authority as causal conjunction. 'Aratrum inicere' 'to put a yoke on the ox's neck' is supported by Stat. *Theb.* I. 132, Manil. II. 250, Ovid. *Met.* VII. 211, Tac. *Ann.* XI. 24. Columella uses both 'adsiccescere' and 'adsiccare.' MSS establish the form 'præfactus' for 'præfractus.' To the acknowledged example of this spelling, 'præstigia,' may be added 'propius (proprius)' and 'crebas (crebras).' 'Remanere' is used meaning 'to spend the night at home,' cp. Hor. *Odes* I. 1, 25. 'Bonus ab' 'good from the point of view of . . .' should be kept in VI. 2, 3.

Fasc. 2-3.

H. Frisk, *Greek Etymologies*, discusses the Homeric *μεσαιπόλιος* (half-grey) and kindred forms, including *ταλαίπωρος*: the first part is not locative. *Ἀήρ* (*ἄFήρ*), *αἶρα* and *ἀείρω* are connected. C. Theander, *Studia Sapphica*, proposes to read: *τίνα δηρτε Πείθων* (acc.) *μαί 'σάγην ἐς σὰν φιλότατα* (*μαί* from *μάεαι*). *Ox. Pap.* 1231, fr. 1, l. 6 *ἀ γὰρ, πόλν περ σκέθοισα | κῦδος ἀνθρώπων Ἑλένα τὸν ἄνδρα | πρῶτι ἄπιστον.* l. 12 *οὐκ ἀκούισαν.* l. 13. *Θῦμος εὐκαμπτον γὰρ ἔφν γύναικος | τὰς Ἔρος κούφως τρέπεται νόησιν.* fr. 15. l. *ᾧδε κοσμήταν κέλομαί σ' ἄρασθαι, | Γογγύλα βρόδανθι (?), λάβοισαν ἄβραν | πᾶκτιν.* S. Pantzerhielm Thomas makes some additions to a previous treatment of the so-called 'Plutei Traiani' in *Symbolae Osloenses* X, and to Svenberg's article in *Eranos* XXXI. 1. 21. J. Svernung, in *Peregrinatio Aetheriae* 8, 2 conjectures 'exculsae' for 'exclusae,' and 25, 8 retains 'oleserica' as a current spelling. G. Wiman criticizes in detail Hartel's edition of Paulinus of Nola in the Vienna Corpus, pointing out various lacunae, and discussing elaborately the Chi-Rho monogram. B. Olsson prints and comments on an interesting Greek letter of 1531 to Gustavus Adolphus petitioning him to liberate Greece.

Fasc. 4.

A. Wifstrand corrects the prose notes on Callimachus recently published by Vitelli and Norsa from a Tebtunis papyrus. G. Thörnell, *Analecta Critica*, makes emendations, among which may be mentioned: Plaut. *Cas.* 159 'flagiti prosequium.' *Poen.* 811 'uerum ita sunt isti <iusti> nostri diuites.' *Lucr.* IV. 1225 'quandoquidem nihilo magis haec <sine> semine certo.' *Tib.* III. 4, 4 'desinite in uentis quaerere uelle fidem.' *Apul. Met.* III. 2, p. 52, 20 'turbae miscellaneae coetu completa.' *Tert. Apol.* XXI. 8 'Iouis ista sunt <nomina>, numina uestra.' *Amm. Marc.* XXI. 5, 10 'licet proposito purgabili. XXI. 16, 9 'tumque in eiusmodi titulis capitali <or> opera <era> t.

Hermes 69. Heft 4.

W. Theiler, *Die grosse Ethik und die Ethiken des Aristoteles*. Argues that the *Magna Moralia* is based neither on the Eudemian nor on the Nicomachean Ethics but on an intermediate treatment of the subject by Aristotle, produced in lectures but not published. H. Dahlmann, *Sallusts politische Briefe*. Argues in favour of their authenticity by a consideration of the change in the writer's political views in the interval (50-46 B.C., if the letters are genuine) between the two. F. Solmsen, *Euripides Ion im Vergleich mit anderen Tragödien*. Discusses the place of the *Ion* in the development of Euripides' dramatic art by comparison with other of his tragedies preserved or partially known. R. Keydell, *Zwei Stücke griechisch-ägyptischer Poesie*. Discusses two fragments of late Greek verse (*P.S.I.* vii. no. 845 and *Rev. Phil.* N.S. 19 (1895), 177), shows that the sentiment expressed is a commonplace going back in Egypt to late Hellenistic times. F. Frahm, *Neue Wege zur Textkritik von Tacitus' Germania*. Shows that our text of the *Germania* goes back to the MS of which some pages (containing *Agr.* c. 13-40) are preserved in the Iesi MS. Illustrates the abbreviations etc. in this MS, shows how these are corrupted in its descendants, presumes similar corruptions in the *Germania* text, and argues that we have thus a way to mend it.

MISZELLEN: A. Becker, *Zwei Beispiele für Interpolationen im Aristoteles-Text*. Illustrates the nature of the interpolations by examination of *Περὶ Ἐρμηνείας* 13, 22b 38-23a 26, and *Metaph.* θ 4, 1047b, 14-30. O. Schroeder, *Arphron*. Discusses metrical problems in the *Παῖον εἰς τὴν Ὑγίειαν*. J. Keil, *Ein missverstandenes Bekenntnis des Königs Antiochos I von Kommagene*. Emends the last paragraph of the Selik inscription (Hermann-Puchstein, *Reisen in Kleinasien und Nordsyrien*, p. 368 f.) and discusses its relation to the religious and political ideas of Antiochus I. A. v. Blumenthal, *Beobachtungen zu griechischen Dichtern*. Comments on *Soph. Electra* 129-

145; 161 f.: *Philoctetes* 984; 931: *Ajax* 670 f.; Euripides *Medea* 766: *Iph. in A.* 1168: Aristophanes *Wasps* 1011 f.: *Birds* 280 f.: Pindar *Ol.* I. 113: Theocritus I. 151. R. Keydell, *Zum Epidaurischen Pankhymnus*. Emends l. 5 f. (cf. above, Heft 1). P. Mass, *Ad Timocreonem Rhodium*. Proposes modifications of Bowra's reading (above, Heft 3). C. Bosch, *Zu Apollodor's Bibliothek* I. 38 (Wagner). Shows from vase inscription that the name of Artemis' opponent in the Gigantomachy should be Γαῖών, not Γαρτίων.

Mnemosyne. Third series. I. 3 (1933-4).

Kronenberg has critical notes on those of Plutarch's *Lives* contained in the Lindskog-Ziegler edition vols. 1, 1; 2, 1; 3, 1 and 2. C. M. Bowra, *Varia Lyrica*, deals with Sappho, *Epithal.* 9, Sappho, *Inc. Lib.* 33, Alcaeus, *frag.* 73, 112 (Lobel): Ibycus, *frag.* 6, Timotheus, *frag.* 7, Timocleon, *frag.* 5 (Diehl). W. I. W. Coster, *De Codice [Laurent. lxxii.] Fragmentum Scholiorum Metricorum ad Pindarum Continente*. This fragment was ignored by Drachmann in his edition of the Pindaric scholia. C. admits that the fragment, of which he gives a detailed account, is of small value. B. A. van Groningen, *Ad Theophrasti Characteres* XIX, 8-11. It is admitted that these sections have nothing to do with δυσχέρεια; an examination of their contents reveals that they are descriptive of improper behaviour at religious ceremonies, and therefore belong to a chapter περὶ τῆς δυσσεβείας (the greater part of which is lost) forming a pendant to the character of the δευσιδαίμων. B. A. van Groningen, *De Hymni HomERICI in Apollinem* v. 168. MSS of the *Hymns* read this line ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ξείνος ταλαπείριος ἐλθών, while Thuc. 2, 104 has ἐνθάδ' ἀνείρηται ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθών. The word ταλαπείριος in Hom. is always joined with a noun and always occupies the 3rd or 4th foot. Van G. would emend both passages to read . . . ταλαπείριος ἄλλος ἐπελθών. G. B. A. Fletcher, *Imitationes vel Loci Similes in Poetis Latinis*, collects parallel passages hitherto unnoticed in Propertius, Statius *Silvae*, Ausonius, Claudian, Prudentius, Paulinus Nolanus, Rutilius Namatianus, and Apollinaris Sidonius. P. J. Enk, *Ad Statii Thebaidos Librum Primum Adnotationes*. J. De Wit, *Vergilius Vaticanus und Nordafrikanische Mosaiken*. The illustrations in the Vatican MS of Virgil have been supposed to owe their origin to an early illustrated edition of the poet. De W. specially studies the underworld group (pictures 33-37), which he reproduces. He finds marked resemblance between them and certain mosaics in Tunisia which come from Roman country houses. 'That the subjects were taken immediately from North African mosaics is not a necessary conclusion but yet is quite possible; we have also in the well-known Mosaic in Alaoui "Virgil sitting between Clio and Melpomene" the best evidence that the N. African man of property included V. and his poems among the subjects with which he liked to decorate his country house.' J. H. Waszink, *Eine Ennius-Reminiszenz bei Cyprian?* Cyprian's *De bono patientiae* is dependent on Tertullian's *De patientia*. But Cyprian's passage on the gifts of Nature to mankind is considerably fuller than the corresponding passage in Tertullian, and its substance suggests that Cyprian was acquainted with Ennius' paraphrase of Aeschylus' song of the Eumenides (151 Vahlen) beginning *caelum mitescere, arbores frondescere*. H. Heuvel, *De Terentianae Eunuchi Prologo*. The difficulty of understanding this prologue from v. 23 on is generally admitted. After a discussion of the problem H. summarizes his interpretation in the form of a paraphrase: 'My opponent has declared that I pillaged Naevius' *Colax* and Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*. If the similarity in the characters and dialogue makes this charge easily credited the fault was mine, because I did not know that N. and P. had themselves drawn upon Menander's *Colax*. But let us see first whether I have committed theft. I deny it; for since I have transferred Menander's "parasite" and "soldier" from his *Colax* into his *Eunuchus*, the alleged theft is impossible. Hence Luscius will have to maintain that those same characters were plays composed by P. and N.,

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which is absurd. If we cannot use these characters, where will Comedy be? For she necessarily relies upon such (stock) characters.'

Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung. X. 6. 1934.

R. Harder, *Platon und Athen*. Mainly a defence against Wilamowitz of the consistency of Plato's attitude towards Athens. H. Aubin, *Neue Beiträge zur Kenntnis von Altgermanien*. An appreciative but critical account of Eduard Norden's *Altgermanien*, 1934, dealing largely with the Romanization of the *decumates agri*. G. Jappe-Schubbing, *Sophokles*. Chiefly a criticism of recent books by Weinstock and Reinhardt.

XI. 1. 1935.

F. J. Brecht, *Sokratische Dialektik*. A close analysis of the essential nature of Socratic dialectic, with special reference to irony and to the use of sophistic arguments by Socrates himself. H. Oppermann, *Das heutige Sallustbild*. The reaction from Mommsen's view has given an equally false picture of Sallust. Sallust was one of the men who understand in life only what they have already learned from books.

XI. 2. 1935.

L. Mader, *Platon und wir*. Plato as the prophet of National Socialism.

Philological Quarterly (Iowa). XIII. 2. (April, 1934.)

Cornelia C. Coulter writes on 'The Speech of Foreigners in Greek and Latin Comedy,' with reference to *Phil. Quart.* XII (1933), 255-68, 'The Broken English of Foreigners of the Elizabethan Stage.'

XIII. 3. (July, 1934.)

Douglas Bush, *Notes on Shelley*, points out some unnoticed classical echoes in Shelley.

XIII. 4. (October, 1934.)

E. M. Sanford discusses the connexion between Adam of Bremen's description of the islands of the North and Greek and Latin speculation. A. H. Gilbert considers the influence of Seneca on Elizabethan Tragedy.

XIV. 2. (April, 1935.)

T. S. Duncan analyses the relevant plays with a view to explaining and defending the use of the *deus ex machina*. H. G. Robertson discusses the rôle of the Guard in the *Antigone*.

Philologus. LXXXIX. (N.F. XLIII.) 3. 1934.

J. Tolstoi, *Einige Märchenparallelen zur Heimkehr des Odysseus*. Compares the story of O.'s return with other similar stories and concludes that all derive from some prehomeric folk-tale. H. Steiger, *Die Groteske und Burleske bei Aristophanes (continued)*. Examines next four plays (*Av.* to *Ran.*) for grotesque and burlesque *strata* (to be concluded). B. Schweitzer, *Mimesis und Phantasia*. Dissents from E. Birmelin's derivation (*Philolog.* 88, pp. 149-180 and 392-414) of the later (hellenistic) Greek concept of *φαντασία* from Aristotle's doctrine of *μίμησις*. Sees rather a Stoic (or at least a non-peripatetic) origin for the theory. J. Stroux, *Erzählungen aus Kallimachos*. Deals with three passages in the newly discovered *Διηγέσεις*: (1) identifies the *Γάιος* of col. V l. 26 with Sp. Carvilius (cf. Cic. *de or.* II 216 et sqq.) and the attack of the *Πενκτίοι* (l. 25) on Rome with that of the Gauls in 360 B.C. (Livy VII 11); (2) uses col. IV 36 (*Πασικλέες*) in conjunction with Ael. *var. hist.* III 26 to explain the puzzling *Melant(h)ea . . . a caede latenter* of Ov. *Ibis* 623 = trying to escape by hiding from being murdered by Melanthus; (3) explains col. VII ll. 19-24, taking *καταισχύνοντα* and (?) *δρᾶν* also as *sens. obsc.* H. Bogner, *Die Religion des Nonnus von Panopolis*. Nonnus wrote the *Dionysiaca* as a heathen and the Paraphrase of the

Fourth Gospel as a Xian. We must conclude that, like Firmicius Maternus, he became a Xian towards the end of his life. W. Kroll, *Rhetorica*. (1) Examines different meanings and definitions of the word *signum*; (2) discusses theories of τὸ γελοῖον in oratory. P. Lehmann, *Die Institutio oratoria des Quintilianus im Mittelalter*. Our text of Q. goes back to a 9th-cent. French MS corrected in Germany (probably at Fulda) in the 10th. Almost one-third of the *Rhetoric* of Ulrich von Bamberg derives from Quint. bks. 8 and 9. He gives a text; also that of a MS from Zwiefalten which is similarly compiled from bks. 1 and 2. MISZELLEN.—R. Pfeiffer, *Zum Papyrus Mediolanensis des Kallimachos*. Three short notes on the Διηγήμευς: would read Διπραπίω[ν in col. II l. 13. B. Rehm, *Catull 66, 1 und der neue Kallimachosfund*. In the first line of the *Coma Berenices* as given in the Διηγήμευς R. defends ὄρον, explaining it from a passage in Aristot. as = οὐρανόν. Would read *limina* (= ὄρους) for *lumina* in corresponding Cat. 66. 1. J. E. Powell, *Zwei Bemerkungen zu Vergils Aeneis*. In 9. 214 would read *mandet humo, aut, solitas si. . .* In 12. 451 explains *sidere* as = *tempestate* (cf. Verg. G. 311, etc.) and *abrupto* as adjectival = sudden (cf. G. 3. 259 *abruptis procellis*). F. Drexler, *Ein Theopomp Fragment bei Psellos*. Psellus (in cod. Vatic. gr. 672, fol. 109 ll. 13-14) quotes a sentence from 17th bk. of Theop.'s *Philippica* not given by Jacoby in his *Fragm. d. griech. Hist.*

LXXXIX. (N.F. XLIII) 4. 1934.

P. von der Mühl, *Einige Interpolationen in berühmten Stellen der Odyssee*. These are: φ 412-5; ψ 18-9; ν 242-7. F. Dornseiff, *Hesiods Werke und Tage und das alte Morgenland*. Calls attention to parallels between Hesiodic poems and Jewish writings. Both derive from an older Asiatic source. H. Steiger, *Die Groteske und die Burleske bei Aristophanes (concluded)*. Examines *Ecclesiastus* and *Plutus* and sums up. R. Preiswerk, *Zeitgeschichtliches bei Valerius Flaccus*. Observes parallels between V. F. and Lucan and Seneca. Hidden references date the *Argonautica* to circ. 69-71 A.D. H. Haftter (editor), *Beiträge aus der Thesaurus-Arbeit I*. This instalment contains *ebria*, *eludificor* (to be rejected as a 'ghost-word'), *enim*, *erecta*, *erigere*, *gula*, *identidem*, *identitas*, *ignominia*.

MISZELLEN: J. Mesk, *Die Parodos der Sieben gegen Theben*. The alternate references to *seeing* and *hearing* in the parodos suggest a definite division of the chorus into two semichori. H. R. Schwyzer, *Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation von Plotin, Enn. IV 7, 6*. The gen. τῶν μορίων is to be taken with τὰ μέρη, not with ἀναίσθητα. B. Bischoff, *Die alten Namen der lateinischen Schriftarten*. The name *africanæ* given to semi-uncials in a MS of Remigius of Auxerre comes from the late Roman book trade with N. Africa; similarly *vergilianæ* is used with reference to Vergil, scribes being accustomed to Vergil MSS written in that script. F. Stählin, *Zu I.G. IX 2, 90 und 91, Inschriften aus Narthakion*. Completes many fragmentary names.

Revue de Philologie. LX. 3. (1934.)

T. W. Allen, *Adversaria*. 1. Schol. Eur. *Troad*. 1019 νι = Νικητᾶς. 2. Exx. of καθά καθό καθότι = where. 3. Paus. VIII. 8. 1 <Μαιρά>, μοῖρα. 4. Apollod. III, 161 <ἐξ>ῆς or <ἐφεξ>ῆς. 5. Semonides I. 3 ἦ δὴ . . . ζώμεν. 6-8. Tyrtaeus I. 11 κωλῆ]ν 15 μῶμη? 22 [περὶ δουρί. 9-10. Solon. X. 5 χεῖρς? XXII. 2 σ' εὖ = σοι εὖ. 11-12. Xenophanes I. 19 and III. 4 are sound. 13 ff. Theognis, 309. δόκει, φέρειν, εἶη are the right variants. 719. ἔλακον H. L. Withers. 799. ἀλλ' ὧς might mean ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧς; otherwise ἀλλ' ὧς λῶιος. 887-94. Spoken by Theognis in exile. 897. χαλέπαινεν = χαλεπὰ ἦν. 903. κατὰ χρήματα = according to his income. 1128. γὰς, even though the plural of γῆ is shy. 1129. ἐμπόμοι, for πίομαι fut. after εἰ is not possible. 1133. παροῦσι, i.e. before they go. 1202. ? μνηστῆς objective gen. 'for a bride.' 1282. Boissonade's οὐ τίς τις οὐδ' ἀδίκων has a parallel in Tib. I. 9. 4. E. K. Rand, *La composition rhétorique du troisième livre de Lucrèce*, finds in this book the rhetorical system of *exordium* (1-40), *narratio* (41-416), *argumentatio* (417-829), *confir-*

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matio (425-633), *refutatio* (634-829), *peroratio* (830-1094). The footnotes to an extensive analysis often discuss readings. L. Robert, *Études d'Épigraphie Grecque*: accuses W. Peek of gross ignorance in his publication (*Ath. Mitt.* 1931) of inscriptions from Smyrna; gives the results of a new reading of the decree of the Asclepiastae at Colophon (*SEG* IV. 566); in *SEG* IV. 594 supplies $\nu\sigma$ <τάριοι>; *IGR* IV. 235 comes from the Dardanelles not Mysia; suggests supplements to an inscription from Gerasa (*Rev. Bibl.* 1927, 252); gives a new copy of and commentary on a long decree from Tralles of the time of Eumenes II: the decree is concerned with a *δικάστης* supplied to Tralles by the Phoceans; in the inscription published in *Hesperia* II. 402 *ζώνη* should be *Ζώνη*: at least 7 persons of this name are known; but the 'name' *Ὀναριδῷ* (*BCH* 1927, 292) is only *ὄναρ* *ἰδῶ*! W. H. Buckler, *Une borne Ionienne* (published in *Révue de philologie*, LIII. 191). *περρωίων* is the name of a people or other social unit. *ἐλεοπεῖν*—the marshes were the best pasture-lands. The writing suggests a date about 360-350 B.C. Notes et Discussions: J. Safarewicz criticizes Drexler's *Plautinische Akzentstudien*.

LX. 4. (October, 1934.)

P. Jouguet: Obituary notice of A. S. Hunt. L. Oeconomus, *Remarques sur le 1^{er} couplet de Phèdre dans l'Hippolyte d'Euripide (vers 198-202)*, reads *αἶπέ τε . . . ὀρθοῦ τε . . . λαβέ τ' εὐπήχεις, πρόσπολε, χείρας*. A. Dain, *Les manuscrits d'Asclépiodote le Philosophe*, gives detailed accounts and corrects Oldfather in some particulars: notably Salmasius made the marginal corrections in Par. gr. 2435, from which he afterwards copied Par. gr. 2528. (To be contd.) G. Daux, *Χειροτέχνιον*: the dispute over the meaning of the phrase *ἀντὶ τοῦ χειροτεχνίου* (*SIG*³ 481) is determined by an unedited inscription, also from Delphi, according to which a foreigner receives *ἀτέλειαν* [τοῦ χειρ] *ροτεχνί* [ου]. The word means 'artisan's tax'; and the sole reason for the philologists' belief in locative *ἀντὶ* at Delphi disappears. Olga Dobiaś Roždestvenskaia, *Quelques considérations sur la date du Vatic. 3868 (c), Térence*, considers as a result of studying the Corbeiensis *Leninopolitani* that the MS. is earlier than 822 A.D. Ch. Mugler, *La fréquence et la distribution des formes nominales du verbe en grec et en latin*: statistics from a number of Greek authors suggest that narrative favours the participle and reflective writing the infinitive. (To be contd.)

Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. N.F. LXXX. 4. 1931.

K. Lehmann, *Von Polybios' Schreibtisch*. L. analyses Polybius' account of Cannae into a time-table of the battle, and criticizes *inter alia* (a) the numbers of the combatants, (b) the movements of Hasdrubal's cavalry corps, (c) the action of Aemilius Paullus, (d) the omission of the tactical plans of the Carthaginians and Romans. Finally he answers Kromayer's criticism of his account in *Klio* XXIV. 94 of the exact position of the battle. A. Klotz, *Zu Catull.* K. decides for *arida* in 1 l. 2, after quoting examples to show that poets were influenced in gender by the Greek equivalent—here *κίσσηρις* as in *Anth. Pal.* VI. 295. 5. He points '*Amor, sinistra ut ante*,' in XLV. 8 on the evidence of *Plut. Them.* 13 *παρὰ μὲς ἐκ δεξιῶν*. He discusses LVIII b, refusing to transpose ll. 2 and 3. The *Attis* is not in imitation of Callimachus, but of a later poem typical of the anti-Oriental Greek literary feeling of the end of the second century B.C. He argues for the retention of *suppositum* in LXVII. 32 (sc. oppidum). M. Boas, *Zur indirecten Caesarüberlieferung*. B. claims *Livy* XXXI. 11. 16 as an imitation of Caesar *Bel. Gal.* I. 43. 4: and on this evidence shows the superiority of the β -class of mss. of Caesar. F. Marx, *Mosella*. M. analyses Ausonius' poem, after sketching its historical background: and concludes that it is in the literary form of the hymn, and was written to exhibit the peaceful condition of the district after Valentinian's campaign. M. Manitius, *Aus mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen*. This is a list of mss. of classical authors noted in mediaeval and

renaissance catalogues, in extension of the list in *Rhein. Mus.* XLVII. MISZELLEN. —E. Bickel, *In Manilii prooemia librorum II et III* accepts Housman's *ignotos*, but keeps *cantus* in III. 4, *blandis . . . sonis* in II. 147, and proposes *immodico* for *ut modico* in II. 148.

N.F. LXXXI. 1. 1932.

L. Weber, *Orpheus*. Orpheus was originally a Thracian chthonian deity of the Mt. Pangaeum district (Eur. *Alc.* 962 ff. 568 ff. are interpreted so as to support the other evidence: and the Aeschylean *Lycurgus* trilogy is analysed). The ancient tradition, which puts his date before the Trojan War, the Thracian incursion into Greece, the connection of the Muses with Mt. Olympus, and Thracian musical proficiency in general help us to reconstruct the history of the cult. *Exkurs I* discusses Neckel's connection of Balder and Orpheus. *Exkurs II* locates the *Νυρίων πεδίων* in Mt. Pangaeum. R. Hennig, *Der kulturhistorische Hintergrund der Geschichte vom Kampf zwischen Pygmäen und Kranichen*. Egyptian evidence makes it plausible to suppose that Homer had learnt from Egypt of actual fights between pygmies and cranes in the swamps of the Upper Nile. C. Fries, *Homerische Beiträge*. The *Odyssey* is 2 poems written by 2 poets at different dates, for a different public. The first is dominated by the contrast of the hero hidden in the isles of Calypso and Circe (identical figures) and completely obscured in the *Nekyia* (this is not an interpolation) with the hero brought into the clear radiance of the heavenly Phaeacia. Here Asiatic and Astral-mythological influences have been potent: and the Moon has served as prototype. The second poem is 'Hesiodic' and everyday. R. Philippson, *Sokrates' Dialektik in Aristophanes' Wolken*. The language of ll. 740 ff. when examined in detail shows the characteristics of Socrates' dialectic as given in Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. H. Maier's hypothesis that Plato is the real author of this dialectic falls to the ground. Aristophanes' picture of Socrates is analysed in detail. W. Schwahn, *Schiffspapiere*. The events recorded Thuc. VII. 25. 2, the working of the trading treaty with Leukon I (Dem. *c. Lept.* 29 ff.), the specific orders given by the Eleusinian authorities for goods from overseas, and in general the collection of the customs, dues etc. necessitate the assumption that a trading vessel carried official papers descriptive of its cargo and destination. B. Warnecke, *Zur Geschichte der Bühnenkunst*. (i) W. suggests that when the stage was crowded, persons grouped themselves in the same way as the figures of temple gables were grouped. (ii) He criticizes Bulle's account of the dances of the chorus. (iii) Menander has very few references to actors' motions or facial expressions: cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1462. The Roman tradition was different, and the absence of masks (maintained against A. S. W. Gow, *J.R.S.* II) made facial expressions possible. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchstudien*. VII. *Zu Phokion-Cato*. Detailed notes are given on 44 places in amplification of his new text. VIII. *Zu Dion-Brutus*. Notes on 25 places. IX. *Der Tod des Dichters Cinna*. Plut. *Brut.* XX. 8 is the only place where the Cinna who was lynched by the mob after Caesar's death is said to have been a poet. Z. summarizes other arguments (stressing especially the necessity for the poet to have been alive when Vergil wrote *Buc.* IX. 35) and adds new stylistic arguments to justify the omission of *ποιητικός* from the text. F. Marx, *de Antigoniae exordio Sophocleae*, emends l. 3 τὸ ποίον: l. 53 ὅπως: l. 24 χωρθεῖσα γαῖα: and (reading in schol. Aristoph. *Ran.* 1344 εἶπε δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τινὶ τῶν δι<ορθω>θέντων on the basis of the compendium in *Parisinus* S. of Demosthenes) approves or suggests the excision of ll. 10, 14, 46, 69-70, 84-87.

N.F. LXXXI. 2. 1932.

G. N. Hatzidakis, *Zur Beurteilung der homerischen Sprache*. H. points to the lack of agreement in modern accounts of the dialect, and suggests that the same lays

were originally sung in both Aeolic and Ionic, thus eventually producing a mixed form. The κλέφτικα τραγούδια of modern Greece are an illuminating parallel. E. Loew, *Die Vorsokratiker über Veränderung, Wahrheit, Erkenntnissmöglichkeit*. For Heraclitus a fluctuating reality is understood only by a fluctuating observation: for Parmenides a changeless reality is understood by an immutable reason. Empedocles combined both doctrines. For him, what is changeless (the 'roots') is understood by reason, what is mutable by the senses. Sextus is mistaken in his account of Empedocles. Anaxagoras (ff. 12, 8, 11) criticizes the complete separation from each other of the Empedoclean roots: and maintains that not only must the senses and reason be used in conjunction, but their insufficiency necessitates also the use of δόξα, 'belief' (fr. 4). Again Sextus is in error. The atomists who had learnt much from their predecessors' mistakes on the subject of being and becoming, and the characteristics of the elements, are rightly assessed by Aristotle, but wrongly criticized by Sextus. All these philosophers except Parmenides had theories of sense-perception to correspond with their theory of knowledge. F. Schachermeyr, *Tyrtaios*. An analysis of the subject-matter and style of the poems enables one to divide them into 2 groups, one Spartan and somewhat harsh by T. himself, the other more polished and Ionic. A. Klotz, *Die Bezeichnung der römischen Legionen*. K. denies that the numbering of the legions began only at the end of the Republican period. It was traditional to change the numbers yearly, keeping 1-4 for the consular armies. Polybius omitted them as meaningless for his public: but Fabius Pictor, drawing on official sources, quoted them (e.g. Pol. III. 40. 14). The numbers mentioned throughout Livy are examined in detail. Ph. Finger, *Die drei Grundlegungen des Rechts im I. Buche von Cic. de Legibus*. I. *Die Quelle des Rechts*. §§ 18 and end of 19 are Posidonian with II. § 8: § 19 with II. §§ 11-13 comes from Antiochus: end of § 27 from Panaetius. II. *Das Verhältniss des Menschen zu Gott*. §§ 21-3 are from Posidonius: §§ 24-7 largely from Antiochus; end of § 27 with II. cap. 7 to end of § 16 is from Panaetius. In both sections the doctrines are discussed with reference to the other tenets of these philosophers. M. Boas, *Cato und die Grabschrift der Allia Potestas*. The couplet at the end of the inscription is an early echo of *Dist. Catonis* IV. 39. 2, the correct reading of which is discussed at length. Ch. Hülsen, *Bonifatius—Malifatius*. Bonifatius is the older spelling: Bonifacius, first found in the eighth century, becomes commoner than the former in the thirteenth century, though the former is found until the fifteenth century. The etymology is from bonum fatum = Εὖτυχής, as an inscription with MALIFATE shows.

N.F. LXXXI. 3. 1932.

E. Schwyzer, *Neugriech.* ΒΕΣΣΑ (Chios), *altgriech.* ΒΗΣΣΑ und *Verwandtes*. The place name in Chios. The ε of the place name is proof of original Ionic pronunciation, as in Pontic districts. The meaning and etymology of the word are discussed. R. Hennig, *Ursache des Glaubens an eine adriatische Mündung der Donau*. Goods and ships were transported from the Adriatic to the river Laibach (Nauportus) and thus to the Danube: hence the name of the Laibach, and of the Istri and Istria; and hence the ancient belief, e.g. in the Argonaut-saga. K. Münscher, *Kritische Nachlese zur pseudo-xenophontischen 'Αθηναίων πολιτεία*. Marchant rightly used Mutinensis 145 (c) as one of the basic MSS. of his recension. In 2. 12 εἰ τιες for οἰτιες and οἰ for ἦ should be read from Vat. 1335. There follow notes on eleven places. F. Oertel, *Der Ebrovertrag und der Ausbruch des zweiten punischen Krieges*. A reconsideration of the diplomatic proceedings, from which O. concludes that the Ebro treaty was the basis of the discussions; that the Carthaginians did not wish to dispense with it, for it was a safeguard; and that the lack of sympathy between Senate and Barcids was a factor of some importance. R. Sydow, *Kritische Beiträge zu Ciceros rhetorischen Schriften*. In 7 places of the *de Oratore* S. re-assesses the reading of M: and discusses 8 other places in that work, along with 3 from the

Brutus and 2 from the *Orator*. Ph. Finger, *Die drei Grundlegungen des Rechts im I. Buch von Ciceros Schrift de legibus*.—in conclusion. 3. *Das Verhältniss der Menschen untereinander* §§ 28-32, 42-3, 36-9 are from Antiochus. §§ 33-4 are Posidonian. Traces of Panaetius occur in §§ 32 and 35. 4. *Das Verhältniss des Menschen zu Recht und Gesetze*. §§ 49-52 are from Antiochus: §§ 42-7 are Posidonian: §§ 40-1, 48-9 are from Panaetius. Finally: §§ 58 and 61-2 are from Posidonius on the theme 'Self-knowledge': §§ 59-60 on the same subject are from Antiochus. R. Chr. W. Zimmermann, *Die Ursachen von Ovids Verbannung*. There is little to connect Ovid's banishment with that of Julia. Augustus proceeded secretly with him, openly with Julia and Silanus; Julia was recalled, while Ovid was kept in exile by Tiberius. Consequently the connection seems unlikely. Tiberius' harshness to Ovid suggests that his exile may have been due to Livia's influence. Perhaps O. was privy to a plot to rehabilitate Postumus: and the *Ars* ran counter to Augustus' legislation on marriage. K. v. Fritz, *Aufbau und Absicht des Dialogus de Oratoribus*. Starting from a consideration of the 2 lacunae, v. F. traces the characterization of the speakers and the spirit of the dialogue, which he considers a supreme example of its kind. The second lacuna (cap. 40) he considers non-existent, the repetitions and contradictions being part of the characterization of Maternus. A. Oxé, *Inscript eines römischen Bronzeschreins*. Gives parallels to the inscr. *Ponis aut pídico te* and refers to Hor. *Epist.* I. 16, 35-8. Fr. Marx, *De Horatii poetae praenomine*. MSS. and Inscriptions show that it should be written *Quinctus*.

N.F. LXXXI. 4. 1932.

A. H. Krappe, 'Επειός. K. accepts Kuhn's equivalation with the Indo-Aryan Saranyû, mother of the Aṇvins: emphasizes and interprets the occurrence of twins (fertility) and horses (death) in both mythologies: and compares also the Walkyre. A. Kocevalov, *Die Einfuhr von Getreide nach Athen*. Dem. c. *Lept.* 31 ff. and Strabo VII. 4. 6. M. Rothstein, *Cäsar über Brutus*. An analysis of the circumstances in which Cic. *ad Att.* XIV. 1 and 2 were written. *Magni refert hic quid velit, sed quidquid volet, valde volet* (the *volt* of the editions must be corrected) was said in Nicaea in the autumn of 47 B.C., and shows that Caesar had observed an incalculable element in Brutus' character, as well as determination and energy in action. His realization of personal danger must date back to the same occasion. W. Ensslin, *Zu den Res Gestae Divi Augusti*. I. Zu c. 18, III. 40 ff. Discussion of Augustus' dealings with the corn-supply of Rome: and of his *patrimonium, res privata, hereditates* etc. II. *Zur Abfassung der Res Gestae*. Neither the order of the recipients of *congiaria* etc. in c. 15, nor the diversity of terms for the monetary unit, nor yet the difference in nomenclature is sufficient to support the theory of a rehandling of the document. Yet other evidence points to an original composition immediately after 2 B.C. and a rehandling in 11 A.D. III. Zu c. 13, II. 44. *Prius quam nascerer* is an intentionally suggestive phrase, to be connected with Verg. *Ecl.* IV., his interest in his horoscope, etc. Ch. Hülsen, *Neue Fragmenta der Acta Ludorum Saecularium von 204 A.D.* A description of and commentary on the new fragments (*Notizie* 1932: pp. 313-45), with complete text, including the older fragments (*Eph.* VII. 1892: C.I.L. VI. 32323-32335). Fr. Marx, *De dignitate et ordine casuum nominis substantivi*. The gen. takes precedence of the abl. in Latin down to the second century A.D.

LXXXII. 1. 1933.

A. Klotz, *Silius Italicus' Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges*. In a score of places where Silius disagrees with Livy, poetic licence, especially with proper names, is in question. In many places however Silius is supported by another authority: and in those places where he agrees with a variant account in Livy, the variant comes from Valerius Antias. Coelius seems not to have been used by

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Silius. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchstudien. X. Zu Aemilius-Timoleon*. Discusses *Aem.* 9, 3: 12, 7: 30, 2-3: and concludes that the MSS. of group Z, which alone fill in the lacunae, do so by conjecture. 23 places are then examined in detail in amplification of his edition. XI. *Die 'Dioskuren' von Samothrake*. The Διοσκούρους of *Aem.* 23 fin. is by conjecture of MSS. of group Z (see above): the 'great gods' are not equivalated by Plut. with the Dioscuri but with the Κάβειροι (*Marcell.* 30, 6), and Κάβειρος is here the best emendation. The lacuna perhaps results from Christian bowdlerization. The passage has therefore much less value than is commonly supposed for the equivalation of Kabeiroi and Dioscuri. XII. Δοκρικὰ ἄσματα. A discussion of *Tim.* 14, 3. Ziegler concludes that Dionysius taught 'on the subject of the ἀρμονία of the Δοκρικὰ ἄσματα' and discusses various emendations. XIII. ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑ ΤΙΜΟΛΕΟΝΤΟΣ? A discussion of *Tim.* 30, 9. Ziegler accepts ὁμολογούμενος. H. Gomoll, *Caecilius' Stellung zu den σχήματα διαβολας*. Compares Quint. *Inst. Orat.* IX. 1. 10 ff. with Caecilius frg. 103 (Ofenloch) for the doctrine of 2 types of σχήματα—natural and artificial: and concludes that Caecilius was a follower of Apollodorus. The connection with Alexander *περὶ σχημάτων* (*Rh. Gr.* III. p. 11, 20 Sp.) and Dion. Hal. *de comp. verb.* p. 32, 7 (Us.-Rad.) is discussed. Tiberius and *περὶ ὕψ.* 16-18 are not dependent on Caecilius. U. Hoefer, *Die Periegesis des sog. Skymnos*. A study of the sources based on a detailed analysis of vv. 470-980 and vv. 215-397. P. Wahrmann, *Zu Catalepton V*. Münscher's *rhoezo* at *Catal.* V. 2 was anticipated by J. M. Stowasser of Vienna, who quoted in support *Anth. Pal.* V. 222.

LXXXII. 2. 1933.

R. Philippson, *Hierocles der Stoiker*. Suggestions on the form of his book and on middle-stoic influence. F. Atenstädt, [*Apollodorus*] *περὶ γῆς*. Eratosthenes was the chief, if not the only, source for the author. At. agrees with Diels that the work is not by Apollodorus. C. Fries, *Zur Vorgeschichte der platonischen Dialogform*. Asserts direct Indian influence on the 'Socrates-legend' and on the form of the Platonic dialogue. K. Praechter, *Zur antiken Literatur über Kraniche und Pygmäen*. Discusses Favorinus *περὶ φνγῆς* Col. 10, 11 ff. in connection with Hennig's article *Rhein. Mus.* 81, 20-4. L. Weber, *Apollon*. The interpretation follows the suggested route taken by the cult of Apollo on its way from Phrygia to Delphi. The Hyperborean tradition, the myths of Admetos etc. are interpreted (to be continued). F. Marx, *ad Dioscuridis Musivum*. Recognizes on the mosaic (cf. *Rhein. Mus.* 79, 197) the figure of a slave-page with a wine cup and refers to Men. *Synar.* 451 κ.

LXXXII. 3. 1933.

L. Weber, *Apollon*. Analyses Delian cult, and the Hyperborean tradition: similarities with Delphic cult are stressed: and finally it is shown how the traditional incursion of Mysians and Teucrians into Europe served as a vehicle for the dispersion of Apolline cult, whose original source W. finds in Crete. F. Marx, *Musik aus der griechischen Tragödie*. In *Hor. serm.* I, 3, 7 ff. the singer would sing the cry from *Eur. Bacch.* 578, 'first on the lowest note, then on the highest that sounds in the tetrachord,' i.e. on g and c'. A summary description of Greek music follows. W. Schwahn, *Die attische εισφορά*. I. Solon's tax was an Income Tax: the first capital levy was Themistocles 479-7. The system is described, and the regular graded income-tax system of Nausinikos 378-7 also. II. An analysis of the economic basis of the earlier agrarian Attica. III. A similar analysis for Periclean Athens. Sch. insists that at this time Attica as a whole 'was worth' 50,000 talents. IV. IV century changes. V. In *Polyb.* II 62, 6 τίμημα = income, not capital valuation. E. Bickel, *Ein Motiv aus Lucan bei E. M. Arndt*. Adduces reasons for thinking that *Der Gott der Eisen wachsen liess* is a conscious imitation of *Luc. IV, 579*.

LXXXII. 4. 1933.

W. Kubitschek, *Zur Geographie der Argonautensage*. Notes springing from Hennig's article *Rhein. Mus.* 81, 204. The first syllable of 'Nau-portus' must refer to the Argo in particular. In Tac. and Strabo the name is that of a place not a river. The *Tab. Pent.* gives the Danube an outlet to the Adriatic as well as the Black Sea, and the sources of this mistake are traced. O. Immisch, *Die Sphragis des Theognis*. Supports the view that the σφρηγίς was an actual seal proving authenticity. W. Judeich, *Zur ionischen Wanderung*. The origin of the Ionic Confederation was at the beginning of the first millennium B.C. It was in form an Amphictiony and was promoted by the religious cult rather than political considerations. W. Heraeus, *Ein Textproblem in einem Zwölftafelgesetz*. Adds to his note in *Palaeographia Latina* IV. 5 ff. on *i a = in alio* as an intrusive marginal formula introducing a variant in the *Mediceus* of Livy (4 places), Gellius XVI, 10, 5; XVI, 10, 1; XIII, 28, 4. *Esse futurum : esse fuit* etc. in the text of Vitruvius he suggests is a similar wrong resolution of a compendium *ē ē* (= *emend.*) *fut* :—a marginal note that emendation must be here resumed. R. Sydow, *Kritische Beiträge zu Ciceros Tusculanen*. Detailed suggestions on the text. A. Rosenberg, *Aristoteles über Diktatur und Demokratie*. Discusses (a) the order and dates of composition of the various books : (b) the interpretation of book III. Ch. Huelsen, *Neue Fragmente der Fasti Ostienses*. Photograph, description, and detailed annotation of the continuation of *CIL*. XIV 4531-46 published by Calza : *Notizie* 1932, 188 ff. C. Horna, *de Athenaei codice Marciano*. New readings from the first page of the ms. Fr. Marx, *Choerili Samii prohoemium*. Notes on the lines printed in *Anon. et Stephani in artem rhet. comment.*, p. 328.

LXXXIII. 1. 1934.

K. Ziegler, *Plutarch-Studien*. XIV. Discusses places in the *Sertorius* and *Eumenes*. XV. description and history of the Heidelberg Plutarch *Palat.* 168, 169. E. Bethe, *Ekkyklema und Thyroma*—a correction of the author's previous opinions. The text of 5th cent. plays, our only valid evidence, demands a means of revealing an inner scene, which is often quite extensive, by an opening in the back of the stage rather than an ekkyklema. Hellenistic practice has deceived the scholiasts, Pollux etc. Only a portion of the scene was opened, the Hellenistic *θυρώματα* are to be accepted for the 5th cent. and allow for changes of scenery etc. K. Hinze, *Zwei heimatberaubte spartanische Dichter*. Four 'Dorisms,' the 2nd person plurals, and the spirit of the verses show beyond doubt that Tyrtaios was a Spartan : and his imperatives that he was a 'Führer.' Alcmān's Doric, his 'Spartan' economy of words, and the varying grammarians' tradition show that he too was a Spartan. The *Partheneion* was not part of a *καθαρμός*. W. Heraeus, *Furius Pilus u. a. (zu Ciceros Brutus)*. In *Brut.* 258 a third name (L. Furius Pilus) should be included, and in 178 the cognomen of Q. Lucretius should be Afella. A. Klotz, *Geographie und Ethnographie in Caesars Bellum Gallicum*. A reconsideration of the attitude adopted in *Phil. Woch.* 1931, 373 ff.

LXXXIII. 2. 1934.

W. Büchner, 'Ὁρσοθήρη : X 126-46. ὄρσ. = a balcony. The staircase, *λαύρα*, and the various rooms are located. K. v. Fritz, *Zur Interpretation des Aias*. On v. 646 ff. There is here some wilful deception—to secure privacy. Aj. feels himself in a world of deceit and might in which his own simplicity is helpless. There is no 'repentance,' but a feeling of helpless loneliness compels suicide : hence his deception. W. Schur, *Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tod*. The crown council in Babylon had arranged for 1 king (Al.'s son), 2 regents and 2 colleagues in charge of European territory. After the army's insistence on Philip Arrhidaeus as king the duplication of the chief executive offices was maintained, as also in the arrangements made after Perdikkas' death. R. Hennig, *Kulturgeschichtliche Studien zu Herodot.* Hdt. IV, 179 : Triton originally was the deity who controlled the tides of the lesser

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Syrtes (known as a lake). R. Philippson, *Die Götterlehre der Epikureer*. A criticism of Merlan's paper *Hermes* 68, 196 ff., centring round the interpretation of Philodem. *περὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν διαγωγῆς* Col. 10, 2 ff. Ch. Huelsen, *Neue Fragmente der Scriptorum Hist. Aug.* The three quotations found by Crous (*Röm. Mitt.* XLVIII 1 ff.) in Marliani are vulgar errors of the Renaissance. M. Boas, *Potentatus*. The 4 earlier uses of the word show that it was a catchword at the end of the Republic: and always implies the extraordinary exercise by a single person of authority normally shared with another. As used by jurists etc. from the III cent. A.D. it is a synonym of *potentia*.

LXXXIII. 3. 1934.

Chr. Jensen, *Aristoteles in der Auge des Machon*. Reconstructs *Herc. voll. coll. alt.* VIII 163 fr. I. (the first fr. of Philodemus *περὶ ποιημάτων* bk V) and elucidates the ref. to Machon's *Auge*. R. Hennig, *Kulturgeschichtliche Studien zu Herodot.* Corrects Hdt.'s account of Cambyses' expedition against the Aethiopians by the inscr. of the Nubian king. C. was not mad: and transport and supplies had been attended to. Hdt. III 32 cannot apply to the Niger. It may be the 'Wadi esch Scherki' and this may also be the stream of Aesch. *Pr. V.* 809-11. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchstudien*. Places are discussed in the *Philopoemen* and *Titus* and in the *Pelopidas* and *Marcellus*. XVII. The Academic opponents of tyranny from Megalopolis (P.W. XV 143) should be called *Ekdelos* and *Demophanes*. The relationship between Polybius, Plutarch, and Pausanias is involved in the argument. A. Klotz, *Ein römische Verlustliste*. Livy 37: 44: 1 and App. *Syr.* 36 (the losses after Magnesia) are derived via Polybius from a Rhodian source which embodied an official Roman report. The exaggerations are due to that report. E. Diehl, *Das saeculum, seine Riten und Gebete*. (1) *Saec.* originally = *phallus* (cf. *genus*). (2) The evidences for an Etruscan 'natural' century with rites at its inception. (3) The Roman custom of reckoning in periods of 100 years, e.g. for driving the nail. (4) Evidences for the Greco-Roman Festival begun in 249 on the basis of the Sibylline literature (to be continued). R. Sydow, *Kritische Beiträge zu Cicero de Officiis*. F. Marx, *Critica et hermeneutica I.* would add τῶν θεῶ ἀθάνατοι, μάκαρες, δωτήρες ἐδῶν or something like it after *Od.* VII 185. A. Kocevalov, *Zur Deutung eines neulich herausgegebenen knidischen Stempels*. Reads the inscr. (from Olbia) [ἐπὶ] Ἀγαθοκλεῦς καὶ τοῦ ἱερέως: 'when A. was both magistrate and priest.'

LXXXIII. 4. 1934.

A. Klotz, *Die Quellen der plutarchischen Marcellus*. The chief sources are: cap. 3-8 either Livy or Antias, cap. 9-11: 21-30 Antias, cap. 13-19 Polybius. F. Bölte, *Ein pythisches Epos*. The geographical details of *Il.* XII 670 ff. are elucidated. Concludes that the passage was originally composed in the neighbourhood before the great migrations. E. Diehl, *Das saeculum, etc.* (continued). Consideration of all the notices of Imperial secular festivals, their ritual and formulae. Fr. Marx, *Critica et hermeneutica*. Notes on *Φ.* 161, *Ion.* ap. *Eucl. scrip. mus.* VIII 216, *Plaut. Casina* 364, *Lucilius* 802, *Hor. Epod.* 16: 1-2.

Rivista di Filologia. N.S. XII. (1934), 1.

A. Rostagni, *Dalle varianti blandiniane e dalle presunte interpolazioni in Orazio, in Virgilio, ecc., alle recensioni critiche di Probo*. The author argues that these peculiar variants (especially *Sat.* I, 6, 126; 3, 130) are authentic. Their preservation may be due to M. Valerius Probus. Similar variants introduced by editors who had access to original corrections made by the authors are to be recognized in Persius (*I.* 121) and in Virgil (*Aen.* XII, 605)—the latter is expressly assigned to Probus by Servius. R. further suggests that the eight lines at the beginning of *Sat.* I, 10 are Horatian but were rejected by Horace himself. P. Frezza, *Il Consortium ercto non cito e i nuovi frammenti di Gaio*. F. discusses the new fragment of Gaius (*P.S.I.* 1182)

about *dominium non divisum*, and illustrates with reference to the scholia on the *Basilica* the changes which the legal system of Justinian made in the classical doctrine of *societas*. As *dominium non divisum* was not a form of contract depending upon *consensus*, it was dropped. G. De Sanctis, *Epigraphica*: X. *Ancora intorno alla Magna Charta di Cirene*. XI. *Ancora sul padre dell'imperatore Theodosio*. De Sanctis subjects this difficult document to a renewed investigation in the light of the text established by Oliviero and offers a new elucidation of the property qualifications demanded of the third category of full citizens—together with their wives they must possess χρήματα μὴ ἀθάνατα to the value of 40 minae. In the second study the author discusses again (cf. *Rivista*, 1930, 480 ff.) the epigram in honour of Count Theodosius and accepts the revision of N. Vulić in l. 9, Βριτανῶν for Δαρδάνων, a great improvement. Q. Cataudella, *Sui novi frammenti degli scolii fiorentini agli Aitria di Callimaco*. With reference to this recent discovery (*Bull. Soc. arch. d'Alexandrie*, 1933, 123 ff.) C. discusses, firstly, the literary polemics of Callimachus (cf. A. Rostagni, *Rivista*, 1933, 189 ff.), noting the absence of any mention of Apollonius in the scholia, and the interpretation of the prologue of the Aitria (*P. Oxy.* XVII, 2079), secondly, the Aitriov of the Lindians (the sacrifice to Heracles, μετὰ καταρῶν), illustration of which he finds in a scholiast on Gregory Nazianzenus (*Adv. Iul.* IV, 103). A. Rostagni, *Nuovi frammenti callimachei nel contesto degli Aitria*. Frag. 2 of Vitelli's publication (*Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*, 1934) has two Aitria dealing with the sacrifices to Apollo at Anaphe and to Heracles at Lindos (cf. the new scholia). In Frag. 1 compared with already existing fragments (Schm. 155, 12 and 122) the Aitriov about the sacrifice to the Charites at Paros can be recognized. M. Guarducchi, *Intorno all'epigramma cnosio di Tharsymachos*. The occasion of this epigram (*S.G.D.I.* 5074), which records a cavalry-battle near Elaion, can be assigned to Philopoemen's last fight in 183/2 B.C. (cf. Plut., *Philopoemen* 18). *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Cronache e commenti. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

N.S. XII. (1934), 2.

G. De Sanctis, *La pace del 362/1*. A discussion of the κοινὴ εἰρήνη after Mantinea. De Sanctis suggests that its importance has been exaggerated by Taeger (*Der Friede von 362/1*, Stuttgart, 1930). Both Taeger and his critic Berve (*Gnomon*, 1933, 301 ff.) hold that the peace included a συμμαχία—wrongly. Taeger is right, however, in referring *S.I.G.*³, 182 to this peace. The character and exact date of this document—a reply sent to the Great King, not to the revolted satraps. S. Pappink, *De Diodori codice antiquissimo*. This is *Cod. Vat.* 996 of XI c., but deriving from a text edited specially for Roman use after Alexander Severus and before the time of Eusebius. Dionysius of Halicarnassus seems to have been treated in the same way, perhaps by the same editor. M. Segre, *Grano di Tessaglia a' Coi*. S. gives two new fragments of the stele published by R. Herzog (*Koische Forschungen*, 1899, 21 ff.). The inscr. records how Cos in a famine got corn from Thessaly. Remarks about two Coan inscr., *I.B.M.* 247 and 336. The stele is to be dated after the Chremonidean war, probably after the Battle of Cos. Evidence about the state of Thessaly at this time. Remarks upon the Mytilenean decree in honour of the Thessalians (cf. L. Robert, *B.C.H.*, 1925, 233). A. Degrassi, ΟΥΕΤΠΑΝΟΙ ΟΙ ΧΩΡΙΣ ΧΑΛΚΩΝ. This concerns the important papyrus (*P.S.I.* 1026) which proves that, normally, men who had served in the legions neither received nor required a diploma. Degrassi argues (against W. Seston, *Rev. de phil.*, 1933, 375 ff.) that the οὐετπανοὶ οἱ χωρὶς χαλκῶν of two papyri (Wilcken, *Chrest.* 458-9) are not legionary veterans but veterans of the auxilia or of the fleets. Remarks about *missio causaria* (cf. the new diploma from Bulgaria (*Ann. ép.*, 1932, 27), and about νομίμη ἀπόλυσις. S. Accame, *Decimo Bruto dopo i funerali di Cesare*. Most scholars have referred the crucial letter *Ad fam.* XI, 1 to the interval between the murder of Caesar and his burial. B. R. Motzo ('Caesariana et Augusta,' *Annali della Fac. di Fil. e Lett. della R. Univ. di Cagliari*,

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1933, 36 ff.) has recently argued for a much later date, April 9th. Accame seeks to prove that the letter should be dated soon after the funeral, probably March 21st or 22nd. The extreme dejection of D. Brutus is to be explained by Antony's behaviour at the funeral. R. Mondolfo, *Note sull' Eleatismo*. Discusses the philosophy of Parmenides with reference to and in criticism of the views of G. Calogero, *Studi sull' eleatismo*, Rome, 1932. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Cronache e commenti. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

Wiener Studien. LII. 1934 (published December, 1934).

ABHANDLUNGEN: A. Lesky, *Die Niobe des Aischylos*, examines published theories about the newly discovered fragments and argues, with Vitelli-Norsa, that the lines belong to the middle of the play and were all spoken by Niobe. A. Wilhelm, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Πόποι*, attacks Schwahn's theory (*Rhein. Mus.* 1931, p. 258 f.) that the author of the Πόποι was not Xenophon, but Eubulus or one of his colleagues. In an appendix he deals with the fragments of Lysias' speech against Theozotides. (*Hibeh Papyri* I p. 49). J. Mesk, *Galens Schriften über Nutzen und Schaden der Nahrungsmittel*, attempts to date the three principal books that Galen devotes to the subject. W. Kraus, *'Ad spectatores' in der römischen Komödie*, examines under four heads the nature and causes of 'out of character' remarks and allusions in Plautus and Terence. M. Schuster, *Lukrezlesungen*, proposes *gnaris* for *magnis* (iii. 962) and defends *permanent* (i. 122), *uariogue* (ii. 825), *nam procul haec dubio nobis simulacra geruntur* (iii. 433), *belua* (iv. 140), *avidam* (v. 201), *accidere* (v. 609), *pueris* (v. 888), *parent* and *possint* (v. 1266), *quippe etenim* (vi. 209), *culmine* (vi. 296), *perfringit* (vi. 350), *loci opus efficit* (vi. 755), *cunctere* and *et fueris* (vi. 799-800). K. Jax, *Die Stellung der Handschriften S und L in der Cäsarüberlieferung*, shows by examples and statistics that *codices Ashburnhamianus* and *Lovaniensis* deserve more attention than they have received. L. Radermacher, *Caecilius von Kaleakte oder Verrius Flaccus bei Quintilian?*, advocates (Quint. VIII. 3. 35) the rejection of *Caecilius* (late MSS.) in favour of *Cincius*, derived from *Cincilius* (old MSS.), and discusses the way in which Quintilian used sources. E. Schuchter, *Zum Predigstil des hl. Augustinus*, describes the rhetorical characteristics of St. Augustine's style and discusses their significance.

MISZELLEN. L. Radermacher proposes in Bacchylides III. 7 ὄλβιον [τέκος, 10 ἐὸδ[αίμων] ἔφν, and new restorations in 40-46. K. Horna argues that lacunae in the extant MSS. of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* of Aristotle show that the archetype was written in lines containing 35 to 45 letters. K. Berg cites statistics of certain test words and constructions to prove that the *Magna Moralia* is a later work than the *Nicomachean* or *Eudemean Ethics*. R. Rau attempts a solution of the difficulties of Caesar, *B.G.* vii. 36-44. K. Prinz argues against an allegorical interpretation of Virgil's second Eclogue. R. Hanslik argues that Pliny, *Epp.* V. 1 was originally written not later than 96 A.D., but was revised and published after 101 A.D. E. Hauler improves the text of Fronto 195. 12 ff. and 198. 3 ff. (Naber) on the strength of the Ambrosian palimpsest. M. Schuster cites literary and stylistic evidence for placing Minucius Felix after Cyprian. V. Bulhart makes some observations on the use of *ille* preliminary to a discussion of the word in the Thesaurus. L. Radermacher cites Plato, *Protagoras* 337c with reference to *Wien. Stud.* L p. 180.

LANGUAGE.

Indogermanische Forschungen. LII. (1934). 2.

H. Dempe examines the manifestations of national spirit in language; he considers it a determining factor. H. Jensen discusses methods of expressing comparison in general, the function of the unmodified adj. form as 'elative,' the superl., the psychological value of comparison-groupings for formation of comp. and superl., the I.Eu. suffixes and their meanings. E. Lewy: I.Eu. words showing 'long'

diphthongs. A. Debrunner: on the inflexion of *i*-stems in O. Pers. O. Beke: on Germanic names of plants and fishes. E. Schwentner: Alsatian *kniz*, O.H.G. *knellizze* 'gnat, *culex*.' E. Fraenkel: Balt. (Zem.) *paviedus* 'similar,' cf. *Feldesθai*, *ēdos*. Id.: secondary *ai* (in ablaut) in I.Eu. bases containing a nasal or liquid; *ei* alternating with *en*, *er* etc. H. Krahe: on a Germ. Runic insc. Reviews.

LII. (1934). 3.

E. Otto discusses some of the more important questions of general linguistics. M. Plancherel: on the cultivation of the native language in school. M. Regula examines several recent theories of the so-called impersonal forms. H. Krahe: a note on the Runic inscription (genuine?) of the Kehrlich fibula. V. Bertoldi: modern parallels to the Messapic place name *Brundisium*. E. Hermann: a note on the relationship of Skt. *mahyam* (**megh-* from **mebh-* by dissimilation) and Latin *mihi* (**meghi*). Id. on Germanic *ek*, *mih*. M. Runes sees in *μέροψ* a **μέρος* 'fate' cf. *μόρος*, *κάσμορος* · *δύστηνος* (Hesych.). A. Tzartanos explores the history of mod. Gr. *οἶζο*. G. Bonfante, accepting Hittite as I.Eu. (in the strict sense) writes a note on its classification (on the basis of the words for 'fire' and 'water'). C. C. Uhlenbeck discusses the case functions of the Dakota (N. Am. Ind.) pronominal forms. A. Debrunner on *custōs* (Goth. *kuzd*) holds that the *u* is short, and explains (cf. Walde-Hofmann) as participial **qudā-to-* (cf. *κεύθω*) in origin with an extension -*ōd-* (cf. *χρωστής*, and *herēs* with -*ēd-*). Reviews.

LII. (1934). 4.

H. Amman supplements his review of de Saussure's *Grundfragen der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft* with a long critical estimate of some of the fundamental ideas underlying that work. H. Frisk discusses compounds in I.Eu. languages of the type represented in Greek by *ἀκρόπολις*, in Latin by *angiportus*, with the object of explaining Hom. *ἀμυχθαλόεις*. As to this (1) he argues that it is not from **ἀμύχθαλος*, nor for **ἀμικτο-θαλόεις*, but derived directly from *ἀμικτον θάλος*, cf. Lat. *plenilunium*: *plena luna*; though (2) *φαιδιμοίεις*: *φαιδιμος* suggests that *ἀμυχθαλόεις* may stand in direct relation to some adj. (not noun) such as **ἀμυχθαλής* which was rejected in favour of the metrical *ἀμυχθαλόεις*. J. Erdödi explains Magyar *föld* 'earth' (cf. for the meaning Skt. *ṛgthivī*, a meaning not found in Germanic) as a borrowing made in Indo-Iranian times, and not, at a more recent date, from Germanic. There would appear to be phonological difficulties in this view.

LIII. (1935). 1.

H. V. Velten relates the results of an enquiry into the relation between phonetic symbols and meaning; between word and sentence; between expressions of 'concept' and expressions of 'relation.' A. Debrunner defends Ved. *akṣibhyām* (for **akṣābhyām*) as arising from the nom.-acc. dual *akṣī* 'the two eyes' against the account given in *Vedic Variants*. V. Pisani publishes a number of etymologies, most of them unconvincing: *sugillare* (Non.) for **sigillare* by popular association with *sūcus* (!); (*s*)*tritaneus* for **struti-*, cf. O.Ir. *sruith* 'old' (!); *contaminare* from **contāmen*, **contāre*, **contos*, this the ptc. of **cono*, **queno*, cf. *inguinare*; *Τρισαύλης* cf. *αἶλαξ*; *Δαμιθαλής* is 'ὁ ἐν χθονὶ θάλλον' (Δᾱ- cf. Δᾱμᾱτηρ); *ἐπαγίζω* and *καταγίζω*, cf. *αἶγες* *κύματα*; *κόμβος* (κομβίων) Macedonian for γόμφος; *iunipeno-*, cf. *iuncus*, **ioiniqwo-s* (an *es*-stem). Idem: notes on the Sicel. inscr., *P.I.D.* ii. 578. R. G. Kent explains the -s in O.U. 3 pl. secondary ending -ns from -m(e)s 1 pl., -l(i)s 2 pl. Idem: Pael. *lexe* is pres. inf., not 2 pl. pf., *lifar* impersonal (rather multipersonal) med.-pass. ('whom it concerns to read this' *pūus ecie lexe lifar*). W. Krogmann derives Goth. *leitils* from a Germanic **lit-*, I.Eu. **elej-* (W.-P. i. 156 ff.). Reviews.

AESCH
Aesch
Aesch
mon
Aesch
Aristo
met
Aristo
192
Arthm
Attic
rela

Box, 1
39 f.

Camp
and
Agas
Cary,
Comic
of O
corrig
Graig.

Daviso

Eichho
Eryx
enim, n
Eryxia
Euripi

geomet
first
gerund
Paneg
Gow, A
critu
Greek
Greek

Herodo

Jackson
52 ff.

Laidlaw
48 ff.
later C

OCT 28 1954

INDICES

I.—GENERAL INDEX.

- AESCHYLEAN image, an, 38
 Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1148, 168 ff.
 Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1223-38 and treacherous monsters, 25 ff.
 Aeschylus *Choephoroi* 225-230, notes on, 83 f.
 Aristotle's account of first principles, geometrical method and, 113 ff.
 Aristotle's *Poetics*, the origins and methods of, 192 ff.
 Arthmius of Zeleia, 177 ff.
 Attic Comedy (Old), Comic fragments in their relation to the structure of the, 181 ff.
- Box, H., Philo in *Flaccum* 131 (M. 2 p. 536), 39 f.; corrigendum, 124
- Campbell, A. Y., Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1223-38 and treacherous monsters, 25 ff.; Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1148, 168 ff.
 Cary, M., Arthmius of Zeleia, 177 ff.
 Comic fragments in their relation to the structure of Old Attic Comedy, the, 181 ff.
 corrigenda: Box, H., 124; Gow, A. S. F., 149
 Craig, J. D., Terentiana, 41 ff.
- Davison, J. A., Simonides fr. 13 Diehl, 85 ff.
- Eichholz, D. E., the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Eryxias*, 129 ff.
enim, notes on the prosody of, 48 ff.
Eryxias, the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, 129 ff.
 Euripides, some new readings in, 164 ff.
- geometrical method and Aristotle's account of first principles, 113 ff.
 gerundive as future participle passive in the *Panegyrici Latini*, 45 ff.
 Gow, A. S. F., notes on the fifth idyll of Theocritus, 65 ff.; corrigendum, 149
 Greek novelists, the, 52 ff., 96 ff.
 Greek poetry, two notes on, 37 f.
- Herodotus, notes on, 72 ff., 150 ff.
- Jackson, J., the Greek novelists (Miscellanea), 52 ff., 96 ff.
- Laidlaw, W. A., notes on the prosody of *enim*, 48 ff.
 later Comic chorus, the, 1 ff.
- Lawson, J. C., notes on Aeschylus *Choephoroi* 225-230, 83 f.
 Lee, H. D. P., geometrical method and Aristotle's account of first principles, 113 ff.
- Maguinness, W. S., the gerundive . . . in the *Panegyrici Latini*, 45 ff.
 Maidment, K. J., the later Comic chorus, 1 ff.
- Nicomachean *Ethics*, book VIII, notes on three passages from, 171 ff.
- Panegyrici Latini*, the gerundive . . . in, 45 ff.
 Percival, G., notes on three passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, book VIII, 171 ff.
 Philo: in *Flaccum* 131 (M. 2 p. 536), 39 f.
 Powell, J. E., notes on Herodotus, 72 ff., 150 ff.
 pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Eryxias*, the, 129 ff.
- Roberts, C. H., some new readings in Euripides, 164 ff.
- Sappho, the second ode of, 37 f.
 Simonides fr. 13 Diehl, 85 ff.
 Solmsen, F., the origin and methods of Aristotle's *Poetics*, 192 ff.
- SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS:
 American Journal of Philology, 58, 125
 Athenaeum, 58 f.
 Classical Philology, 60, 125 f., 202
 Eranos, 126, 202 f.
 Hermathena, 60 f.
 Hermes, 126 ff., 203 f.
 Indogermanische Forschungen, 215 f.
 Mnemosyne, 61 f., 204 f.
 Neue Jahrbücher, 62, 205
 Philological Quarterly (Iowa), 205
 Philologus, 62, 205 f.
 Revue de Philologie, 63 f., 206 f.
 Rheinisches Museum, 207 ff.
 Rivista di Filologia, 64, 213 ff.
 Wiener Studien, 215
 Zeitschr. f. vgl. Sprachforschung, 128
- Terentiana, 41 ff.
 Theocritus, notes on the fifth idyll of, 65 ff.
 Thomson, G., two notes on Greek poetry, 37 f.
- Whittaker, M., the Comic fragments in their relation to the structure of Old Attic Comedy, 181 ff.

II.—INDEX LOCORVM.

Achilles Tatius :—

- i. (3), 54; (4), 98; (11), 101; (12), 54; (15), 101
- ii. (2), 52 f.; (9), 57; (11), 53 f.; (22), (37), 101
- iii. (6), 103; (7), 55; (8), 108
- iv. (1), 57; (8), 109; (11), 109 f.; (12), 100; (13), 57, 104; (18), 101, 108
- v. (13), (22), 108; (23), 101
- vi. (3), 108; (7), 107; (8), 101
- vii. (2), 56; (7), 102 f.; (9), (11), 56
- viii. (3), 105; (6), 71, 97; (6), (7), 105; (8), 97; (9), 103; (10), 101; (11), 97 f.

Aeschines :—

- Ktes.* (121), 30
- in Tim.* (157), 13

Aeschylus :—

- Agam.* (606-8), 29; (1148), 168 ff.; (1223-38), 25 ff.; (1253), 30; (1259), 36
- Choeph.* (225-30), 83 f.; (919-21), 28; (991-6), 31
- P. V.* (140), 38
- Sept.* (418), 34
- Suppl.* (911), 30

Alexis :—

- Kouplis* [Kock, 107], 20
- Trophonius* [Kock, 237], 14

Ammianus Marcellinus :—

- xvi. 12. (22), 45

Antiphanes :—

- [Kock, 191], 7; *Soldier* [Kock, 204], 23

Aristophanes :—

- (fr. 10), 68

Aristotle :—

- Anal. Post.* 73a. (21), 199
- Eth. Eud.* 1237a. (40)-b. (2), 173; 1238a. (30-32), 174
- Eth. Nic.* 1139b. (29), 121; 1140b. (33 ff.), 120; [viii] 1156a. (6-10), 171 ff.; 1156a. (16), 173 f.; 1156b. (17-24), 1158a. (25-27), 174 f.; 1159b. (12-15), 174
- Post.* 1448b. (24 ff.), 197; [vi], 194; 1449b. (9 ff.), 194; 1449b. (27), 198; 1449b. (31), (36), 199; 1450b. (32), 201; [xiv], 192 f.; [xv], 1454a. (37 ff.), 193; 1459b. (7-16), 194 f.; 1459b. (17), 194; [xxiv], 194
- Pol.* iii. 3. (1276b), 2, 13
- Top.* 100b. (3), 121; 100b. (5-14), 120

Athenaeus :—

- xii. 527 (c), 52 f.

Ath. Pol. :—

- (56), 4

Bacchylides :—

- i. (162), 92

Bion :—

- i. (21), 38

Callimachus :—

- Cer.* (124-5), 38

Chariton :—

- i. (8), 96; ii. (1), 99; (11 *fin.*), 54; (12), 56; iii. (2), 102; (8), 57; iv. (4), 96; (6), 102; (7), 57; vi. (2), 55; (6), 103; vii. (4), 100; (6), 100, 102; viii. (4), 54, 104

Cicero :—

- ad Att.* vi. (1), 10

Clement :—

- Paed.* ii. (32), 53

Com. Aesp. :—

- (395), 33

Demosthenes :—

- [21.] (156), 2; *de Cor.* (254-5), 28; *in Lept.* (23), 3, 23

[Dicaearchus] :—

- Aristoph. *Frogs* Arg. (iii), 5

Diodorus :—

- xviii. 33. (3), 106

Diogenes Laertius :—

- i. (101), 157; iii. (62), 141; vi. (70), 147; vii. (102), 144; (103), 133

Ennius :—

- Ann.* (371), 48

Euripides :—

- Antiope*, *Frag. A.* (1), (22), (23), (27), 164; *Frag. B.* (1), (8), (12), (15), 165; (62), 165 f.; (63), (78-9), (85), 166
- Electra* (547-8), 83
- Hecuba* (1277), 29
- Melanippe Vincula* (5), 167
- The Cretans*, 166 f.; (52), 167

Eustathius :—

- Hymn. et Hymn.* i. 5. (7), 52

Fronto :—

- [Naber, p. 243], 29 f.

Heliiodorus :—

- ii. (16), 100 f.; (25), 102; (31), 99; (33), 107; iii. (6), 107; iv. (16), 56; v. (13), 54; vi. (8), 103; vii. (4), 109; (6), 54 f.; viii. (8), 103 f.; (17), 104; ix. (10), 100; x. (7), 103; (14), (32), 106

Herodotus :—

- i. 67. (4), 98. (4), 72; i. 117. (3), 120. (1), 73; i. 137. (1), 155; i. 152. (3), 157; i. 164. (1), 72; i. 185. (6), 73 f.; i. 214. (1), 74
- ii. 15. (3), 74; ii. (16), 74 f.; ii. 99. (1), 78; ii. 100. (3), 108. (2), 75; ii. 110. (2), 116. (6), 76; ii. (117), 76 f.; ii. 125. (1), 127. (2, 3), 77; ii. (143), 147. (1), 78; ii. 148. (1), 155. (1), 80; ii. 155. (2, 3), 81; ii. 156. (5), 81 f.; ii. 163. (2), 169. (1), 79

Herodotus—*continued* :—

- iii. 17. (2), 39. (1), 44. (1), 150; iii. 57. (3), 151; iii. 58. (1), 151 f.; iii. 59. (1), 60. (1), 64. (3, 4), (5), 152; iii. 76. (3), 153; iii. 84. (1), 153 f.; iii. (87), 154; iii. 108. (1), 31; iii. (135), 154; iii. 146. (3), 154 f.; iii. 151. (1), 72; iii. 154. (1), 155; iii. 160. (1), 163
iv. 67. (2), 120. (3, 4), 156; iv. 127. (4), 145. (4, 5), 157; iv. 146. (2), 158
v. 33. (4), 158; v. (60), 158 f.; v. 92⁸. (1), 92⁷. (2), (100), 159
vi. 40. (1), 159 f.; vi. 40. (2), 160; vi. 100. (3), 158
vii. 13. (2), 76; vii. 15. (3), 16⁷. (1), 161; vii. 184. (2, 3, 5), 185. (3), 162
viii. 50. (1), 108. (1-2), 162; viii. 111. (1), 162 f.
ix. 54. (1), 56. (1), 122. (2), 163.
Homer :—
Il. vii. (474), 38; xi. (760), xvi. (849), 163; xxi. (24-5), 38; xxii. (83-4), 37
Od. ii. (343), 28

I.G. :—

- 971 (c), 3; ii. (585), 13; ii. (973), (1280), 2; ii. (1285), 3; ii. (1289), 23; ii. Suppl. (1280b), 2, 3

Isocrates :—

- Areopag.* (53), 23

Julian :—

- 19 (a), 103

Longus :—

- Daphnis et Chloë*, i. (4), 38; ii. (8), 98; ii. (11), 107; ii. (25), 98; ii. (34), 107 f.; iv. (7), 99; iv. (18), 98
Pastoralia, iii. (12), 111

Lucian :—

- Apol.* (721-2), 39

Lysias :—

19. (29), 2, 4; 19. (42), 21. (1), 21. (2), 21. (4), 2

Menander :—

- (?) *Epiclerus* (Frag. Flor.), 18
Epitrepontes (32), 19; (217 ff.), 20; Cairo frag. (195 ff.), 17. 19; St. Petersburg frag. (3-5), 17
Periceivomene (71 ff.), 17; (231), 19
Samia (269), 19; (271), 18; (331), 19

Mnesimachus :—

- [Kock, 4], 22

Nicander :—

- Ther.* (131), 32

Nonnus :—

- v. (374), (405-7), 38

Oppian :—

- de ven.* i. (497-8), 38

Panegyrici Latini :—

- iv. 24. (2), (7), 45

Papyri :—

- Brit. Mus. Pap. (688), (2822), 12

Pausanias :—

- viii. (16), 56

Philostratus :—

- ep.* (45), 53

Plato :—

- Charm.* 154(D), 56

- Laws*, ii. 654(B), 12

- Phaedo*, 58(E), 35

- Protag.* 348(C), 97

- Rep.* 414(D), 30

Plato Comicus :—

- Zxeval* [Kock, 130], 11

Plautus :—

- Amph.* (333), 49; (838), 50

- Asin.* (688), 49

- Aul.* (500), 49

- Bacch.* (104 ff.), 20; (457), 49

- Capt.* (500), (608), 50

- Cas.* (372), 50

- Curc.* (438), 50

- Men.* (94), (251), 50

- Merc.* (159), (738), 50

- Mil.* (429), 50; (810), 49

- Most.* (245), (551), 50; (888), 49; (1002), 51

- Pers.* (116), 51; (498), (506), 15

- Stich.* (562), 51; (737), 50

- Trim.* (263), 51

- Truc.* (313), 51

Plutarch :—

- Crassus*, xxxii. (4, 5), 31

- Glor. Ath.* 347(e), 15

Scholia :—

- Aristoph. Av.* (1377 ff.), 9

- Aristoph. Ran.* (153), 9; (404), 1, 9

Seneca :—

- Ep.* 87. (22), 143; 117. (9), 145

Simonides :—

- fr. 13 [Diehl], 85 ff.

Solon :—

- fr. 23 [Diehl], 66

Sophocles :—

- Ajax*, (46), 30; (1384 ff.), 77

- O.C.* (16-18), 170; (348-9), 38

Stobaeus :—

- Ecl. Eth.* 95. (9), 145

Terence :—

- Adelph.* (467), 43; (836), 42

- Andr.* (186), 44; (201), (659), (807), 43; (809), 48; (838-9), 41; (893-4), 42

- Eun.* (215), 41; (355), 48; (750-51), 42; (789), 48

- Heaut. Tim.* (4-5), 15; (71-2), 41; (167-173), 20 f.; (589), 42; (596), 42, 44

- Hec.* (192), 43; (745), 44

- Phorm.* (147), 43; (310-11), 42; (445), 43; (909-10), 42

- Theocritus* :—

- v. (14), 65 f.; (89), (90), (100-103), (105-6), 66; (108-11), 67; (138-9), 68 ff.; (143-4),

Theocritus—*continued* :—

(145), 71; xv. (146), 71; xvi. (94-6), 68;
xix. (xxiv.) (36), 38

Theophrastus :—

H.P. iv. 12. (3), 68

Theopompus :

fr. 264 [G.-H.], 52

Timocles :—

(fr. 21), 66; (fr. 25), 13

Virgil :—

Aen. iii. (424-7), 34

Virgil—*continued* :—

Ecl. iii. (66), 66

Vita Aristophanis :—

(11), 12

Vitruvius :—

v. *Praef.* (4), 12

Xenophon :—

Anab. iv. 4 (16), 155; vii. 8. (13), 72

Xenophon Ephesius :—

i. (2), 110 f.; i. (4), 106; i. (15-16), 99; ii.
(1), 99; iii. (4), 99; iii. (6), 96; iv. (2), 99

2

5), 99 ; ii.
iv. (2), 99

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